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PUBLIC WRONGS AND PRIVATE BILLS:
INDEMNIFICATION AND GOVERNMENT
ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC
JAMES E. PFANDER* & JONATHAN L. HUNT†
Students of the history of administrative law in the United States regard the antebellum
era as one in which strict common law rules of official liability prevailed. Yet
conventional accounts of the antebellum period often omit a key institutional feature.
Under the system of private legislation in place at the time, federal government officers
were free to petition Congress for the passage of a private bill appropriating money to
reimburse the officer for personal liability imposed on the basis of actions taken in the
line of duty. Captain Little, the officer involved in one oft-cited case, Little v. Barreme,
pursued this avenue of indemnification successfully. As a result, the ultimate loss
associated with that officer’s good faith effort to enforce federal law fell on the
government rather than on the officer himself.
This paper fills out the picture of government accountability in the early nineteenth
century by clarifying the practice of congressional indemnification. After identifying
cases in which officers sought indemnity from Congress through a petition for private
relief, we examine the way official liability, as administered by the courts, interacted
with private legislation, as administered by Congress, to shape the incentives of
government officers to comply with the law. We find that a practice of relatively routine
indemnification took the sting out of sovereign immunity, a doctrine that key players—
including James Madison and John Marshall—treated as thinly formalistic. We also
find that Congress assumed responsibility for deciding when federal officers were
entitled to indemnity for acts taken in the scope of employment.
The antebellum system thus contrasts sharply with modern government accountability
law. Jurists today tend to regard sovereign immunity as a barrier to relief, rather than
a principle of forum allocation that preserves legislative primacy in the adoption of
money bills. Moreover, courts today often refrain from deciding the question of formal
legality in an effort to strike a proper balance between the victim’s interest in
accountability and the official’s interest in immunity. Whatever the wisdom of the
resulting body of qualified immunity law, the doctrine reflects judicial control of
matters that the early republic had assigned to the legislative branch.
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INTRODUCTION

Many students of administrative law have examined the relatively
strict system of official liability that prevailed during the nineteenth
century.1 No case better illustrates the standards to which federal
government officers were held than Little v. Barreme.2 There, the Supreme
Court affirmed a finding that George Little, a Captain in the United States
Navy, was subject to personal liability for the wrongful seizure of the
Flying Fish, a vessel that was suspected of trading with the French in
violation of federal law. As a consequence of the Court’s decision, Little
was obligated to pay damages, costs, and interest totaling the substantial
sum of $8504.3 Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Marshall acknowledged
both the harshness of the rule and his own initial inclination to protect

1

See, e.g., RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART & WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS
FEDERAL SYSTEM 841–45 (6th ed. 2009) [hereinafter HART & WECHSLER] (exploring
historical and conceptual foundation of sovereign immunity); GREGORY C. SISK, LITIGATION
WITH THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 104–19 (2000) (discussing evolution of federal sovereign
immunity in Supreme Court); David E. Engdahl, Immunity and Accountability for Positive
Governmental Wrongs, 44 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 14–15 (1972) (discussing substantial disfavor of
governmental immunity during nineteenth century); Vicki C. Jackson, Suing the Federal
Government: Sovereignty, Immunity, and Judicial Independence, 35 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV.
521, 556 (2003) (reviewing availability of suits against government officers); James E. Pfander,
Sovereign Immunity and the Right To Petition: Toward a First Amendment Right To Pursue
Judicial Claims Against the Government, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 899, 937 n.138, 966–71 (1997)
(examining rise of government accountability at common law); Ann Woolhandler, Patterns of
Official Immunity and Accountability, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 396, 414–53 (1986) (discussing
emergence of legality and discretionary models of official liability in nineteenth century).
2 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170 (1804).
3 Id. at 175.
AND THE
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Captain Little from liability.4 In a revealing aside, Marshall suggested that
his colleagues on the Court had persuaded him that lenity was inconsistent
with the necessarily strict role the federal courts must play in enforcing
official liability.5 In a well-known companion case, the Marshall Court
likewise upheld the imposition of personal liability on Captain Alexander
Murray for the wrongful seizure of the Danish vessel the Charming Betsy.6
The Little and Murray decisions offer a striking contrast to modern
official accountability rules. Since the latter part of the nineteenth century,
the Court has developed rules of official immunity that may have precluded
the imposition of personal liability on Captains Little and Murray. Today,
officials enjoy immunity from liability as long as they do not violate clearly
established legal rules of which a reasonable person would have known.7
Scholars debate the justifications for this rule of qualified immunity. Some
express concern that the rule undermines the goal of securing compensation
for victims of government lawlessness;8 others note the Court’s suggestion
that officials might shy away from the vigorous performance of their
official duties if they faced the sort of strict liability that the Little and
Murray Court deemed to be essential to government accountability.9 An
increasingly sophisticated literature has grown up around this question of
official liability and immunity, one that considers alternatives to official
immunity and examines the likely impact of liability on the incentives of
government principals and agents.10
4

Id. at 179.
Id.
6 See Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 117 (1804).
7 See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818–19 (1982) (“[G]overnment officials
performing discretionary functions[] generally are shielded from liability for civil damages
insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of
which a reasonable person would have known.”). Earlier decisions recognized privileges from
tort liability based on the common law. See, e.g., Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 570 (1959)
(applying “absolute privilege” to executive officer in context of libel action (citing Spalding v.
Vilas, 161 U.S. 483, 498–99 (1896))). As explored in greater detail in Part IV, later decisions
transformed common law privileges into a federal common law of qualified immunity.
8 See, e.g., Sheldon H. Nahmod, Constitutional Wrongs Without Remedies: Executive
Official Immunity, 62 WASH. U. L.Q. 221 (1984) (criticizing rule of qualified immunity as
reflected in Harlow).
9 See Ronald A. Cass, Damage Suits Against Public Officers, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 1110,
1153–59 (1980) (assessing possibility that official liability may result in overdeterrence of official
action); John C. Jeffries, Jr., The Right-Remedy Gap in Constitutional Law, 109 YALE L.J. 87, 90
(1999) (noting that threat of overdeterrence is important consideration); Woolhandler, supra note
1, at 472–77, 483 (discussing role of legal immunity in structuring officials’ actions). The Court
has expressed similar concerns about overdeterrence of official action. See, e.g., Scheuer v.
Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 240 (1974) (justifying official immunity on ground that liability might
“deter [an officer’s] willingness to execute his office with the decisiveness and the judgment
required by the public good”), abrogated in part by Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
10 See PETER H. SCHUCK, SUING GOVERNMENT: CITIZEN REMEDIES FOR OFFICIAL WRONGS
60–77 (1983) (offering evaluation of power of supervisors to shape incentives of street-level
5
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For all of its theoretical sophistication, the literature on immunity and
accountability reveals little about the way the antebellum legal system
ultimately allocated responsibility for the losses associated with
government wrongs.11 Although scholars have often assumed that officers
were entitled to some form of indemnification, the institutional foundations
of indemnity have escaped sustained attention. For example, in an
important investigation of the use of civil actions to enforce constitutional
rights, Akhil Amar explained that the officers likely viewed indemnity as
an essential part of their contract with the government; otherwise, who
would accept government employment?12 Amar, in turn, cited the work of
David Engdahl, who also assumed the availability of indemnity without
exploring its institutional underpinnings.13 Engdahl observed that officers
might enjoy a right to indemnity, but he noted that the officer’s ability to
enforce such a right would ultimately depend on the government’s
willingness to waive its sovereign immunity so as to allow an indemnity
suit to proceed in the federal courts.14 Others have debated the prevalence
of indemnity as a feature of modern government practice.15 After surveying
these works, Robert Brauneis called for a more careful study of actual

government employees); Cass, supra note 9, at 1174–84 (offering model of “enterprise liability”
as alternative control of official misconduct); Daryl J. Levinson, Making Government Pay:
Markets, Politics, and the Allocation of Constitutional Costs, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 345 (2000)
(exploring potential justification for constitutional compensation remedies other than deterrence
of government misconduct).
11 Scholars have occasionally commented on the harsh rules of Little and Murray without
recognizing that the government indemnified both captains for their losses. See Engdahl, supra
note 1, at 14–15 (discussing Little); Woolhandler, supra note 1, at 415–16 (discussing Murray).
But see Oren Gross, Chaos and Rules: Should Responses to Violent Crises Always Be
Constitutional?, 112 YALE L.J. 1011, 1109–10 (2003) (recognizing that Congress indemnified
Captain Little); Jerry L. Mashaw, Recovering American Administrative Law: Federalist
Foundations, 1787–1801, 115 YALE L.J. 1256, 1328–30 (2006) (relaying story of Jeremiah
Olney, government official during early republic, who anticipated that Congress would indemnify
him for liabilities incurred in line of duty).
12 See AKHIL REED AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: FIRST
PRINCIPLES 20 (1997) (“[E]veryone understood that the real party in interest was the government
itself, which would typically be forced to indemnify officials who were merely carrying out
government policy.”).
13 See id. at 198 n.199 (citing Engdahl, supra note 1, at 17–18); see also Louis L. Jaffe, Suits
Against Governments and Officials: Damage Actions, 77 HARV. L. REV. 209, 227 (1963)
(assuming availability of indemnity).
14 Engdahl, supra note 1, at 18.
15 Compare Carlos Manuel Vázquez, Eleventh Amendment Schizophrenia, 75 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 859, 880–81, 881 n.92 (2000) (assuming routine availability of indemnity in defending
reliance on officer suits under § 1983), with Daniel J. Meltzer, State Sovereign Immunity: Five
Authors in Search of a Theory, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1011, 1020–21 (2000) (doubting that
indemnity practices extend uniformly and operate seamlessly to ensure fully compensatory
awards). See generally John C. Jeffries, Jr., In Praise of the Eleventh Amendment and Section
1983, 84 VA. L. REV. 47 (1998) (defending combination of presumptive indemnity and qualified
immunity as appropriately requiring government to bear cost of official wrongdoing).
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indemnification practices in order to develop a fuller picture of the growth
of qualified immunity doctrine.16
In this Article, we explore the indemnification practices of the early
republic and antebellum periods in greater detail. We find that while the
right to indemnity was understood in contractual terms, the practice of
securing a determination of the right to indemnity almost invariably
entailed the submission of a petition to Congress for the adoption of private
legislation.17 The practice took shape during and immediately after the
Quasi-War with France (1798–1801), when the government of the United
States came under diplomatic pressure to provide compensation to the
owners of neutral Danish vessels. Although the two best known private
bills were those for the relief of Captain Murray in 1805 and Captain Little
in 1807,18 we find that Congress adopted its first private bill of indemnity
in April 1802 and adopted a public act of indemnity as early as 1799.19 We
also find evidence that James Madison, the Secretary of State under
President Jefferson, played a crucial role in establishing the early
institutional practice of indemnification. Madison insisted, as had others
before him, that the Danish owners of the erroneously seized vessels first
secure a judicial resolution of their legal claims before seeking the payment
of compensation from the government. Madison also took the view that
Congress was ultimately responsible for deciding whether to pay the
judgment through the appropriations process.20
After describing in detail its Madisonian origins in the wake of the
Quasi-War, we consider the antebellum practice of congressional
indemnification at a somewhat higher level of abstraction. Using a variety
of tools, we have attempted to identify and analyze cases in which federal
government officers sought indemnity from Congress through a petition for
private relief.21 While the congressional reports we studied did not always

16 Robert Brauneis, The First Constitutional Tort: The Remedial Revolution in NineteenthCentury State Just Compensation Law, 52 VAND. L. REV. 55, 108 (1999).
17 See infra Part III (discussing process of congressional indemnification).
18 See Act for the Relief of Alexander Murray, ch. 12, 6 Stat. 56 (1805); Act for the Relief of
George Little, ch. 4, 6 Stat. 63 (1807). As discussed in greater detail below, the process of private
legislation began with a petition for relief, often assigned to the Committee on Claims of the
House of Representatives for investigation and a proposed disposition. See H.R. REP. NO. 8-46
(2d Sess. 1805), reprinted in 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: NAVAL AFFAIRS 138 (Washington,
Gales & Seaton 1834) (reporting Committee on Claims’s favorable disposition on petition of
George Little).
19 See infra notes 61, 97–101, and accompanying text (discussing relief bill for Paolo Paoly).
20 See infra note 100 (discussing Madison’s role in Paoly incident).
21 In attempting to identify successful petitions, we first examined the private bills that
Congress adopted as collected in the Statutes at Large. We also examined the collection of
private bills of indemnity in an index of private legislation compiled in 1828 by the clerk of the
House of Representatives, Samuel Burch. See GENERAL INDEX TO THE LAWS OF THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA FROM MARCH 4TH, 1789, TO MARCH 3D, 1827, at 152–53 (Samuel Burch
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provide detailed information on the rationale of a particular decision, we
have located a number of relatively complete records in order to compile
this data. We use this information to examine the way official liability, as
administered by the courts, interacted with private relief legislation, as
administered by Congress, to shape the incentives of government officers
to comply with law. Perhaps most strikingly, we find evidence that
nineteenth-century legislators viewed reimbursement of a well-founded
claim more as a matter of right than as a matter of legislative grace.22
Indeed, our study suggests that government officers succeeded in securing
indemnifying private legislation in roughly sixty percent of cases in which
they petitioned for such relief.23 Certainly by 1828, when Congress
published Burch’s Index, an abridgement of private legislation that
collected the leading principles of “indemnity,” the practice of government
indemnity had become settled and routine.24
Our study of the practice of securing private bills of indemnity also
sheds light on a number of debates in the current literature. First, the
practice of relatively routine, but not automatic, indemnification clarifies
the historical function of the doctrine of sovereign immunity.25 The

ed., Washington City, William A. Davis 1828) [hereinafter BURCH’S INDEX] (listing “[c]ases in
which individuals have been indemnified for losses, or damages sustained by reason of acts done
in the discharge of official duty”). To locate unsuccessful petitions (a more challenging
undertaking), we relied primarily on congressional compilations and focused on petitions by
officers seeking indemnity in respect of court judgments. With our focus on petitions arising out
of judicial proceedings, we excluded private petitions for direct compensation, many of which
were submitted to Congress by American citizens for wartime losses they had sustained during
the War of 1812.
22 See infra Part III (discussing development and procedure of indemnification). On the
counterintuitive idea of a legal entitlement to a remedy by way of legislative petition, see
Christine A. Desan, Contesting the Character of the Political Economy in the Early Republic:
Rights and Remedies in Chisholm v. Georgia, in THE HOUSE AND SENATE IN THE 1790S:
PETITIONING, LOBBYING, AND INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 178, 192–93, 230–31 (Kenneth R.
Bowling & Donald R. Kennon eds., 2002) [hereinafter HOUSE & SENATE IN THE 1790S]. On the
handling of such claims in Congress, see Floyd D. Shimomura, The History of Claims Against the
United States: The Evolution from a Legislative Toward a Judicial Model of Payment, 45 LA. L.
REV. 625, 637–48 (1985).
23 We collect these data in the Appendix to this Article. Obviously, one cannot draw any
definite conclusions from the success rate of officers’ indemnity petitions. For one thing, our
search may not have captured all of the unsuccessful petitions. For another, some officers may
have failed to seek indemnity after concluding that they had little chance of persuading Congress
that they were acting in the scope of their employment. We have greater confidence that we have
identified successful petitioners than that we have captured the universe of potential claimants.
24 See BURCH’S INDEX, supra note 21, at 152–53 (listing significant number of indemnity
petitions).
25 Today, sovereign immunity protects the federal government from suit in the absence of an
extremely clear congressional waiver. See, e.g., United States v. Nordic Vill., Inc., 503 U.S. 30,
34 (1992) (applying strong presumption against waiver of federal immunity). Even a clear
congressional statement may fail to override state sovereign immunity from suit, at least for
statutes adopted pursuant to the Commerce Clause. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 712
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doctrine generally barred private individuals from suing the United States
directly, but it did not bar suits against government officials. Following the
imposition of liability on a government officer, Congress would decide
whether to make good the officer’s loss in the exercise of its legislative
control of the appropriation process. Indemnifying
legislation
thus
preserved the formal doctrine of sovereign immunity while assigning the
ultimate loss associated with wrongful conduct to the government. In
contrast to its operation today, when the doctrine applies to bar relief
altogether,26 sovereign immunity in the early republic served less to
authorize lawless conduct on the part of the federal government than to
allocate responsibility for appropriations and adjudication as between the
legislative and judicial branches of government.27 Courts were to decide
whether the conduct in litigation was lawful and award damages against the
officer if it was not; Congress was to decide whether the officer had acted
for the government within the scope of his agency, in good faith, and in
circumstances that suggested the government should bear responsibility for
the loss. This allocation of responsibilities had a self-reinforcing quality;
perhaps as early as 1804, when the Marshall Court decided Little and
Murray, and certainly by 1836, the Supreme Court simply assumed that
indemnity was routinely available to take the sting out of any official
liability.28 In other words, the nineteenth century’s strict, judge-made rules
of liability may have resulted from, as much as they led to, the practice of
congressional indemnification.
Second, the history of indemnification practice enriches our
understanding of the incentive system that confronted federal officials.
(1999) (holding that state sovereign immunity limits Congress’s power to impose suit on states in
state court).
26 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Jurisdiction-Stripping Reconsidered, 96 VA. L. REV. 1043, 1106
(2010) (“[T]he doctrine of sovereign immunity . . . typically bars suits against the government
without the government’s consent.”); Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Nonretroactivity, and Constitutional Remedies, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1731, 1753 (1991) (treating
sovereign immunity as bar to enforcement of individual rights in cases to which it applies).
27 For valuable discussions of the role of Congress’s appropriations power and its
constitutional relationship to sovereign immunity, see Paul F. Figley & Jay Tidmarsh, The
Appropriations Power and Sovereign Immunity, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1207, 1258–64 (2009), and
Jackson, supra note 1, at 523–52.
28 Up to now, the literature has assumed that Congress adopted its first private
indemnification bill in 1805 for the relief of Alexander Murray. See Frederick C. Leiner, The
Charming Betsy and the Marshall Court, 45 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 1, 19 (2001) (characterizing
1805 bill as “first time”). Our study suggests that Congress had adopted such legislation at least
by 1802 and perhaps as early as 1799, depending on how one characterizes the legislative action
in connection with the Navy’s wrongful seizure of the Niger. See infra note 110 (discussing
appropriations). These indemnification practices were well established by the time the Court
evaluated the liability of government officers in Little and Murray. Certainly by the 1830s, the
Court assumed the availability of indemnity for actions taken in accordance with official
instructions. See Part III.C (discussing routine use of indemnification).
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Congress used a variety of tools to shape the incentives of federal officers.
Some officers—federal judges, for example—were placed on salary.29
Others, like marshals and revenue collectors, were paid through a
combination of salary and fees for their services.30 Still others (naval
captains and port officials) were given incentives to ferret out and pursue
wrongdoing through the initiation of forfeiture proceedings. Thus, customs
collectors could initiate a forfeiture proceeding against a vessel that failed
to comply with the revenue laws and expect to receive a share of the
proceeds.31 Similarly, Captain Little stood to gain had the federal courts
upheld his interdiction of the Flying Fish, as federal law provided naval
captains with a fifteen percent share in the proceeds of any vessel forfeited
for violation of federal law.32 Captain Little thus had reason to act
aggressively for his own account in enforcing federal law; yet he also had
reason to act cautiously for fear of personal liability. The prospect of
indemnity would have moderated, but not eliminated, the risk associated
with an erroneous seizure.
Finally, and most intriguingly, indemnification practice sheds light on
the modern, judge-made doctrine of qualified immunity. Today, courts
view the qualified immunity doctrine as one that requires them to strike the
proper balance between the interests of the victims and the interests of
government actors. Too much immunity may leave victims uncompensated
and fail to assure proper respect for the law; too little may chill government
officials in the zealous discharge of their appointed duties.33 Antebellum
29 See generally James E. Pfander, Judicial Compensation and the Definition of Judicial
Power in the Early Republic, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1 (2008) (describing salary-based compensation
system put in place by founding generation for judges on Article III courts).
30 On the payment of marshals and members of Congress, see id. at 5 n.17, 13 n.62, which
reports that marshals received both salaries and fees for services, while members of Congress
received per diem fees for attendance and compensation for travel expenses. For surveys of early
compensation practices, see THOMAS K. URDAHL, THE FEE SYSTEM IN THE UNITED STATES 122–
33 (Madison, Democrat Printing Co. 1898), and Nicholas Parrillo, The Rise of Non-Profit
Government in America 14–19 (Nov. 15, 2006) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the New
York University Law Review).
31 For an account of early forfeiture practice in relation to the alien tort statute, see Joseph
Modeste Sweeney, A Tort Only in Violation of the Law of Nations, 18 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP.
L. REV. 445, 446–47 (1995).
32 See Act for the Better Government of the Navy of the United States, ch. 33, §§ 5–6, 2 Stat.
45, 52–53 (1800).
33 The Court’s immunity decisions have attempted to strike this balance. See Harlow v.
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818–19 (1982) (proposing test of objective reasonableness of officials’
conduct as balancing compensation of victims against execution of government duties); Butz v.
Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 525 (1978) (describing Bivens-type action as permitting suit against
government while limiting risk of overdeterrence of official execution of duties); Procunier v.
Navarette, 434 U.S. 555, 562 (1978) (invoking “good faith” standard from Wood v. Strickland,
420 U.S. 308, 321 (1975), as enabling school officials to go forward with their business); Scheuer
v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 240 (1974) (explaining dual rationales for official immunity), abrogated
in part by Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982). See infra notes 276–86 and accompanying
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courts did not attempt to strike this delicate balance; instead, they simply
addressed the issue of legality and left Congress in charge of calibrating the
incentives of government officials. Congress offered government
employees a mix of salary, fees, and forfeitures to ward off bribery and
ensure zealous enforcement; Congress provided further incentives by
indemnifying from any liability only those government officials who acted
in good faith.34 But Congress might also refuse to indemnify, thus leaving
the loss on the official who acted without just cause. One can debate
whether this complex mix of incentives struck a more satisfying balance
between interests in legality, victim compensation, and effective
enforcement than the judge-made balance that prevails today. It certainly
provided a set of incentives that Congress could tailor to the particular job,
rather than the one-size-fits-all immunity standard of Harlow v.
Fitzgerald.35
This Article has four Parts. Part I provides a general overview of the
rules of sovereign immunity and official liability that prevailed during the
antebellum period. Part II sketches the litigation that grew out of the QuasiWar with France during the administration of John Adams. In addition to
discussing the claims against George Little and Alexander Murray, we
describe claims filed against Lieutenant William Maley, also the
commander of a government warship. We chose these disputes because
they led to the first private acts of official indemnity adopted by Congress.
Part III explores the private bill process as applied to the indemnity claims
of Little, Murray, and Maley, and describes more generally how it worked
in other representative cases. We also provide an overview of the
indemnification process as it evolved in the antebellum period from an ad
hoc process to a relatively formal and legalistic proceeding, complete with
proof, precedents, and legal principles. Part IV then summarizes the lessons
of the study.
I
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY, THE POWER OF THE PURSE, AND PRIVATE BILLS

The founding generation inherited a system of administrative law that
ensured government accountability through judicial processes and
protected the role of the general assembly in the payment of public
claims.36 Thus, the common law developed an array of writs that allowed
text for further discussion of modern qualified immunity doctrine.
34 See infra Part III.D.
35 See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818 (1982) (declaring federal officers immune from suit unless
they violate “clearly established” law of which reasonable person would have known). For a
critique of the qualified immunity standard’s failure to consider variations in the responsibilities
assigned to federal officers, see SCHUCK, supra note 10, at 56.
36 In England, the petition of right (a mechanism for the adjudication of money claims against
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individuals to test the legality of government conduct by filing suit against
government officials. The familiar writs of habeas corpus, mandamus,
trespass, and assumpsit all served something of the same function in testing
the legality of government action.37 Habeas focused on the legality of
detention; mandamus issued to compel official action; trespass claimed
damages for a government invasion of liberty or property; and assumpsit
facilitated a challenge to the legality of taxes and other government
exactions.38 In each case, the action went forward against the government

the Crown) had fallen into desuetude by the eighteenth century and was reportedly replaced by a
practice of parliamentary control. See Figley & Tidmarsh, supra note 27, at 1213–14 (describing
decline of petition of right). We have not found solid evidence that the English Parliament also
took over the task of indemnifying government officials by inviting petitions for private bills. To
be sure, the Crown agreed to defend and indemnify the defendants in a series of suits famously
brought by John Wilkes to challenge the legality of searches conducted pursuant to general
warrants. See Wilkes v. Wood, (1763) 98 Eng. Rep. 489 (K.B.) (listing government officers as
attorneys for defendants); see also NELSON B. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION 44–45 (1937) (recounting verdicts against
defendants Wood and Lord Halifax in amounts of £1000 and £4000); Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth
Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 812 (1994) (reporting that Crown spent
some £100,000 in defending suits and paying damage awards). But Wilkes’s own account
suggests that the indemnity resulted from the action of the Crown, rather than from any action
taken as a result of petition to Parliament. See 1 JOHN ALMON, THE CORRESPONDENCE OF THE
LATE JOHN WILKES, WITH HIS FRIENDS 136–37 (London, Richard Phillips 1805) (reporting that
defendant, Lord Halifax, Secretary of State, had procured assurance of indemnity by warrant
signed by “lord-privy-seal,” an executive officer).
37 For an overview of the operation of these official writs in the scheme of early republic
government accountability and of their English and colonial origins, see James E. Pfander, Article
I Tribunals, Article III Courts, and the Judicial Power of the United States, 118 HARV. L. REV.
643, 691 (2004), and Pfander, supra note 1, at 986. Officer suits failed to provide an effective
mechanism for claims sounding in contract; the liability did not run against the officer as such but
against the government, thus necessitating some sort of approach to the legislature. See Figley &
Tidmarsh, supra note 27, at 1261 (noting lack of remedy for those who contracted with state and
that legislative discretion was only remedy); Louis L. Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and
Officers: Sovereign Immunity, 77 HARV. L. REV. 1, 2 (1963) (describing importation of officer
suit but noting failure of American colonies to develop petition-of-right practice that would
facilitate litigation against Crown itself for claims sounding in contract). For a summary of
historical writing on early administrative institutions, see generally Richard R. John,
Governmental Institutions as Agents of Change: Rethinking American Political Development in
the Early Republic, 1787–1835, 11 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 347 (1997).
The antebellum practice of indemnity may shed light on the current debate over how broadly
or narrowly to interpret legislation that suspends the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
Compare Trevor W. Morrison, Suspension and the Extrajudicial Constitution, 107 COLUM. L.
REV. 1533 (2007) (contending that suspension of privilege of writ of habeas corpus would leave
detainees free to sue officers in trespass for award of damages for wrongful imprisonment), with
Amanda L. Tyler, Suspension as an Emergency Power, 118 YALE L.J. 600 (2009) (arguing that
suspension broadens executive detention authority and ordinarily both prevents release from
confinement and provides officers with defense to trespass action).
38 On congressional solicitude for the use of actions in assumpsit to test revenue collection,
see Ann Woolhandler, Judicial Deference to Administrative Action: A Revisionist History, 43
ADMIN. L. REV. 197, 221–24 (1991). On the use of assumpsit to litigate the constitutionality of
taxes, see Ann Woolhandler, The Common Law Origins of Constitutionally Compelled Remedies,
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officer, thereby preserving the formal truth that the government itself was
immune from suit at common law.39
The common law’s emphasis on officer suits meant that individuals
could not pursue money claims directly against the government, for
payment out of the fisc, except in accordance with whatever system the
assembly put in place. Throughout the colonial period, many lower houses
of the assembly guarded their power over the purse and insisted on
relatively complete control over the payment of all public claims.40 This
lower-house control led to the development of what Christine Desan has
aptly described as a process of legislative adjudication in which individuals
filed petitions seeking the payment of funds from the treasury.41 These
petitions were often referred to a committee on public claims for a
determination on the merits, and such committees would often follow triallike processes in passing on such claims. If successful, the claims were paid
either by inclusion in a general appropriations bill or by passage of a
private bill.42
The mixed character of claims for money—implicating both the
assembly’s power of the purse and the judicial role in the resolution of
disputes—gave rise to some institutional uncertainty after the
Revolutionary War. Many of the newly independent states simply
maintained their existing schemes and continued to rely on the assembly
for the determination of public claims. But some assemblies experimented
with structural innovations that gave the courts a more significant role in
the process. Thus, the states of New York, Pennsylvania, and Virginia all
recognized a role for the courts in passing on public claims.43 Some states,
moreover, adopted constitutional provisions more or less guaranteeing
107 YALE L.J. 77, 135–37 (1997).
39 See Jaffe, supra note 37, at 2 (discussing formal quality of sovereign immunity); Pfander,
supra note 1, at 963 (noting Blackstone’s account of the “fictions and circuities” of government
accountability (quoting 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *268)).
40 See JACK P. GREENE, THE QUEST FOR POWER: THE LOWER HOUSES OF ASSEMBLY IN THE
SOUTHERN ROYAL COLONIES, 1689–1776, at 51–71 (1963) (describing lower house control over
taxation and money bills in Southern colonies).
41 See Christine A. Desan, The Constitutional Commitment to Legislative Adjudication in the
Early American Tradition, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1381, 1382 (1998) [hereinafter Desan,
Constitutional Commitment] (demonstrating that state legislatures served as fora for claims
against government); Christine A. Desan, Remaking Constitutional Tradition at the Margin of the
Empire: The Creation of Legislative Adjudication in Colonial New York, 16 LAW & HIST. REV.
257, 258 (1998) (defining “legislative adjudication” as “the provincial assembly’s distinctive
power to determine claims made by individuals against the colony”).
42 On the role of petitions and their use to secure an appropriation, see RAYMOND C. BAILEY,
POPULAR INFLUENCE UPON PUBLIC POLICY: PETITIONING IN EIGHTEENTH CENTURY VIRGINIA
27–29, 129–30 (1979), which describes the rise in colonial Virginia of a Committee on Public
Claims and the process by which petitioners could present their claims for payment.
43 For a summary of statutes adopted in New York, Pennsylvania, and Virginia that
authorized judicial determination of claims against the state, see Pfander, supra note 1, at 939–43.
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individuals the right to interplead with the government in the regular
courts.44 Leading thinkers of the day agreed that, from the perspective of
the separation of government powers, the task of adjudicating money
claims against the government was one that the courts should perform.45
Such was the backdrop to the framing of the Constitution, a document
that recognizes legislative control of the fisc and extends federal
jurisdiction to claims against the government.46 These provisions authorize,
but do not necessarily require, Congress to assign the adjudication of
money claims to the federal courts. So while one can argue that the
doctrine of government (sovereign) immunity has no place in a constitution
that recognizes the sovereignty of the people, the institutional practices that
arose after the Constitution’s ratification presumed the existence of such
immunity.47 One important feature common to these practices was the
refusal of the federal courts to hear disputes that were subject to review
either by Congress or by the executive branch.48 Their refusal substantially
limited Congress’s ability to assign public claims to the federal courts
without also surrendering its traditional authority to control the eventual
44 See id. at 927 n.101 (describing adoption of constitutional provisions, in both Pennsylvania
and Tennessee, that called upon legislative body to create mode for suits against state).
45 Such thinkers included Edmund Pendleton, Chief Justice of the Virginia Court of Appeals,
who worked with Thomas Jefferson to codify the petition of right in the Commonwealth. See id.
at 942–43 (discussing Jefferson’s role in codification of petition of right). James Wilson, a
prominent member of the Philadelphia Convention and an eventual Justice of the Supreme Court,
persuaded the 1790 Pennsylvania state constitutional convention to include a provision for
government suability. Id. at 928 n.101. Edmund Randolph, governor of Virginia and the nation’s
first attorney general, supported government suability both in his report on the federal judiciary
and in his arguments to the Supreme Court in Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 420
(1793). See EDMUND RANDOLPH, REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL TO THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES (Dec. 31, 1790), reprinted in 4 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 1789–1800, at 127, 130–31 (Maeva Marcus et al. eds.,
1992). St. George Tucker also expressed support for government suability in his influential
version of Blackstone’s Commentaries. See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE
LAWS OF ENGLAND 363–64 (St. George Tucker ed., Philadelphia, William Birch Young &
Abraham Small 1803) (arguing that legislative determination of public claims does not conform
to theory of separation of powers).
46 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7 (“All Bills for raising Revenue shall originate in the House of
Representatives . . . .”); id. art. III, § 2 (“The judicial power shall extend to . . . Controversies to
which the United States shall be a Party . . . .”). The Court held that Article III does not
contemplate suits against the United States in Williams v. United States, 289 U.S. 553, 577
(1933), but it has since reached the contrary conclusion. See Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S.
530, 566 (1962) (“[C]ongressional understanding that suits against the United States are
justiciable in courts created under Article III may not be lightly disregarded.”).
47 For an account of the institutional history of the conflict between Congress and the courts
over who should adjudicate claims against the government, see generally Shimomura, supra note
22.
48 See Hayburn’s Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409–10, 410 n.† (1792) (collecting letters from circuit
court justices that questioned power of federal courts to hear cases subject to executive and
legislative revision). For an account of the Hayburn decision and its role in structuring
Congress’s ability to rely on the federal courts, see Pfander, supra note 37, at 699–704.
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payment of those claims. Congress eventually ceded control over the
process by creating a judgment fund under which the decisions of the
federal courts were payable as a matter of course, but this regime did not
arrive until the twentieth century.49
Early federal practice thus relied on traditional tools of government
accountability—habeas, mandamus, trespass, and assumpsit claims against
federal officials, rather than against the government itself.50 From the
perspective of the federal officer, these tools posed financial threats that
varied quite substantially. Successful habeas and mandamus petitions both
resulted in specific decrees, directing the official to take certain action on
pain of contempt.51 Successful trover and replevin actions similarly
contemplated specific performance. While they might entail fees, such
proceedings did not result in a judgment for damages payable by the
official. Successful trespass and assumpsit claims were different, however.
Both resulted in the entry of a judgment for money damages, payable by
the officer.52 Assumpsit claims posed little risk for public officers,
however. Tax collectors, the most frequent target of assumpsit actions,

49 See Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 569–70 (1962) (concluding that likelihood of
payment through standing judgment fund created sufficient finality to permit involvement of
Article III courts); Pfander, supra note 37, at 759–62 (same). Today, the judgment fund provides
for the routine payment of any judgment against the United States. See Jackson, supra note 1, at
594 & n.266.
50 See, e.g., Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75 (1807) (relying on habeas action to test
confinement of Burr’s alleged co-conspirators); Wise v. Withers, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 331, 331
(1806) (presenting trespass action against officers to test legality of court martial proceeding); cf.
Kendall v. U.S. ex rel. Stokes, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524, 533 (1838) (upholding writ of mandamus
against postmaster to compel payment).
51 See Pfander, supra note 1, at 912 n.40 (discussing use of contempt and threat of
imprisonment to enforce specific decrease of mandamus and habeas corpus).
52 See Elliot v. Swartwout, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 137 (1836) (granting assumpsit to recover
customs tax from collector); Wise, 7 U.S. 331 (awarding damages for wrongful seizure of
property to enforce illegal fine); Mitchell v. Merriam, 13 Me. 439 (1836) (holding federal postal
official liable for malicious prosecution); Imlay v. Sands, 1 Cai. 566 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1804)
(holding federal collector liable for wrongful seizure of vessel). Officials would justify their
conduct by reference to statutory authority, and such justifications could pose questions about the
breadth of their authority and its constitutionality. See Bd. of Liquidation v. McComb, 92 U.S.
531, 541 (1875) (declaring in response to such justification that “[a]n unconstitutional law will be
treated by the courts as null and void”); Callender v. Marsh, 18 Mass. (1 Pick.) 418, 430–31
(1823) (explaining Constitution’s role in depriving officer of authority in suit for just
compensation); cf. Miller v. Horton, 26 N.E. 100, 100–03 (Mass. 1891) (opinion of Holmes, J.)
(looking to plaintiff’s due process entitlement to compensation in denying agency’s statutory
defense in trespass action). Damage claims against federal officers drew on English common law
principles. See, e.g., Entick v. Carrington, (1765) 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (K.B.) (holding officials
liable for illegal trespass); Leader v. Moxton, (1733) 95 Eng. Rep. 1157 (K.B.) 1160 (subjecting
commissioners to liability in tort when they exceed their powers). Other litigation sought forms of
specific relief. See, e.g., Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824)
(injunction against trespassory taxation); Meigs v. McClung’s Lessee, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 11
(1815) (ejectment).
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maintained a running account with the Treasury. If courts subjected tax
collectors to liability in assumpsit for wrongful tax collection, the tax
collectors could recover the money by claiming an accounting credit
against any sums they would otherwise pay into the Treasury.53 Officers
subject to trespass liability, by contrast, would not necessarily have had an
open account with the government and, even if they did, could not have
simply claimed credit for any payment they made to satisfy the judgment.54
Trespass liability thus presented a grave challenge to early federal
administrative law.55 Because sovereign immunity barred suits directly
against the government, the personal liability of the officer was essential to
ensure a test of the legality of government action. As a consequence,
trespass liability created risks for the victims of government misconduct
(who might not get paid in full by the officer), and for the officers named
53 See 1 Op. Att’y Gen. 99, 102 (1825) (“[The government agent] retain[ed] in his own hands
the proceeds of the sales of the [cargo], and these actual proceeds, with reasonable deductions for
expenses, being the measure of the damages recovered against him, he has in his own hands what
must be considered as sufficient to satisfy these damages, and of course is completely
indemnified.”).
54 With respect to trespass liability, however, routine indemnity was not an option and thus
posed a threat to the financial security of the official. See Jerry L. Mashaw, Reluctant
Nationalists: Federal Administration and Administrative Law in the Republican Era, 1801–1829,
116 YALE L.J. 1636, 1679 (2007) (quoting Treasury Secretary Albert Gallatin who argued that
tort liability asks collectors to “risk all they are worth in doubtful cases”).
For an illustration of the principle that indemnification was not granted as a matter of course
for trespass actions, consider Emerson v. Hall, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 409 (1839). The litigation turned
on whether money paid to a government tax collector to indemnify him for losses he suffered in a
trespass action was part of his account with the government or a separate matter. The Court
viewed them as separate. Thus, the Court explained that in pursuing a forfeiture, the collector
acted on behalf of his own account, not the government’s. Id. at 412. Any payment from
Congress by way of indemnity for losses Emerson suffered as a result of a flawed forfeiture
proceeding was a free gift or donation, not part of his running account with the federal
government (and thus not subject to prior claims of his creditors). Id. at 412–13.
55 For an excellent illustration of the risks associated with trespass liability, consider the
plight of Jeremiah Olney, the federal collector in Providence, Rhode Island, in the 1790s. Olney
enforced federal revenue laws in denying Welcome Arnold government credit after Arnold
defaulted on a revenue bond. Treasury Secretary Alexander Hamilton encouraged Olney in this
course of action, promised that federal lawyers would represent Olney in any suit brought by
Arnold, and assured him that the federal government would indemnify him against losses he
might incur. See 7 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES 1789–1800, at 565–77 (Maeva Marcus et al. eds., 2003). Although Arnold sued in
trespass in Rhode Island state court and won a judgment in his favor, Olney sought review in the
Supreme Court on a writ of error, where he was represented by the Attorney General of the
United States, Charles Lee. The Court upheld its jurisdiction and reversed the state court
judgment, thus siding with Olney and Hamilton. Id. at 617 (recording minute entry from Supreme
Court in which state court judgment was “reversed with costs”). Curiously, the United States
Reports mistakenly indicates that the court affirmed the Rhode Island judgment. See Olney v.
Arnold, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 308, 318 (1796). This error in the official report has confused scholars.
See, e.g., Mashaw, supra note 11, at 1328–30 (relying on report in 3 Dallas in concluding that
Supreme Court upheld trespass judgment against Olney and regretting absence of any reported
explanation for decision).
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as defendants. The government expected the officer to defend the action
personally, subjecting the officer to writs of execution (including seizure
and sale of personal assets) to satisfy any resulting judgment. Congress
dealt with these imbalances by adopting private bills of indemnification—
bills that protected the officer from ruinous liability, assured the victim of
compensation, and overcame the doctrine of sovereign immunity by
ensuring that, at the end of the day, the government paid for the losses its
officials inflicted in the line of duty. The next Part explores the origins of
the practice of indemnity in connection with the imposition of substantial
liability for maritime torts.
II
MARITIME TORTS DURING THE QUASI-WAR WITH FRANCE

George Little and Alexander Murray committed two of the bestknown maritime torts of the early Republic.56 Both occurred during the
Quasi-War with France. And both cases are best known for legal
propositions: Little for its strict attitude toward official liability,57 and
Murray for its articulation of what we know today as the Charming Betsy
canon.58 Both cases began with the seizure of Danish vessels which were
56 Accounts of the Quasi-War provide sketches of the lives of Murray and Little. According
to Michael Palmer, Alexander Murray served in the Maryland line during the Revolutionary War,
sailed with the Continental Navy, and had been a successful merchant in Philadelphia before
receiving his commission as a commander in the Quasi-War. MICHAEL A. PALMER, STODDERT’S
WAR: NAVAL OPERATIONS DURING THE QUASI-WAR WITH FRANCE, 1798–1801, at 167–68
(William N. Still, Jr. ed., 1987) [hereinafter STODDERT’S WAR]. George Little lived in Boston
and, like Murray, served with a measure of distinction in naval battles. Like other commanders in
the Caribbean theater, Little apparently accepted gifts and gratuities from local politicians. Id. at
181. The Navy later subjected Little to a naval inquiry regarding the alleged mistreatment of
French prisoners of war, but it ultimately acquitted him of any wrongdoing. Id. at 219–20.
Alexander Murray shows up in other reported decisions. In one, he defended a position in
prize litigation that might strike the reader as rather aggressive. In Murray v. McLane, 1 Del. Cas.
534 (1815), Murray brought suit after he was imprisoned as the defendant in an action brought by
Allen McLane, the federal collector for Delaware. The dispute began when Murray seized an
English vessel as lawful prize in Delaware Bay, shortly after the 1812 declaration of war with
Great Britain. McLane brought suit, arguing that Murray’s authority to claim prize was limited to
vessels on the high seas, and succeeded in having Murray imprisoned on special bail. The jury’s
rejection of Murray’s subsequent false imprisonment action reflects a finding that McLane had
just cause for contesting Murray’s authority. In another, Murray successfully defended his
enlistment into the Navy of a boy seventeen years of age. See Commonwealth v. Murray, 4 Binn.
487 (1812).
57 For discussions of Little’s strict approach to official liability, see Engdahl, supra note 1, at
17–18, 18 n.73, and Woolhandler, supra note 1, at 415–16.
58 The Charming Betsy canon takes its name from the vessel Murray seized and libeled. It
holds that an act of Congress “ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any
other possible construction remains.” Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64,
118 (1804). See generally Curtis A. Bradley, The Charming Betsy Canon and Separation of
Powers: Rethinking the Interpretive Role of International Law, 86 GEO. L.J. 479 (1998)
(discussing Charming Betsy canon as device sometimes employed to support U.S. foreign
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suspiciously plying the waters of the Caribbean, and both ended before
federal admiralty courts, which heard conflicting claims of prize, capture,
salvage, and tort. Both came before the Marshall Court during the February
Term of 1804, and both resulted in substantial judgments in favor of the
Danish owners.59 Both captains eventually secured private bills to pay the
judgments.60 Lesser known claims against Lieutenant William Maley grew
out of the same conflict and similarly produced indemnifying legislation.61
This Part sketches the military hostilities and resulting litigation that gave
rise to these early, precedent-setting indemnity claims.62
The Quasi-War grew out of long-simmering tensions rooted in the
conflict between revolutionary France and Great Britain. The United States
attempted to remain neutral, but French officials thought its 1778 treaty
with the United States entitled France to American support.63 France further
regarded Jay’s Treaty in 1794 as aligning the United States with Britain in
the conflict. By 1798, France’s refusal to respect American neutrality,
coupled with France’s insulting treatment of American diplomats, led the
Adams administration to put the country on a war footing.64 Congress

political obligations, and more recently, as tool to facilitate balance between legislative and
judicial branches).
59 See Murray, 6 U.S. 64 (affirming district court’s decree of liability and remanding for
damage calculation); Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170 (1804) (affirming lower court
decision holding official liable for unlawful seizure). The decisions came down five days apart,
on February 22 and February 27, respectively.
60 See Act for the Relief of Alexander Murray, ch. 12, 6 Stat. 56 (1805); Act for the Relief of
George Little, ch. 4, 6 Stat. 63 (1807).
61 See Maley v. Shattuck, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 458 (1806) (discussing Maley’s unlawful taking
of Shattuck’s vessel, Mercator); Act for the Relief of Jared Shattuck, ch. 19, 6 Stat. 116 (1813)
(compensating Shattuck for $33,864.55 in damages awarded against Maley in connection with
Maley’s seizure of Shattuck’s vessel, Mercator); Act for the Relief of Paolo Paoly, ch. 27, 6 Stat.
47 (1802) (granting $7040.55 in compensation to Danish subject Paolo Paoly, awarded by
Pennsylvania circuit court as result of Maley’s wrongful seizure of Paoly’s schooner,
Amphitheatre).
62 One might argue that these maritime torts arose in an international setting that deprives
them of precedential value for wholly domestic government torts. Yet, as we will see, the pattern
of liability and indemnity set in the government’s handling of maritime tort claims was quickly
adopted for use in wholly domestic cases involving the actions of U.S. marshals. See infra notes
187–88 and accompanying text.
63 For an account of the Washington administration’s efforts to preserve neutrality amid the
division in American politics between the Federalists, generally aligned with England, and the
Democrat-Republicans, generally aligned with France, see WILLIAM R. CASTO, FOREIGN
AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE AGE OF FIGHTING SAIL 35–58 (2006).
64 On the development of hostilities, the French attacks on American shipping, and the rise of
war fever following the disclosure of the diplomatic debacle known as the XYZ affair, see
STANLEY M. ELKINS & ERIC L. MCKITRICK, THE AGE OF FEDERALISM: THE EARLY AMERICAN
REPUBLIC, 1788–1800, at 537–79 (1993). For an account of the Quasi-War from the perspective
of an American naval officer, see STODDERT’S WAR, supra note 56. For an account of the war
from a diplomatic vantage point, see ALEXANDER DECONDE, THE QUASI-WAR: THE POLITICS
AND DIPLOMACY OF THE UNDECLARED WAR WITH FRANCE 1797–1801 (1966).
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adopted a series of laws responding to French provocations, including one
that suspended the Treaty of 1778,65 one that authorized the seizure of
French vessels,66 one that subjected aliens to removal,67 and one that barred
commercial intercourse between American merchant ships and French
ports.68
While the maritime tort claims arose from efforts to enforce the
Nonintercourse Act, an additional difficulty stemmed from the breadth of
presidential instructions. As communicated to U.S. Navy officers, early
instructions directed the seizure of all vessels “bound to or from” a French
port when the vessel or cargo was “apparently as well as really
American.”69 The instructions went on to warn officers of Americans using
Danish papers for the purpose of evading the law. Both captains honestly
believed that the vessels in question actually were American ships
masquerading as Danish to evade the Nonintercourse Act.70
In addition, Little and Murray both captured the vessels as the vessels
sailed away from a French port. In Little, this fact raised the question of
whether the instructions could authorize a capture not squarely permitted
by the terms of applicable law. By the time of Murray, however, Congress
had amended the law to interdict American vessels sailing to or from a port
controlled by the French Republic. The case then focused on whether
ownership of the vessel had genuinely passed from American to Danish
hands.
Both Little and Murray had reason to suspect that the vessels in
question were trading in violation of the prohibition. Captain Little and his
crew were cruising in the company of another frigate near the island of
Hispaniola (now Haiti), a French possession. On December 2, 1799, they
happened upon the Flying Fish, a vessel laden with coffee and bound from

65

Act of July 7, 1798, ch. 67, 1 Stat. 578.
See Act of July 9, 1798, ch. 68, § 1, 1 Stat. 578, 578 (1798) (authorizing Navy to seize
armed French vessels and empowering President to issue commissions to privateers to prey on
French commercial shipping).
67 A cluster of statutes dealt with aliens, including a law that subjected alien enemies to
removal and a law that lengthened the required period of residency for naturalized citizenship
from five to fourteen years. Act of July 6, 1798, ch. 66, 1 Stat. 577 (deportation); Act of June 18,
1798, ch. 54, 1 Stat. 566 (naturalization). The Sedition Act prohibited statements meant to bring
the government or the Adams administration into disrepute. See ELKINS & MCKITRICK, supra
note 64, at 700, 703–06, 710.
68 See Act of June 13, 1798 (Nonintercourse Act), ch. 53, 1 Stat. 565 (prohibiting vessels
owned by Americans from sailing to ports and places governed by French Republic). Over the
next two years, Congress reenacted the law. See Act of Feb. 9, 1799, ch. 2, 1 Stat. 613; Act of
Feb. 27, 1800, ch. 10, 2 Stat. 7.
69 Little, 6 U.S. at 178.
70 See Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 116 (1804) (noting that
Murray considered Shattuck “an American citizen who was violating the law”); Little, 6 U.S. at
178 (expressing no doubt as to whether Little truly suspected Flying Fish to be American ship).
66
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the French port of Jeremie to the Danish colony of St. Thomas.71 During
the chase that ensued, the master of the Flying Fish threw the logbook and
other papers overboard.72 Little decided to seize the vessel, conveying it to
Boston where it was libeled in the District Court of Massachusetts.73
Despite Little’s suspicions, the Flying Fish was neither an American
vessel, nor was it sailing to a French port; it was not, therefore, subject to
forfeiture under the Act.74
In July 1800, seven months after Little’s encounter with the Flying
Fish, the U.S. frigate Constellation, under the command of Captain
Murray, spotted the schooner Charming Betsy.75 After a two-hour chase,
the Constellation fired a shot across the bow of the Charming Betsy, hailing
its master. Murray learned that the vessel had been taken over by a prize
crew from France (an indication that the French regarded the vessel as
American owned).76 Murray recaptured the Charming Betsy, reasoning that
he was entitled either to salvage—for protecting the vessel against
wrongful seizure by the French—or to a forfeiture if the vessel was really
American and had violated the Nonintercourse Act.77 Murray’s crew sailed
the schooner to Philadelphia and instituted a libel proceeding in the district
court. During that proceeding, the court learned that the vessel had been
recently sold to Jared Shattuck, a former citizen of Connecticut who
expatriated himself to become a Danish burgher on the island of St.
Thomas. As with Little’s claim against the Flying Fish, then, Murray’s
view that the vessel was really American was unsupported by the facts. The
district court thus rejected the condemnation claim and ordered the vessel
restored.78
Following restoration of the vessels, the lower courts faced claims for
damages by their owners ; there, consensus disappeared. The district court
in Massachusetts ruled that neutral vessels on the high seas in a theatre of
war must act openly and avoid the appearance of fraud or duplicity.79 The
71 Little, 6 U.S. at 178. Upon capture, the master of the Flying Fish convinced his crew to
collude with him in telling their captors that they were bound from Port-au-Prince—a French port
that was excepted from the Nonintercourse Act by a presidential proclamation—rather than
Jeremie which remained prohibited under the President’s orders. H.R. REP. NO. 8-46 (2d Sess.
1805), reprinted in 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: NAVAL AFFAIRS, supra note 18, at 138.
72 H.R. REP. NO. 8-46, at 138–39. When Little’s crew boarded the vessel, they found that the
master spoke in a perfect American accent and had the appearance of an American. Furthermore,
the mate was a citizen of the United States. Id.
73 Little, 6 U.S. at 172.
74 Id. (discussing fact that vessels of neutral nations were not subject to Act).
75 For a detailed account of the seizure of the vessel and the early stages of litigation, see
Leiner, supra note 28, at 1–11.
76 See id. at 2.
77 Id. at 4–5.
78 Id. at 6–9.
79 Little, 6 U.S. at 174–75. The district court addressed the fact that France and the United
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court found that the Flying Fish did not meet these duties and was not
entitled to damages or costs.80 The owners of the Flying Fish appealed.
Meanwhile, in Philadelphia, the district court directed the clerk to calculate
Shattuck’s losses, less a reasonable allowance as salvage for the rescue
from French privateers. The resulting judgment, over $14,000, was well
more than Murray could afford to pay. Indeed, he could not afford to post a
bond in an amount sufficient to perfect his right to appeal.81
In an effort to get the federal government involved, Murray wrote to
the Department of the Navy, pleading for support. After mulling over the
question for some time, the Secretary of the Navy eventually agreed to post
Murray’s appeal bond.82 Moreover, the Secretary procured the services of
the United States Attorney for the District of Pennsylvania, Alexander
Dallas, to serve as appellate counsel.83 Dallas succeeded at the circuit court
level, obtaining a reversal of the damages award against Murray.84
Meanwhile, up in Massachusetts, the circuit court reversed the district
court’s decision on damages and awarded some $8000 against Captain
Little for invasion of the rights of a neutral vessel. This division of lower
court authority set the stage for Supreme Court review.
The Supreme Court ruled resoundingly in favor of the Danish owners
and against Captains Little and Murray.85 The Court concluded that the
States were not engaged in a full-fledged war, but it held that this state of affairs had no impact on
a neutral vessel’s duties. Id. at 174.
80 Id. Marshall later characterizes the district court’s holding as being based on grounds of a
probable cause excuse. See id. at 176.
81 Leiner, supra note 28, at 10.
82 Id. at 10–11.
83 The Secretary’s account reveals some uncertainty about how to proceed. He felt much
“hesitation” in reaching his conclusion but ultimately decided that the executive could, under the
circumstance of the case and in the “exercise of a reasonable discretionary power,” protect the
officer in question by providing an appeal bond and appellate counsel in an effort to “prevent an
eventual loss to the public.” Letter from R. Smith, Secretary of the Navy, to George Harrison,
Navy Agent (Sept. 23, 1801), in 7 NAVAL DOCUMENTS RELATED TO THE QUASI-WAR BETWEEN
THE UNITED STATES AND FRANCE 287 (Office of Naval Records & Library ed., 1938). The letter
indicated that the decision about executive branch involvement was discretionary and
acknowledged that a judgment against Murray might well create a charge or demand for
“eventual” payment by the public.
84 See Leiner, supra note 28, at 11 (noting that “[t]he circuit court acted Solomonically” in
returning Charming Betsy to Shattuck while reversing lower court’s finding of liability against
Murray).
85 Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 125–26 (1804); Little, 6 U.S. at
179. Early in the Quasi-War, the Court respected the sale of American vessels to Danish
purchasers even when the sale enabled the vessel to evade federal trade restrictions imposed on
American citizens. Consider the 1800 case of United States v. Topham, which arose from the sale
of the brig Harriott to a naturalized Danish subject, John Imlay, Jr. Imlay bought the vessel from
American owners in St. Thomas, sailed it to a French port, and then sailed back to the United
States with a new cargo valued at some $22,000—well more than the sale price of the vessel.
Joshua Sands, the intrepid collector of the Port of New York, initiated the process leading to libel
proceedings to forfeit the vessel for violation of the Nonintercourse Act. See 8 THE
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captors had failed to show that the Flying Fish and the Charming Betsy
were American owned at the time of their capture. Without American
ownership, the Court found no basis on which to forfeit the vessels under
the Nonintercourse Act.
On the question of damages for wrongful capture, the Court adopted a
fairly strict approach. On the one hand, the Court recognized that the
captors had acted with “correct motives” and “pure intention” in seizing the
vessels.86 Writing for the Court in both cases, Chief Justice Marshall
expressed sympathy for the difficult position of a “public officer entrusted
on the high seas to perform a duty deemed necessary by his country, and
executing according to the best of his judgment the orders he has
received.”87 On the other hand, the Court refused to treat the officer’s good
faith as a legal justification for the wrongful seizure. Thus, the Court
explained in Murray that a captain is necessarily “a victim of any mistake
he commits.”88 But this strict liability extended only to actual damages; the
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 1789–1800, at 320–
26 (Maeva Marcus et al. eds., 2007). In an unreported opinion, the Supreme Court affirmed the
circuit court’s rejection of the forfeiture claim. See id. at 325; 1 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF
THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 1789–1800, at 324 (Maeva Marcus et al. eds.,
1985) (reproducing minute entry of Supreme Court decision). Imlay later sued Sands in New
York state court and, despite the state court’s recognition that Sands had probable cause for the
seizure, succeeded in recovering damages. Imlay v. Sands, 1 Cai. 566, 567 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1804)
(concluding that court was “bound to pronounce the law as we find it” and to “leave cases of
hardship, if any exist, to legislative provision”). See generally 2 THE LAW PRACTICE OF
ALEXANDER HAMILTON 858–60 (Julius Goebel Jr. ed., 1969) (recounting litigation history and
Hamilton’s role in representing Sands). Sands secured indemnity from Congress in 1815. See
infra Appendix Table 2. As in other similar cases, Richard Söderström, the Swedish consul who
also acted on behalf of Danish interests, 6 THE PAPERS OF JOHN MARSHALL 21 n.1 (Charles F.
Hobson ed., 1990), asked Timothy Pickering, the Secretary of State, to intervene in the litigation.
See Letter from Richard Söderström to Timothy Pickering (July 30, 1799), in 8 THE
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 1789–1800, supra,
at 329–31 (inviting Pickering to terminate forfeiture so as to avoid “the delay & expence of
Judicial proceedings”). Pickering replied that the executive branch should not control the
judiciary. Id. at 331 n.5.
86 Murray, 6 U.S. at 124 (acknowledging that Murray had acted from “correct motives, from
a sense of duty”); Little, 6 U.S. at 179 (acknowledging that Little had acted with “pure
intention”).
87 Murray, 6 U.S. at 124.
88 Id. Some observers have mistakenly interpreted the Murray decision as upholding a
defense based upon probable cause. See Leiner, supra note 28, at 16 (suggesting that probable
cause would have shielded Murray from imposition of damages). To be sure, Marshall spends
some time discrediting the evidence that was proffered in support of Murray’s good faith.
Murray, 6 U.S. at 122–23. But Marshall did not hold that probable cause would justify the
seizure; he simply found that there was not “such” probable cause as would justify it. Id. at 123;
id. at 67 (“Whatever probable cause might appear to captain Murray, to justify his conduct; or
excite suspicion at the time, he runs the risk of, and is amenable for consequences.”). Marshall
went on to explain that Murray’s character and good faith were such that he should not have his
case made harder “by a decision in any respect oppressive.” Id. at 124. In context, Marshall
softened the rule of strict liability for mistakes by foreclosing vindictive or punitive damages for
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Court explained that for a captain acting in good faith “it can never be
proper to give speculative or vindictive damages.”89 The Court remanded
Murray to the lower courts for a recalculation of damages and affirmed the
award in favor of the Flying Fish.90
The Little case has come into vogue in recent years for the light it
sheds on founding era perceptions of the President’s obligation to comply
with statutes regulating the exercise of war powers.91 From the perspective
of early federal administrative law, Marshall’s discussion of the Court’s
rejection of a qualified immunity defense based on “pure intentions” and
compliance with superior orders is an equally intriguing feature of the
opinion, which came down within a week of the Murray decision in
those who acted in good faith. Id.
The misunderstanding of the role of probable cause in Murray may reflect the influence of
the reporter, William Cranch, whose headnotes wrongly characterized Marshall’s holding.
Cranch’s notes suggest that liability in the case was based on a finding that there was “no
reasonable ground of suspicion” that the vessel was trading in violation of federal law. Id. at 65.
While the published version of the report clearly distinguishes the opinion of the Court from the
reporter’s notes, the electronic version of the case on Westlaw confuses matters by including the
reporter’s note under the heading “Marshall” and thus suggesting, incorrectly, that the
“reasonable suspicion” language forms part of Marshall’s opinion. See Murray v. Schooner
Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 64 (1804), 1804 WL 1103, at *1. Marshall’s opinion does
not begin until page 115 of the U.S. Reports. Murray, 6 U.S. at 115. Mistaken placement of
Cranch’s notes on Westlaw has apparently misled others. See Roger P. Alford, Foreign Relations
as a Matter of Interpretation: The Use and Abuse of Charming Betsy, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 1339,
1348 & n.38 (2006) (attributing to Marshall statement in Little that officer “acts at his peril”). The
statement in question appears in Cranch’s notes to the Little decision, see Little, 6 U.S. at 170, not
in Marshall’s opinion, which begins later. See id. at 176.
89 Murray, 6 U.S. at 112. Here we find an echo of the view, rooted both in Blackstone and in
the leading treatises of the early republic period in the United States, that the amount of damages
should take account not only of the loss that the victim had sustained but also of the nature of the
wrong. See John C.P. Goldberg, Two Conceptions of Tort Damages, 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 435,
443–45 (2006) (collecting evidence from works by Blackstone, Nathan Dane, and Zephaniah
Swift that ordinary (nonpunitive) tort damages could include award to take account of actor’s
malicious intent).
90 The Court’s decree in Murray specifically affirmed the restoration of the vessel but
remanded for a calculation of damages by a commission appointed by the circuit court. See
Murray, 6 U.S. at 125. In directing the appointment of a commission on damages, the Court may
have been subtly suggesting that the district court had erred in assigning the calculation of
damages to the clerk of the district court, a point Dallas made in his argument. See id. at 75
(pointing out error of relying on clerk while acknowledging that point had not been preserved for
review on appeal).
91 See, e.g., David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in Chief at the Lowest
Ebb—A Constitutional History, 121 HARV. L. REV. 941, 967–70 (2008) (discussing Little’s
holding as recognizing implied restrictions on President’s warmaking powers due to contrary
congressional authorizations); Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., The Enemy Combatant Cases in Historical
Context: The Inevitability of Pragmatic Judicial Review, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1005, 1025–
26 (2007) (arguing that Little concludes that “the President did not have Article II power to
exceed Congress’s explicit directive”); J. Gregory Sidak, The Quasi War Cases—And Their
Relevance to Whether “Letters of Marque and Reprisal” Constrain Presidential War Powers, 28
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 465 (2005) (arguing that Quasi-War cases provide lens to understand
private versus public warmaking powers).
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February 1804. Marshall made clear the issues at stake in this decision:
I confess the first bias of my mind was very strong in favor of the
opinion that though the instructions of the executive could not give a
right, they might yet excuse from damages. I was much inclined to think
that a distinction ought to be taken between acts of civil and those of
military officers; and between proceedings within the body of the
country and those on the high seas. That implicit obedience which
military men usually pay to the orders of their superiors, which indeed is
indispensably necessary to every military system, appeared to me
strongly to imply the principle that those orders, if not to perform a
prohibited act, ought to justify the person whose general duty it is to
obey them, and who is placed by the laws of his country in a situation
which in general requires that he should obey them. I was strongly
inclined to think that where, in consequence of orders from the
legitimate authority, a vessel is seized with pure intention, the claim of
the injured party for damages would be against that government from
which the orders proceeded, and would be a proper subject for
negotiation. But I have been convinced that I was mistaken, and I have
receded from this first opinion. I acquiesce in that of my brethren, which
is, that the instructions cannot change the nature of the transaction or
legalize an act which without those instructions, would have been a
plain trespass.92

Marshall here made a number of interesting points.93 He suggests that
a defense based on compliance with a superior officer’s orders would
transform the claim from one against the officer to one against the
government. Marshall apparently envisioned that such a claim would be
resolved through diplomatic channels by way of “negotiation.”94 In the end,
though, Marshall rejected the superior-orders defense, as applied to military
conduct and affirmed the damages award against Little. Perhaps Justice
Chase persuaded him that the superior-orders defense had no place in
92

Little, 6 U.S. at 179.
Among other key points, Marshall suggests that the rule of official liability should be
harsher for civil than for military officers. One might view such an insight as captured in the
Bivens line of cases, which admits the possibility of constitutional tort liability for civilian but not
for military officers. See United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 680 (1987) (holding that service
members may not sue officials responsible for conducting involuntary drug experiments on
them); Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 305 (1983) (holding that service members may not sue
superior officers for racial discrimination).
94 Although he did not say so, Marshall may have envisioned negotiation through a treaty-like
process following espousal of the claims by the Danish government. On espousal of private
claims in the international context, see generally Thomas H. Lee, The Supreme Court of the
United States as Quasi-International Tribunal: Reclaiming the Court’s Original and Exclusive
Jurisdiction Over Treaty-Based Suits by Foreign States Against States, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1675
(2004). Jay’s Treaty with Great Britain sought to settle a variety of private claims of English
subjects whose property and contract rights had been invaded during the Revolutionary War. See
Henry Paul Monaghan, Article III and Supranational Judicial Review, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 833,
852–57 (2007) (describing origins and elements of Jay’s Treaty).
93
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military or civilian law.95
Both the prospect of indemnity and doubts as to the propriety of
qualified immunity may have informed Marshall’s change of heart.96
Indeed, two years before the Little and Murray cases came before the
Court, Congress agreed to underwrite the settlement of another case
involving the Navy’s mistaken seizure of a Danish vessel. In that case,
William Maley, the Lieutenant commanding the Experiment, seized the
schooner Amphitheatre, owned and operated by Danish citizen Paolo
Paoly.97 Maley eventually sailed the vessel to Philadelphia and libeled it in
the federal admiralty court there.98 Although Maley won at trial, the circuit
court reversed that decision and awarded $7000 damages to Paoly for
wrongful capture and detention. At this point, Maley apparently
disappeared; in any case, he never appealed to the Supreme Court.99
Instead, the Danish consul to the United States, Richard Söderström, acting
95 During oral argument in Murray, Justice Chase repeatedly dismissed all discussions of the
good faith of the captors and the terms of their instructions on the ground that neither
consideration would entitle the officer to a defense if he had exceeded the limited authority
conferred by the statute. See Murray, 6 U.S. at 78 n.†. Justice Chase’s view prevailed; the Court
later held that superior orders do not provide a justification for illegal actions by either civil or
military officers. See Mitchell v. Harmony, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 115, 137 (1851).
96 One must also recognize the possibility that Marshall did not agree with the disposition and
was, in effect, dissenting from his own opinion by articulating the “first bias of [his] mind.” Little,
6 U.S. at 179.
97 Maley had a brief and inglorious career in the Navy. See STODDERT’S WAR, supra note 56,
at 167–68. Although he was apparently a competent sailor, Maley’s subordinates accused him of
drunkenness, cowardice, and fighting. He was brought before a court of inquiry on these charges.
Stoddert, the naval secretary, eventually dismissed Maley from the service for failure to respect
the rights of neutral vessels, describing Maley as a “very ignorant illiterate man.” Id. at 168. Of
the fourteen prizes he claimed during his tour of duty, only a fraction were upheld in subsequent
litigation. Id.
98 After Maley seized the Amphitheatre, it was pressed into service as a tender to support a
frigate under the command of Commodore Talbot. Only much later, when the squadron returned
to port, did Maley pursue the vessel’s adjudication as prize. See STODDERT’S WAR, supra note
56, at 174, 181.
Although we have been unable to locate a copy of the decision of the Circuit Court for the
District of Pennsylvania in Maley v. Amphitheatre, the report of the House committee in favor of
Paoly’s petition for compensation includes a brief description of that opinion. The report indicates
that the district court ruled in favor of Maley and condemned the vessel as lawful prize. See
REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE PETITION OF PAOLO PAOLY, Cong. 7th, Sess. 2d (1802),
microformed on AMERICAN IMPRINTS, Ser. No. 2, No. S3417 (NewsBank, Inc.) [hereinafter
PAOLY REPORT]. On appeal to the circuit court, Paoly obtained a “reversal of that sentence.” Id.
The Committee reported that the United States is “bound by the principles of justice and equity to
make restitution and refund to the petitioner” an amount in excess of $7000. Id. Other sources
indicate that the circuit court opinion came down in May 1801. See 3 THE PAPERS OF JAMES
MADISON: SECRETARY OF STATE SERIES 47 n.2 (D.B. Mattern et al. eds., 1995) [hereinafter 3
MADISON PAPERS] (reporting that Pennsylvania circuit court reversed district court and awarded
damages against Maley in May 1801).
99 See Letter from James Madison to Alexander J. Dallas (June 15, 1802) in 3 MADISON
PAPERS, supra note 98, at 308 (reporting that Maley was, as of June 1802, “both absent from the
United States and in a state of insolvency”).
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as Paoly’s attorney-in-fact and seeking the adoption of a private bill to pay
the judgment, submitted a petition to Congress.100 Söderström’s efforts
quickly bore fruit: Following a favorable committee report in March 1802,
Congress enacted a bill in April 1802 appropriating the sum in question.
But the bill did not indemnify Maley; the appropriated funds were payable
directly to Paoly.101 In addition, the bill required that Paoly acknowledge on
record that he received the funds in “full satisfaction of the judgment
against the said Maley in the premises.” In short, Congress appears to have
settled the litigation by paying Paoly directly.
One final, notable case, also involving the unfortunate Lieutenant
Maley, arose after Maley detained a Danish vessel during the Quasi-War
with France. Maley detained the Mercator, a vessel owned by the same
Jared Shattuck involved in litigation with Alexander Murray.102 While
under American control, a British warship claimed Shattuck’s ship and
sailed it to a prize court in Jamaica. Eventually, the British prize court ruled
against Shattuck and ordered the vessel forfeited, apparently on the ground
that it was French.103 Shattuck initiated proceedings in the federal admiralty
100 See PAOLY REPORT, supra note 98 (reciting facts surrounding capture of Amphitheatre).
Söderström corresponded with Madison about the Paoly case and provided him with a copy of his
petition on Paoly’s behalf. See Letter from Richard Söderström to James Madison (Mar. 15,
1802), in 3 MADISON PAPERS, supra note 98, at 36 (inviting Madison’s advice as to whether “the
owner should and ought to petition Congress for the payment”); Letter from Richard Söderström
to James Madison (Mar. 18, 1802), in 3 MADISON PAPERS, supra note 98, at 46 (describing
himself as Paoly’s agent under power of attorney and recounting conversation in which Madison
advised him to petition Congress for payment following entry of judicial decree in favor of
owner). In the March 18 letter, Söderström noted that he was enclosing a copy of his petition on
Paoly’s behalf and intended to present the petition to Congress “today,” id., thus enabling us to
date the submission of the petition.
Treasury records report that Söderström was paid $7040.50 as Paoly’s representative. See
Letter from the Treasurer of the United States Accompanying the General Account of his Office,
at *6 (Dec. 27, 1802), microformed on EARLY AMERICAN IMPRINTS, Ser. No. 2, No. 3330
(NewsBank, Inc.).
101 See Act for the Relief of Paolo Paoly, ch. 27, 6 Stat. 47 (1802). Although the record does
not make this clear, it seems likely that Congress chose to make its payment directly to Paoly
after concluding that Maley was insolvent. As we shall see, Maley was also named as the
defendant in a case involving the seizure of the Mercator owned by Jared Shattuck. Shattuck
successfully petitioned for a private bill as well, securing a payment of some $33,864.55. As in
the Paoly proceeding, the private bill in Shattuck’s case called for the payment to Shattuck
himself, rather than to Maley. The report of the Supreme Court’s decision in that case notes
Maley’s insolvency and absence, as does Madison’s correspondence with Dallas. See Maley v.
Shattuck, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 458, 470 (1806) (noting that Maley died insolvent); Letter from
James Madison to Alexander Dallas, supra note 99, at 308 (reporting that Maley was both absent
and insolvent).
102 See Compensation for Seizure, 1 Op. Att’y Gen. 106, 106 (1802) (recounting events
surrounding Maley’s seizure of Mercator). Other cases grew out of the enforcement of the
Nonintercourse Act during the Quasi-War but did not produce any notable contribution to the
law. See Sands v. Knox, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 499, 503 (1806) (upholding award against government
official and treating case as controlled by prior decision in Murray).
103 For an account of the background of the litigation, see Shattuck, 7 U.S. 458. See also
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court in Pennsylvania, bringing a libel action against Maley for wrongful
detention. Maley apparently never appeared in the litigation; rather,
Madison directed the attorney for the district of Pennsylvania, Alexander
Dallas, to represent Maley’s interests. Madison, the Danish minister, and
Dallas treated the matter as an amicable proceeding to determine whether
Shattuck suffered a cognizable wrong.104
When the case reached the Supreme Court, Marshall viewed it as
essentially governed by prior decisions; the vessel was Danish and thus was
not subject to detention.105 The wrongful detention subjected Maley to
liability, regardless of what happened later at the hands of the British. The
court that found Shattuck’s failure to perfect an appeal from his loss in
Jamaica was irrelevant; Shattuck could abandon his claim.106 Nor did the
Jamaica disposition require an American court to accept the conclusion that
the vessel was French. Damages for loss of the vessel were assessed in the
amount of $33,244.67 (a figure well beyond the means of most naval
officers and certainly beyond those of the insolvent Lieutenant Maley).107
As it had in the Paoly case, Congress paid this amount directly to Shattuck
by way of private bill.108 The next Part explores the private bill process and
the factors that led Congress to pay for all four wrongful seizures.
III
PRIVATE BILLS AND OFFICIAL INDEMNIFICATION

The federal practice of adopting private bills109 began when the first
REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE, H.R. DOC. NO. 9-175 (1st Sess. 1806), reprinted in 1
AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: CLAIMS 332–33 (Washington, Gales & Seaton 1834) (reporting to
Congress in favor of payment of Shattuck’s petition for payment of amount awarded in judgment
of Supreme Court).
104 We discuss the connection between the Paoly legislation and the Shattuck litigation in Part
III.B infra.
105 Shattuck, 7 U.S. at 489–91.
106 Id. at 485.
107 Id. at 477.
108 See Act for the Relief of Jared Shattuck, ch. 14, 6 Stat. 116 (1813) (appropriating
$33,864.55 plus interest since date of Supreme Court decree in Shattuck’s favor).
109 Some have suggested a distinction between public and private laws on the basis that public
laws were published. See DANIEL J. HULSEBOSCH, CONSTITUTING EMPIRE: NEW YORK AND THE
TRANSFORMATION OF CONSTITUTIONALISM IN THE ATLANTIC WORLD, 1664–1830, at 55 (2005)
(reporting that British Parliament published public acts but did not publish private bills). In
general, as Hulsebosch also notes, private bills in the parliamentary tradition began with the
submission of petitions and often involved such matters as debtor relief, reimbursements,
licenses, land questions, and naturalization. Id. Yet, as noted below, Congress took early steps to
ensure the publication of all acts, broad and narrow alike. See infra note 128 and accompanying
text. As a result, it may make more sense to draw the line between public and private bills on the
basis of their relative breadth (generality) or narrowness. Something like that distinction appears
in Burch’s Index, the congressionally sponsored collection of legislation published in 1828. As
the Index explains, it set out to provide a “General Index to the Laws of the United States of
America . . . in which the principles involved in acts for the relief of individuals, or of a private or
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Congress convened in 1789, but the first bills to indemnify federal officers
did not appear for another decade.110 Much of the early private legislation
addressed individual claims that dated from the Articles of Confederation.
Later, because of the commission of maritime torts during the Quasi-War,
Congress faced the issue of how to handle petitions for indemnity. Part
III.A will offer a brief overview of private bill practice as it developed in
the early republic. Part III.B will then examine in greater detail the
circumstances surrounding the early adoption of federal indemnifying
legislation for maritime torts.111 Part III.C examines the way the maritime
precedents were institutionalized for use in domestic cases. Part III.D
explores the way the prospect of indemnity interacted with other features of
the officer’s employment relationship to shape the incentives of
government agents.
A.

An Introduction to the Practice of Private Legislation

In a practice narrower than that of many state assemblies, Congress’s

local nature, are arranged.” BURCH’S INDEX, supra note 21, at i. This Article will follow Burch’s
Index in defining private legislation in terms of its functional character as legislation for the relief
of an individual petitioner or to address private or local matters.
One can see something like this distinction in the way the practice of petitioning gave way to
the adoption of general laws. The petitions of Revolutionary War veterans were first handled on
an individual basis, see infra note 112, but this body of claims was transferred to the federal
courts and the War Department. See Act of Mar. 23, 1792, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 243 (providing for
federal courts to make initial determinations of disability subject to review by War Department);
Pfander, supra note 29, at 35–40 (describing evolution of pension system). Something very
similar occurred in connection with petitions from the widows of veterans. As Kristin Collins
reports, the steady stream of widows’ petitions eventually led to the adoption of the watershed act
of July 4, 1836, ch. 362, 5 Stat. 127, which establised a general framework for widows’ pensions.
See Kristin A. Collins, “Petitions Without Number”: Women’s Petitions and the Nineteenth
Century Origins of Marriage-Based Entitlements 30–34 (unpublished manuscript) (on file with
author).
110 The first private bill of indemnity that we have located was adopted in April 1802. See
supra note 101. The first such public bill was enacted even earlier. In 1799, Congress
appropriated $11,000 to cover the losses awarded by the circuit court in Virginia for the wrongful
capture of the English vessel the Niger. Act of Mar. 2, 1799, ch. 28, 1 Stat. 723; see also infra
note 174. We have been unable to locate a copy of the circuit court opinion and cannot say with
any certainty if the amount appropriated corresponded to the amount fixed by the judgment of the
circuit court or was agreed upon through negotiations between the United States and Great
Britain. The legislation itself speaks of the circuit court’s award of damages as having run
“against the United States,” not against Captain Nicholson. § 3, 1 Stat. at 724.
111 For an introduction to private bill practice in the American colonies, see BAILEY, supra
note 42, and S.M. Pargellis, The Procedure of the Virginia House of Burgesses, 7 WM. & MARY
Q. 143 (1927). For an overview of private bill practice in Congress, see generally 1 CONG.
QUARTERLY, GUIDE TO CONGRESS 614–15 (6th ed. 2008), Charles E. Schamel, Untapped
Resources: Private Claims and Private Legislation in the Records of the U.S. Congress, 27
1
(1995),
available
at
PROLOGUE
http://www.archives.gov/publications/prologue/1995/spring/private-claims-1.html, and Note,
Private Bills in Congress, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1684 (1966).
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enactment of private bills in the early years consisted primarily of the
payment of money, often to Revolutionary War veterans or their
survivors.112 Congress avoided other common forms of private legislation,
perhaps due in part to constitutional limits on the scope of congressional
power.113 For example, despite the fact that the Constitution gave Congress
authority over naturalization, Congress initially declined to adopt private
naturalization bills.114 Similarly, Congress did not appear to view itself as
authorized to grant a divorce, dock an entail, or overturn the decisions of
the federal judiciary.115 Limitations on federal legislative authority and the
separation of government powers thus restricted the scope of Congress’s
private bill authority.116 No one appears to have doubted, however, that
112 Thus, Congress’s first private bill provided compensation to a war veteran for services
rendered. See Act To Allow the Baron de Glaubeck the Pay of a Captain in the Army of the
United States, ch. 26, 6 Stat. 1 (1789). At least some veterans’ petitions sought only to hold the
Continental Congress to its promise; legislation adopted during the war guaranteed soldiers
disability and pension payments. See Kristin A. Collins, Federalism’s Fallacy: The Early
Tradition of Federal Family Law and the Invention of States’ Rights, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 1761,
1785 n.78 (2005) (laying out disability and pension laws adopted by Continental Congress).
Private bills also provided relief from the payment of import duties. See, e.g., Act for the Relief of
Thomas Jenkins and Company, ch. 20, 6 Stat. 2 (1790). For a useful overview of Congress’s
procedures for handling private bills, see 8 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL
CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 748–87 (Kenneth R. Bowling et al. eds., 1998)
[hereinafter FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS]. See also William C. diGiancomantonio, Petitioners and
Their Grievances: A View from the First Congress, in HOUSE & SENATE IN THE 1790S, supra
note 22, at 29, 47 (“The overwhelming majority of the petitions submitted to the First Congress
were direct by-products of the War for Independence . . . .”).
113 The scope of private legislation at the federal level was far narrower than that in some state
assemblies, where private bills might provide equitable relief from a common law disposition or
confer naturalized citizenship on the petitioner. Elsewhere, private legislation was enacted to
create a new corporation, to provide a divorce, to dock the entail of certain real property, or to
provide a land grant. Perhaps most commonly, private legislation would provide for the payment
of a sum of money to the petitioner. The assembly’s control of the appropriations power naturally
attracted money claims or what came to be known as public claims. See generally BAILEY, supra
note 42, at 114–31 (describing variety of claims presentd to Virginia legislature); Desan,
Constitutional Commitment, supra note 41 (describing tradition of legislative resolution of claims
against government in New York).
114 See BERNADETTE MAGUIRE, IMMIGRATION: PUBLIC LEGISLATION AND PRIVATE BILLS 3
(1997) (“Immigration bills were very few in the early days of Congress.”). Maguire notes John
Campbell White’s private naturalization bill in 1839 as the first private immigration bill enacted
by Congress. Id. Elsewhere, Pfander and Wardon contend that Congress had studiously avoided
private naturalization bills up to that time on the ground that the Constitution obligated it to adopt
public laws of general applicability. James E. Pfander & Theresa R. Wardon, Reclaiming the
Immigration Constitution of the Early Republic: Prospectivity, Uniformity, and Transparency, 96
VA. L. REV. 359, 393–403 (2010).
115 Of the private bills adopted in the 1790s, none dealt with these subjects.
116 Article I of the Constitution did not give Congress specific power over family and property
law matters; contemporaries would have thought this omission ruled out a congressional role in
granting divorces and docking entails. Article III was thought to vest all the judicial power in the
federal courts and to foreclose both executive and legislative revision of judicial decrees. On the
early exposition of the doctrine of judicial finality and the related ban on legislative and executive
revision of judicial decrees, see HART & WECHSLER, supra note 1, at 86–93.
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Congress could adopt legislation that paid public money to private
individuals.117 Perhaps any debt that Congress chose to recognize and pay
was seen as a debt of the United States within the meaning of Article I.
Private bills invariably began with the submission of a petition to
Congress. Petitions came in many forms. Some contained the signatures of
a broad range of individuals and advocated the adoption of public laws;
such group petitions operated somewhat like public opinion polls do today
by communicating community sentiment about an important piece of
proposed legislation. Some petitions, by contrast, contained but a single
signature and requested relief on behalf of a single individual. The first
Congress received petitions of both kinds. The tradesmen and merchants of
Baltimore, Maryland, petitioned for the adoption of a public law imposing
import duties on foreign goods.118 Meanwhile, inventors and authors
petitioned for the adoption of private bills conferring patent and copyright
protection.119 War veterans petitioned for compensation and pensions,
seeking a private appropriation of money.
The procedure for handling petitions continued to evolve throughout
the early republic. Petitions were read upon their arrival in the House or
Senate and allowed to lie upon the table.120 Both the House and Senate also
117 Some observers link the power to adopt private bills to the right to petition the government
for a redress of grievances. See U.S. CONST. amend. I. Yet the individual right to petition does not
necessarily imply a power in Congress to provide the redress requested; petitions may address
themselves to matters outside Congress’s authority. Close observers of the records of the
Philadelphia Convention have found support for a power to authorize payments to private
individuals. See Figley & Tidmarsh, supra note 27, at 1254–55, 1259. One might nonetheless
imagine a limit on private bill authority derived from the requirement that Congress spend money
“to pay the debts and provide for the . . . general welfare of the United States.” U.S. CONST. art. I,
§ 8, cl. 1. The provision of a wholly private benefit, if conferred through a private bill, might fail
a general welfare test. Today, of course, the broad definition of the spending power would
seemingly foreclose such an argument. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206–07 (1987)
(“In considering whether a particular expenditure is intended to serve general public purposes,
courts should defer substantially to the judgment of Congress.”). Even during the antebellum
period, the Court found little reason to question Congress’s power to appropriate money to
private parties. See Emerson v. Hall, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 409 (1839) (characterizing private
appropriation as gift or donation but raising no question about its constitutional legitimacy).
118 According to the House Journal, tradesmen and merchants from Baltimore, Maryland,
submitted a petition on April 11, 1789, asking Congress to impose taxes on foreign goods. H. R.
JOURNAL, 1st Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1789). On April 13, a second petition arrived, this time from
shipwrights in Charleston, South Carolina. Id. at 13. On April 15, petitions seeking individual
copyright and patent protection were brought before the House. Id. at 14. Petitions from two
widows of veterans of the Revolutionary War were received on May 4, 1789. Id. at 26–27. See
generally diGiacomantonio, supra note 112, at 31–35 (describing trade-related commercial
petitions).
119 See diGiacomantonio, supra note 112, at 39–41 (describing petitions for copyright and
patent protection).
120 The House rules provided as follows:
Petitions, memorials, and other papers addressed to the House, shall be presented
through the Speaker, or by a member in his place, and shall not be debated or decided
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called for brief summaries of the contents of petitions.121 Upon receiving
petitions, the House felt some obligation to deal with each one on the
merits, either by committing it to a three-person committee or by assigning
it to the Committee of the Whole House.122 Often the referral to a
committee led to some investigation of the petition’s merits. Committees
might ask an executive department, often the Department of the Treasury
or the Department of War, for advice about the disposition of the claim. On
occasion, the committee would investigate the petition itself, perhaps
through inquiry directed to the principals. Eventually, the committee would
report to the House, recommending a disposition of the petition. If the
House agreed with a favorable committee report, it would direct the
committee to draft appropriate legislation. If such legislation was debated
and approved by the House and Senate, and signed by the President, it
became law and provided a warrant for the payment of public money from
the treasury.
Compared with that of some other assemblies, the practice of
Congress was remarkably inexpensive, open, and transparent. To petition
for a private bill in England was to enter a shadowy world where it was
necessary to hire special counsel, pay a series of exorbitant fees to the
officers of Parliament, and provide whatever additional gratuities were
necessary to grease the wheels of private justice.123 Fees placed the private
bill process beyond the reach of most individuals of modest means and
earned the Speakers of the Houses of Commons and Lords a great deal of
money.124 By way of contrast, Congress did not require petitioners to pay
an official fee at any stage in the private bill process. Members of Congress
and their staff were paid out of public funds and did not earn any additional
income on the basis of the number of petitions they received or bills they

on the day of their being first read, unless where the House shall direct otherwise; but
shall lie on the table to be taken up in the order they were read.
REPORT OF THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON STANDING RULES AND ORDERS OF PROCEEDING (Apr. 7,
1789), reprinted in 8 FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS, supra note 112, at 766.
121 On the Senate side, the summary was offered just before the petition was read. See
STANDING RULES OF THE SENATE, R. 20 (Apr. 18, 1789), reprinted in 8 FIRST FEDERAL
CONGRESS, supra note 112, at 752. On the House side, it became the practice to read the petitions
in full but to publish a summary in the House journal. See 8 FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS, supra
note 112, at xvi (reporting that proposal to summarize petitions became practice in House).
122 The Quaker petition campaign for the abolition of slavery in 1790 sorely tested this
tradition of considered disposition. See generally William C. diGiacomantonio, “For the
Gratification of a Volunteering Society”: Antislavery and Pressure Group Politics in the First
Federal Congress, 15 J. EARLY REPUBLIC 169 (1995).
123 On the high cost of securing a private bill of naturalization from Parliament, see II
FREDERICK CLIFFORD, A HISTORY OF PRIVATE BILL LEGISLATION 725 (London, Butterworths
1887).
124 On the amount of income from parliamentary fees, see id. at 716–17, which notes that
petitioners were “continually abused by excessive charges” by both clerks and high officials.
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enacted.125 As a consequence, petitions flowed into Congress for the
payment of amounts that seem almost trifling by today’s standards.126
While Congress received a substantial number of petitions prepared by
experts, many were written by the petitioners themselves and bear some
resemblance to the in forma pauperis petitions that now flow into state and
federal courts.127
Two final features of the transparency of early practice in handling
private bills deserve mention. First, in contrast with the modern legislative
world of hidden perks and pork, the bills themselves were worded in ways
that provided the reader with a fairly good idea of why the legislation was
adopted. The laws did not simply appropriate a sum to an identified
individual but explained in brief the circumstances that gave rise to the
legislation. Second, Congress took pains to ensure that all laws, public and
private, became a part of the public record. Thus, legislation adopted by the
first Congress provided that whenever any bill, vote, or resolution took
effect, either by presidential concurrence or legislative override of a
presidential veto, the Secretary of State was obliged to record the original,
publish a true copy in three public newspapers, and deliver printed copies
to every member of the House and Senate and to the governor of every
state.128 Early practice under this law resulted in the consistent publication
of private laws. For example, the National Intelligencer, a Washington,
D.C.–based newspaper, published “By Authority,” a complete version of
each of the private laws adopted to indemnify naval officers for maritime
torts against Danish vessels.129 Such transparency allowed the people to
evaluate the work of their representatives and moderated any tendency
among members of Congress to adopt private bills that lacked any obvious
public justification.130
125 Legislation provided for the payment of a per diem to members of Congress along with a
stipend to cover travel expenses. See Act of Sept. 22, 1789, ch. 17, 1 Stat. 70 (specifying $6 per
day, and per twenty miles of travel, for attendance in House and $7 per day, and per twenty miles
of travel, for attendance in Senate). There was no provision for the payment of additional
compensation to the leadership of the two chambers. In one exception to the rule against user
fees, the House provided for the sergeant-at-arms to collect a fee of $2 from every person arrested
for contempt and additional fees to defray the cost of custody. See H.R. JOURNAL, 1st Cong., 1st
Sess. 14 (1789).
126 See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 17-566 (1st Sess. 1822), reprinted in 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS:
CLAIMS, supra note 103, at 802 (listing claim for $6.46).
127 See Jeffrey L. Pasley, Private Access and Public Power: Gentility and Lobbying in the
Early Congress, in HOUSE & SENATE IN THE 1790S, supra note 22, at 57, 62–63. Pasley reports
that petitions often substituted for what we would today view as lobbying and notes the success of
an early lawyer, Miers Fisher, who secured adoption of private legislation on behalf of two
clients. Id. at 62. Other petitioners, facing straitened circumstances and unable to hire a lawyer,
submitted petitions that they drafted themselves.
128 Act of Sept. 15, 1789, ch. 14, § 2, 1 Stat. 68, 68.
129 Washington Advertiser, NATIONAL INTELLIGENCER, Apr. 21, 1802.
130 As the number of petitions proliferated, Congress adopted measures to streamline the

PFANDERHUNT-FIN2.DOC

December 2010]

11/8/2010 11:24:58 AM

PUBLIC WRONGS AND PRIVATE BILLS (DRAFT)

B.

131

Private Indemnification for Maritime Torts

By the time the Danish owners of vessels (and the Danish
government) began to seek compensation for their losses in the Quasi-War,
American diplomatic policy had changed rather sharply. For one thing,
President Adams had sent a diplomatic mission to France to negotiate a
cessation of hostilities.131 For another, the elections of 1800 put Adams out
of office and (after several ballots in the House of Representatives) led to
the installation of Thomas Jefferson as President.132 Although he
disappointed the French, who had hoped for a full-scale American
realignment, Jefferson pursued a foreign policy based on neutrality and
respect for the rights of neutral vessels.133 In addition, the United States
continued to pursue indemnity from France for the losses U.S. vessels had
suffered as neutral parties in the mid-1790s.134 All of these considerations
lent force to Danish claims for compensation.
Because they enjoyed considerable diplomatic support, the Danish
claims eventually landed on the desks of two well-known U.S. foreign
officers.135 The first belonged to John Marshall, the Secretary of State under
John Adams, and the soon-to-be Chief Justice who would write for the
Court in Little, Murray, and Maley v. Shattuck. Richard Söderström, the
Danish consul, approached Marshall in November 1800 seeking
compensation on behalf of Paolo Paoly and Jared Shattuck for the losses
process. One response was to assign responsibility for initial determinations to other institutions
of government, such as the federal courts or an executive body, subject to review by Congress. A
second response was to establish a standing Committee on Claims to which all petitions for
private money bills and public land were assigned. Over time, the single Committee on Claims
gave way to more specialized committees on veteran pensions, public lands, and so forth. A third
response was to adopt a public law setting forth rules for determining the issues at hand and
assigning the resolution of the claims to other institutions of government. For a summary of these
developments, see Shimomura, supra note 22, at 637–39, 643–48. By the 1830s, the system of
private claims was in a state of crisis. The House presented two reports detailing the problems
and arguing for the creation of an alternative institutional structure. Eventually, these calls for
reform led to the creation of the Court of Claims. Id. at 648–52.
131 See DECONDE, supra note 64, at 223–37 (describing mission of Oliver Ellsworth, William
R. Davie, and William Vans Murray as ministers to France). The mission produced a treaty of
peace in October 1800, which the United States and France ultimately ratified in July 1801. Id. at
316–20.
132 For an account of the balloting to break the electoral college tie between Jefferson and
Aaron Burr, see GORDON S. WOOD, EMPIRE OF LIBERTY: A HISTORY OF THE EARLY REPUBLIC,
1789–1815, at 284–85 (2009), which recounts that the House of Representatives, in February
1801, required several days and thirty-six ballots to break the electoral impasse.
133 DECONDE, supra note 64, at 306–10. Jeffersonian suspicions of Great Britain would
eventually lead to the War of 1812.
134 See DECONDE, supra note 64, at 229, 253–54 (identifying compensation for American
shipping losses as major goal of negotiation and noting that indemnity was deferred and then
omitted from eventual accord).
135 Timothy Pickering, the less well-known Secretary of State who preceded Marshall in that
office, also dealt with claims arising from the Quasi-War. See supra note 85.
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they suffered at the hands of William Maley.136 As perhaps befits a man
who was only months away from a new job, Marshall temporized.137
Several months later, after Jefferson’s inauguration, Söderström
approached the new Secretary of State, James Madison. The
correspondence began in June 1801 and continued through October, when
Madison asked that further discussions take place at the ministerial level.138
At that point, the Danish resident minister, Peder Blicherolsen, took up the
cases.139
In his correspondence with Danish representatives, Madison appears
to have played a decisive role in shaping the institutional response to the
reparation claims. He was quite clear throughout the exchange of letters
136 Richard Söderström represented the interests of several Danish vessel owners in letters to
the Secretary of State from November 1800 until March 1802. See, e.g., Letter from John
Marshall to Richard Söderström (Nov. 26, 1800), in 6 THE PAPERS OF JOHN MARSHALL, supra
note 85, at 21 (acknowledging receipt of Söderström’s letters); Letter from Richard Söderström to
James Madison (Mar. 18, 1802), supra note 100, at 46 (describing Söderström as Paoly’s agent).
137 Thus, Marshall noted that Maley had been relieved from naval duty due to his failure to
respect the rights of neutral vessels. Letter from John Marshall to Richard Söderström (Nov. 26,
1800), supra note 136, at 21. Marshall recommended an appeal from the British prize disposition
and concluded by disclaiming sufficient knowledge at present to accept responsibility should the
appeal fail. Id. When Shattuck’s claim against Maley came before the Court several years later,
Shattuck attempted to secure compensation for the cost of pursuing the British appeal, something
that Marshall was to reject in his opinion for the Court. See Maley v. Shattuck, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch)
458, 491–92 (1806) (concluding Maley was not liable for cost of pursuing appeal in British case).
138 See Letter from Richard Söderström to James Madison (June 10, 1801), in 1 THE PAPERS
OF JAMES MADISON: SECRETARY OF STATE SERIES 290 (Robert J. Brugger et al. eds., 1986)
[hereinafter 1 MADISON PAPERS]; Letter from Richard Söderström to James Madison (July 21,
1801), in 1 MADISON PAPERS, supra, at 452; Letter from Richard Söderström to James Madison
(Aug. 10, 1801), in 2 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON: SECRETARY OF STATE SERIES 29 (Mary
A. Hackett et al. eds., 1993) [hereinafter 2 MADISON PAPERS]. The last of the letters asked
specifically for a response. Id. at 30. It drew a fairly petulant letter from Madison. See Letter from
James Madison to Richard Söderström (Oct. 27, 1801), in 2 MADISON PAPERS, supra, at 206
(noting importance of following “useful and established forms” of diplomacy, by which Madison
meant that he would no longer deal with mere consul but would insist that residential minister
represent Danish subjects in “making their reclamations”). Nonetheless, Söderström continued to
send letters directly to Madison, including one in March 1802 that enclosed a copy of the petition
he would introduce on behalf of Paolo Paoly.
139 See Letter from Peder Blicherolsen to James Madison (Jan. 16, 1802), in 2 MADISON
PAPERS, supra note 138, at 400, 401 (asking that Madison “[p]ermit me therefore Sir, to urge Mr.
Söderströms [sic] request, that some mode” of adjudicating issue be agreed upon); Letter from
Peder Blicherolsen to James Madison (June 6, 1802), in 3 MADISON PAPERS, supra note 98, at
280. Blicherolsen’s letter refers to another letter dated April 22, 1802, in which Madison
proposed a resolution of the dispute between Maley and Shattuck’s vessel, the Mercator, through
an amicable proceeding in court between the claimant and Maley, with the United States
appearing on Maley’s behalf. Blicherolsen accepted the proposal and suggested that the litigation
proceed in the district court in Philadelphia. Id. Madison then wrote to Alexander Dallas, the
United States Attorney for the District of Pennsylvania, describing the dispute in brief and noting
that Maley was “both absent from the United States and in a state of insolvency.” Letter from
James Madison to Alexander J. Dallas (June 15, 1802), supra note 99, at 308. For Blicherolsen’s
identification as the Danish resident minister, see 34 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 451
(Barbara B. Oberg ed., 2007).
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that any solution must respect the role of the federal courts in adjudicating
claims of liability and the role of Congress in making any appropriation of
funds to pay the claims. Thus, in a letter to Söderström, Madison explained
that whatever the executive branch concluded about the justice of the
Danish claims, “it must be sanctioned by an appropriation of the
Legislature.”140 Moreover, Madison noted that “the general usage requires
that redress should be first prosecuted judicially.”141 Only if relief were not
obtained through the judicial process and only if “the obligations of the
United States should be found nevertheless to demand that compensation
should be made,” would the government consider making a payment.142
Each branch must play its assigned role in the process.143
Advice in March 1802 from the Attorney General, Levi Lincoln,
confirmed Madison’s view about the need for adjudication. Lincoln raised
questions both about the extent of Maley’s liability for the seizure of
Shattuck’s vessel (the Mercator) and about the degree of any government
responsibility for the losses Shattuck suffered.144 Lincoln explained that one
could doubt Maley’s responsibility for the loss of the Mercator, given the
intervening British prize claim by which the vessel was condemned.145
Even if Maley were responsible, Lincoln could find “no principle of the
law of nations” that would require the government to “answer in the first
instance” for the unlawful captures committed by its citizens or to become
liable as a result of their insolvency or avoidance.146 Lincoln admitted that
governments might provide a reparation as a matter of policy “under . . .
special circumstances,” but this was not viewed as a “great and obvious
principle[] . . . of national right.”147 Lincoln thus recommended that the
government of the United States “ought not to interfere” but should leave
Shattuck to any relief he might secure from Maley or from a reversal of the
British condemnation of his vessel in Jamaica.148

140 Letter from James Madison to Richard Söderström (July 23, 1801), in 1 MADISON PAPERS,
supra note 138, at 461.
141 Id.
142 Id.
143 Söderström, for his part, claimed to understand the necessity of interbranch coordination.
See Letter from Richard Söderström to James Madison (Aug. 10, 1801), supra note 138, at 29
(describing himself as “well aware” of need for legislative appropriation). But he nonetheless
sought to secure some kind of arbitral assessment of the loss so as to avoid having recourse to
“tedious & expensive judicial proceedings.” Id.
144 See Opinion of Levi Lincoln to Secretary of State (Mar. 11, 1802), in 1 Op. Att’y Gen. 106
(1852).
145 Id. at 107.
146 Id. at 108.
147 Id.
148 Id. Söderström pointed out to Madison that the outbreak of hostilities between Britain and
Denmark left Shattuck with “no hope whatever of obtaining any satisfaction from that quarter.”
Letter from Richard Söderström to James Madison (June 10, 1801), supra note 138, at 292
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Following his receipt of Lincoln’s opinion, Madison made
arrangements to secure a judicial determination of Shattuck’s claim against
Maley. In a letter to the Danish minister dated April 23, 1802, Madison
explained that Shattuck’s claim could not be adjusted without a prior
judicial investigation: “According to the usual course, injuries committed
on aliens as well as citizens, ought to be carried in the first instance at least,
before the tribunals to which the aggressors are responsible . . . .”149 Such
an adjudication would enable the government to determine the
circumstances surrounding the seizure and could shed light on the question
Lincoln raised, namely whether the intervening seizure of the vessel by a
British privateer was the true cause of the loss. Madison closed by
explaining that Blicherolsen should prepare to show why, under the law
and usage of nations, the government of the United States should be
responsible for making redress, rather than the “positive authors” of the
injury.150 In other words, Madison was not promising that ultimate
compensation would be forthcoming even if Shattuck were successful in
the judicial proceeding.151
Madison also played a central role in getting the litigation against
Maley underway. This was complicated, needless to say, by the fact that
Maley was both absent from the country and presumed insolvent.152
Madison invited the Danish minister to choose a forum for the litigation;153
Blicherolsen chose the Pennsylvania district court as the venue closest to
his own residence in the United States and as the place where Maley
resided at the time of the capture and “may in his absence perhaps be most
legally sued.”154 Madison next arranged with Alexander Dallas, the United
States Attorney for the District of Pennsylvania, to assent to the institution
of a proceeding against Maley, directing that Dallas appear “in behalf of
Captn. Maley; in whose defence the United States are interested.”155
Madison enclosed copies of the only documents relating to the Mercator he
(emphasis omitted). Söderström was referring to Britain’s attack on Denmark to force it to
withdraw from the French-inspired League of Armed Neutrality. See DECONDE, supra note 64, at
310–11 (describing Britain’s demand that Denmark withdraw from League and its subsequent
attack on Danish navy).
149 Letter from James Madison to Peder Blicherolsen (Apr. 23, 1802), in 3 MADISON PAPERS,
supra note 98, at 152.
150 Id.
151 See id. (recognizing as “question, distinct from the conduct of Captain Maley, how far the
capture of the Mercator [by a British prize ship] . . . ought to make the United States rather than
Great Britain, liable to the Danish claimants”).
152 See id. (noting “absence of Captain Maley”).
153 Id. (indicating that adjudication could be had through “proper instructions to an Attorney of
the United States” as soon as minister “shall be pleased to signify the district” in which he would
prefer to proceed).
154 Letter from Peder Blicherolsen to James Madison (June 6, 1802), supra note 139.
155 Letter from James Madison to Alexander J. Dallas (June 15, 1802), supra note 99, at 308.
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could locate: a statement from a member of the crew supporting Maley’s
action in detaining the Mercator and a copy of the British vice admiralty
court’s decision condemning the vessel as lawful prize.156
Madison’s efforts to facilitate an amicable proceeding defended by the
United States Attorney might appear to have tied the government’s hands.
It would be difficult, after all, for the government to take the position that it
had no obligation to pay any resulting judgment in favor of Shattuck after
Madison had taken steps to involve the government in defending its own
interests in the litigation. (Shattuck could presumably have obtained a
default judgment against Maley,157 but the government doubtless would
have declined to pay such a judgment without a judicial investigation of
Maley’s defenses.) Madison’s agreement with the Danish minister thus
appears somewhat inconsistent with his stated view that the executive
branch must respect the role of Congress as paymaster. Shattuck’s success
in litigation would make it much more difficult for members of Congress to
argue that the United States bore no legal responsibility for the loss of the
Danish vessel.158
Madison’s desire to involve Congress in deciding the question of
indemnity for Danish vessel owners may help to explain the speed with
which the relief bill on behalf of Paolo Paoly became law.159 With a
156 Id. These documents were apparently destroyed when the British set fire to the nation’s
Capitol building during the War of 1812. See note accompanying H.R. REP. 9-175 (1806),
reprinted in 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: CLAIMS, supra note 103, at 333.
157 Although Maley was absent from Pennsylvania, it may have been possible to reach him
through the process of outlawry. For a description of the process and its use against absentees, see
3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES, *282–84, and 1 WILLIAM TIDD, THE PRACTICE OF
THE COURT OF KING’S BENCH IN PERSONAL ACTIONS 122–43 (Philadelphia, William P. Farrand,
2d ed. 1807).
158 Indeed, when Congress received a petition for payment of Shattuck’s claim in 1806, the
House asked Madison for his opinion as to the validity of Shattuck’s claim. Madison
recommended payment, recounting the steps that led to the litigation. In doing so, Madison
pointed out that he had reserved the rights of the United States in his correspondence with the
Danish minister and had explained that a judicial decree against Maley would not necessarily
obligate the United States. See H.R. REP. 9-175 (1806), reprinted in 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS:
CLAIMS, supra note 103, at 333 (“[A] final decree in the suit against William Maley should not,
in any degree, involve a decision upon the question, whether the United States are responsible . . .
.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
159 Madison may have taken the view he did in light of his own posture in the debate over
Jay’s Treaty. Madison argued not against the constitutionality of the treaty, but against its
wisdom. See David M. Golove, Treaty-Making and the Nation: The Historical Foundations of the
Nationalist Conception of the Treaty Power, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1075, 1178–85 (2000). He also
contended that, in order to implement any treaty that dealt with subjects within the scope of the
legislative power, the House would have to adopt implementing legislation, and the House could
deliberate as to whether to enact such legislation. 5 ANNALS OF CONG. 772–74 (1796). One
provision of the Treaty in particular, Article VI’s provision for the federal compensation of
frustrated British creditors, obviously implicated the role of the House in the enactment of money
bills. Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation, U.S.-Gr. Brit., art. VI, Nov. 19, 1794, 8 Stat.
116 [hereinafter Jay’s Treaty].
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judgment already issued against Maley, the bill moved very quickly
through the House. Söderström’s petition on behalf of Paoly, submitted on
March 18, 1802, was referred to committee on March 22, 1802 and
favorably reported out four days later on March 26.160 The Committee of
the Whole House agreed with the committee report and voted in favor of
compensation on April 2, 1802.161 The next day, a bill for Paoly’s relief
was read twice and committed to the Committee of the Whole House.162
The Committee met on April 5 and reported the bill without amendment.163
On April 6, the House read the bill a third time, voted in its favor, and sent
it to the Senate for consideration.164 Senate records reveal that the Senate
began work on the bill that same day, April 6, and completed its work on
April 12.165 Jefferson signed the bill on April 14, 1802,166 some three weeks
after the favorable House report on the petition. Few private indemnity bills
have moved so quickly through Congress. That it did so at a time when
Congress was engaged with other weighty matters suggests that the
legislation had strong backers.167
Although we have uncovered no direct evidence of their involvement
in promoting the Paoly legislation,168 Madison and Jefferson had good
reason to support the legislation and to encourage its speedy passage.169 In
160 See 11 ANNALS OF CONG. 1129 (1802) (reporting that House resolved itself into
Committee of the Whole to consider Söderström’s petition on behalf of Paoly and noting dates of
referral and favorable report).
161 Id.
162 Id. at 1131.
163 Id. at 1133.
164 Id. at 1141.
165 See id. at 253, 257, 259 (reading bill first and second time, ordering third reading, reading
it third time, and passing it).
166 See Act for the Relief of Paolo Paoly, ch. 27, 6 Stat. 47 (1802).
167 During the first session of the Seventh Congress, the Jeffersonians reworked a number of
Federalist institutions, including the judicial branch of government and the rules of naturalization.
See Act of Apr. 29, 1802, ch. 31, 2 Stat. 156 (amending judicial system of United States); Act of
Apr. 14, 1802, ch. 28, 2 Stat. 153 (rejecting fourteen-year waiting period for naturalization
adopted in 1798 and returning to five-year residency rule); Act of Mar. 8, 1802, ch. 8, 2 Stat. 132
(repealing Judiciary Act of 1801).
168 Highly suggestive indirect evidence appears in correspondence a year later. See Letter from
James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Feb. 21, 1803), in 2 THE REPUBLIC OF LETTERS 1260, 1260
(James Morton Smith ed., 1995) (noting Congress’s indemnification of Paoly). Madison’s letter
encloses his report on a Danish claim that American officers wrongly seized a Danish vessel and
condemned it (irregularly) before a British prize court. Madison’s cover letter reports that he
sought the review and acquiescence of “Mr. L,” doubtless a reference to Levi Lincoln. The letter
further refers to the precedent of “Paoli” in which Congress had “already interposed” and
explains that “[t]he judgm[ent] of the Court ag[ainst] Capt. Maley was p[aid] by Congs.”—a fact
Madison cited to support his view that compensation was owed in the instant case as well. Id.
169 The timing of the events of March and April 1802 also suggest a connection between the
Lincoln opinion, the action of Congress on the Paoly bill, and Madison’s proposal to the Danish
minister. The period of intense legislative action on the Paoly petition came immediately after
Lincoln delivered his opinion on March 11, 1802. Madison’s April 23 letter to the minister was
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addition to indemnifying Paoly for his loss, the bill established a precedent
that Congress would compensate the owners of neutral Danish vessels for
losses inflicted by officers of the United States. It also established that the
United States would provide indemnity directly to the affected owner when
the officer in question had become insolvent or was otherwise unavailable.
Madison found both conclusions extremely useful. For one, Congress’s
action nicely rebuffed the Attorney General’s opinion that the government
should leave Shattuck to his remedies against Maley and the British prize
crew. Madison could not easily reject advice from the chief legal officer of
the executive branch, but Congress could. In addition, Congress’s action in
the Paoly incident cleared the way for Madison to suggest a judicial
proceeding between Maley and Shattuck as the answer to the repeated
inquiries of the Danish ministry. Congressional action suggested that the
government would honor the results of the Shattuck litigation, just as it had
honored the judgment in the Paoly litigation. The Paoly legislation thus
added substantial weight to Madison’s proposed diplomatic solution and
removed any hint of interbranch impropriety. Rather than taking action on
his own that would oblige the government to pay any resulting judgment,
Madison may have encouraged Congress, as the government’s paymaster,
to establish a formal system for acceptance of responsibility on which he
and others could rely in continuing to process such cases. Notably,
Madison’s letter suggesting a judicial resolution of the Shattuck and Maley
dispute came shortly after the Paoly legislation had become law.
Whatever its diplomatic underpinnings and implications, the Paoly
legislation established a precedent that lent decisive shape to the indemnity
process. The next two private bills for the indemnification of federal
officials were adopted on behalf of Alexander Murray and George Little.
Both bills appear to have been viewed as routine matters. Murray’s
litigation at the Supreme Court had resulted in a remand to the circuit court
for the recalculation of damages. Following completion of that process,
Murray filed a petition for indemnification with Congress in 1804, which
was dutifully referred to the House Committee on Claims.170 The
Committee report, submitted to the House on January 8, 1805, noted that
Murray was liable to execution of the judgment. It also observed that
Murray had acted in accordance with the perception of his “duty” as an
officer and in compliance with his “public instructions” in intercepting the
Charming Betsy.171 The Committee thus recommended that Murray’s

sent shortly after Jefferson signed the Paoly legislation on April 14.
170 See H.R. REP. NO. 8-44 (2d Sess. 1805), reprinted in 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: NAVAL
AFFAIRS, supra note 18, at 128 (indicating that Murray’s memorial was referred to Committee on
Claims).
171 Id. at 129.
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prayer for indemnity was “reasonable” and “ought to be granted.”172 The
Committee report appended the Supreme Court’s decision, a letter from the
Secretary of the Navy recommending payment, and copies of the
instructions under which Murray was acting at the time of the seizure.173
The Navy Secretary acknowledged that, in September 1801, he had
authorized the government to post Murray’s appeal bond and had requested
the United States Attorney in Philadelphia to handle Murray’s appeal.174 He
did so, he acknowledged, in the belief that the government would
“ultimately have to pay whatever damages might be decreed against
him.”175 Murray’s relief bill became law on January 31, 1805.176
The House Committee on Claims also processed George Little’s
petition for indemnity. The Committee report, dated February 20, 1805,
recited the circumstances of the Little litigation, noted that the judicial
process had ended with the entry of the circuit court’s judgment in October
1804, and described Captain Little as subject to the process of execution.177
172

Id.
See id. at 129–32 (reproducing opinion from Murray, letter from R. Smith, Secretary of the
Navy, to Samuel W. Dana, Chairman of the Committee of Claims, and instructions from Ben
Stoddert).
174 Id. at 131–32. In defending himself against having presumed too much in deciding to
support Murray’s appeal, Smith observed that the policy of indemnifying federal officers had
been established by the case of the Niger and the adoption of indemnifying legislation in March
1799. The Niger was a British ship mistakenly seized as a prize by Captain Samuel Nicholson
aboard the U.S. frigate Constitution and escorted to Hampton Roads, Virginia, for adjudication.
See STODDERT’S WAR, supra note 56, at 47. The capture resulted in a protest by the British
minister, the release of the vessel by the Circuit Court for the District of Virginia, and the award
of $11,000 in damages to the ship’s owners. Nicholson, apparently in debt and prize hungry, had
no assets with which to pay this bill. Id. at 49. Congress accordingly included a provision in its
supplemental appropriation authorizing the President to pay $11,000 to the owners of the Niger.
See Act of Mar. 2, 1799, ch. 28, § 3, 1 Stat. 723, 724.
Nicholson’s conduct was severely criticized, both because he mistakenly seized a British
vessel and because he left his assigned duties to escort his prize to harbor, thus effectively taking
his boat out of commission for a month in pursuit of personal gain. Secretary of State Timothy
Pickering understood that Nicholson’s personal poverty may have explained his behavior;
claiming prizes was apparently “his only living” and his “eagerness . . . to procure a
condemnation savored of rapacity.” STODDERT’S WAR, supra note 56, at 49 (internal quotation
marks omitted).
One can fairly debate Secretary Smith’s contention that the Niger legislation should be
regarded as a definitive precedent for the Danish cases. Under the terms of Jay’s Treaty between
the United States and Great Britain, the owners of a wrongfully detained vessel were to be
“speedily and completely indemnified” either by the “captors,” or “in their default the
government under whose authority they act.” Jay’s Treaty, supra note 159, art. XVIII. The Treaty
thus contemplated government responsibility in cases where the captors could not afford to pay
compensation. The decision to pay the British owners of the Niger may reflect treaty obligations,
rather than obligations under the law of nations.
175 H.R. REP. NO. 8-44, at 132.
176 See Act for the Relief of Alexander Murray, ch. 7, 6 Stat. 56 (1805).
177 H.R. REP. NO. 8-46 (2d Sess. 1805), reprinted in 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: NAVAL
AFFAIRS, supra note 18, at 138.
173
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The report, authored by Chairman Samuel Dana, included a copy of the
Supreme Court’s decision and the instructions under which Captain Little
acted.178 Dana apparently regarded the justice of the petition as too obvious
to require detailed explanation. As the report explained, “The committee
deem it unnecessary for them at this time to enter into an examination of
the principle on which the relief is requested. It has already been clearly
recognized.”179 The report apparently referred to the principle established
by the bill enacted on Murray’s behalf three weeks earlier.
Although the principle may have been established, Congress took its
time in granting indemnity to Captain Little. No immediate reason for the
delay appears in the records we have reviewed. Committee reports for the
next few sessions of Congress, like the report in February 1805,
recommended in favor of Little’s petition. However, Congress took no
action to adopt indemnifying legislation. Eventually, Little’s bill became
law in January 1807,180 some two years after Murray was indemnified.
Whether members of Congress expressed concern about the merits of
Little’s petition or simply deferred its consideration due to the press of
other business, we cannot determine.181 But Little’s experience anticipates
that of many other petitioners who were thought to have valid claims and
eventually secured the passage of indemnifying legislation, but who were
not indemnified with the speed which they may have wished.182
Jared Shattuck, the Danish owner of the Mercator, experienced even
lengthier delays. Shattuck’s amicable proceeding against the absentee
William Maley got underway in 1804, two years after Madison made the
arrangements with Dallas and the Danish minister but only months after the
Court’s decisions in Little and Murray established the legal principles on
which Shattuck would rely.183 Dallas appealed the matter on behalf of
Maley and the government without success, and the Supreme Court
affirmed a judgment for Shattuck in 1806.184 Shattuck, acting with the
assistance of Danish agents, sought compensation from Congress a short
178

Id. at 138–39.
Id. at 138.
180 See Act for the Relief of George Little, ch. 4, 6 Stat. 63 (1807).
181 The ultimate relief granted to Little called for payment of money from the treasury as
necessary to “satisfy[] the [judgment]” in the case of the Flying Fish. Id. By defining the relief in
terms of the satisfaction of the judgment, rather than the simple payment of funds to Little, the
legislation suggests that treasury officials were to ensure that the money made its way to the
Danish claimants in satisfaction of the judgment. Simple payment of money to Little may have
subjected those funds to levies from other creditors and put the Danish claimants at risk.
182 Had the Danish claimants agreed to accept the appropriation of funds and to defer any
direct execution on the assets of Captain Little, it would have moderated, to some degree, the
urgency with which Little would have pursued the appropriation.
183 See supra notes 86–95 and accompanying text (discussing legal principles at issue in Little
and Murray).
184 See Maley v. Shattuck, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 458 (1806).
179
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time later. Although he petitioned consistently for several years thereafter,
his private bill did not become law until February 1813, some seven years
after the Court’s decision and thirteen years after his loss.185
A variety of factors may account for the delays Shattuck experienced.
First, some members of Congress may have shared the view (expressed by
Lincoln and Madison but rejected by the Court) that the intervening
wrongful act of the British prize crew in carrying off the Mercator to
Jamaica absolved Maley and the government of any responsibility for the
loss. Second, the loss itself was quite substantial; Shattuck sought (and
eventually secured) a payment of $33,000—well more than the figures at
issue in the earlier cases. Third, the payment was to go to Shattuck himself,
rather than to an officer of the navy who faced the prospect of execution on
a judgment. As an absentee insolvent, Maley, the responsible government
official, faced little apparent risk of personal loss, unlike Murray and Little.
In any event, the leisurely way in which Congress dealt with the Shattuck
petition serves to highlight the speed with which it responded to the Paoly
petition in 1802.186
C.

Institutionalizing the Practice of Indemnification

Although the nation’s first private indemnity bills operated for the
benefit of Danish claimants and arose from naval actions on the high seas,
everyone appears to have understood that the system of litigation and
indemnity applied to losses inflicted by government officers acting within
the United States as well.187 Indeed the early practice bears out this
assumption. One relatively early indemnity bill was adopted for the relief
of Samuel Ellis, a Deputy Marshal serving in the District of Maine.188

185 See Act for the Relief of Jared Shattuck, ch. 19, 6 Stat. 116 (1813) (describing amicable
proceeding and noting that it was product of “instructions . . . from the executive of the United
States”).
186 A report of the Attorney General apparently played a decisive role in moving the bill to
passage. The House Committee on Claims had posed a specific question about the implications of
the intervening capture by the British prize crew. See H.R. REP. NO. 12-234 (1st Sess. 1812),
reprinted in 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: CLAIMS, supra note 103, at 418, 419. The Attorney
General briefly but firmly confirmed the Supreme Court’s decision that Maley, as an initial
wrongdoer, bore responsibility for all losses that followed in the wake of his wrongful detention
of the vessel. See id. He also confirmed that the British vice-admiralty court’s judgment of good
prize had no bearing on the proper disposition of Shattuck’s claim against Maley. Id.
187 Thus, Madison explicitly equated the domestic and international claims process: His letter
to Blicherolsen confirmed that the institutional practice of litigation and indemnity applied to
government “injuries on aliens as well as citizens.” Letter from James Madison to Peder
Blicherolsen (Apr. 23, 1802), supra note 149, at 152. Alexander Hamilton had earlier assured the
federal collector in Rhode Island, Jeremiah Olney, that the government would indemnify him for
any trespass liability he incurred in following instructions. See supra note 55 (discussing
Hamilton’s promise to Olney).
188 See Act for the Relief of Samuel Ellis, ch. 40, 6 Stat. 132 (1814).
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Although we could not locate a copy of the judicial decision, the indemnity
bill recites that Ellis seized and sold a quantity of flour to satisfy a
judgment that had been obtained by the federal government against one
John Barton. Unfortunately for Ellis, the flour in question belonged not to
Barton but to someone else. Ellis was accordingly held accountable for the
loss of the flour and sought relief from Congress. Congress appropriated up
to $1000 and directed the Secretary of the Treasury to determine what more
specific amount should be deemed “adequate” to indemnify Ellis for the
damages awarded against him.189
To better understand antebellum indemnification practices more
generally, we conducted a study of congressional records between 1789
and 1860 and found 57 cases of officers petitioning for indemnification and
11 cases of suitors petitioning for the payment of a judgment against an
officer.190 Of these, the great majority of officer petitions (37) were filed on
behalf of military officers who had been held legally responsible for some
form of trespassory invasion: a wrongful seizure of property or persons.
Many of the remaining officer petitions (14) were filed by or on behalf of
federal revenue officers who, like their military counterparts, were seeking
indemnity for liability imposed to compensate for some kind of trespass or
conversion. In most such cases, the revenue officers in question had seized
property and instituted forfeiture proceedings, but the courts ultimately
rejected the legal justification for the forfeiture. The officers were then
subjected to liability in trespass, either on the basis of a counterclaim
brought in the context of the forfeiture proceeding itself (as in both Little v.
Barreme and Murray v. Charming Betsy) or in a separate proceeding
instituted in state court.191 Rounding out the officer petitions are a
189

Id.
For a summary of our findings, see the Appendix to this Article. (We include some
petitions from before 1860 on which Congress finally acted after that date.) Notably, we exclude
indemnity for the contempt fine paid by Andrew Jackson following his imposition of martial law
in New Orleans during the War of 1812. See Abraham D. Sofaer, Emergency Power and the Hero
of New Orleans, 2 CARDOZO L. REV. 233, 239–51 (1981) (describing Jackson’s imposition of
martial law, his refusal to honor writ of habeas corpus, his decision to jail federal judge who
issued order, his subsequent payment of $1000 contempt fine, and passage of indemnifying
legislation in 1844). Jackson did not petition Congress for relief.
191 See, e.g., Gelston v. Hoyt, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 246 (1818) (affirming New York state court
judgment against revenue officers who wrongfully seized American Eagle); Imlay v. Sands, 1
Cai. 566, 573 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1804) (imposing liability on federal revenue officer for wrongful
seizure of neutral vessel). Congress appropriated $130,000 to pay the judgment in Gelston v.
Hoyt. See Act of Apr. 9, 1918, ch. 45, 3 Stat. 418, 423 (appropriating no more than $130,000 for
judgment). After his death, Gelston’s executor successfully petitioned for the adjustment of
Gelston’s account with the government to credit him for certain additional expenses he incurred
in defending against the claims brought by Hoyt. See Act for the Relief of M. Gelston, ch. 200, 6
Stat. 728 (1838) (allowing Gelston credit for judgment obtained against him by his attorney,
Charles Baldwin, and other incidental costs of defending that and other proceedings). Gelston, as
the collector for the Port of New York, was a frequent litigant. See, e.g., Brewster v. Gelston, 4 F.
190
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smattering of petitions filed on behalf of federal marshals (2) and federal
postal workers (2), and a few that could not be identified.
As for the success rate of officer petitions, we found that petitioners
were relatively effective in securing relief from Congress. Roughly 60%
(36 of 57) of those petitioning eventually received some form of relief from
Congress.192 The forms of relief varied. Some private bills were structured
as direct payments to the petitioning government officers; others were
structured as payments to the victims of government misconduct.193 The
great majority of successful petitions resulted in the adoption of some sort
of appropriation (31 of 36), but other forms of relief were occasionally
granted. Sometimes, a private bill made no specific appropriation of funds
but simply directed a department of the government to adjust or settle the
claim.194
A review of the procedural aspects of the officer indemnity process
suggests that the House Committee on Claims played the leading role. For
example, the great majority of the officer petitions we studied originated in
the House; about 85% (49 of 57) of indemnity petitions began there. The 8
remaining officer petitions originated in the Senate. We also found a
surprising degree of deference to the recommendations of the committees
to which the petitions were referred. In the House, we found that adverse
action by the committee (either in the form of an adverse report or in the
failure of the committee to take action) was invariably fatal to the petition’s
success: We found no example of a case in which the House overrode an
adverse report by adopting a private bill of indemnity.195 Favorable
committee action received almost the same degree of deference. We found
29 favorable House committee reports, and in only one case did the House
fail to adopt legislative relief of some form.196 This finding helps to explain
Cas. 82 (C.C.D.N.Y. 1825) (No. 1853) (granting new trial following verdict against Gelston for
share of forfeiture); Sands v. Gelston, 15 Johns. 511 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1818) (finding for Gelston in
suit brought by former collector of customs to recover commissions on forfeitures).
192 Some were successful after a single petition; other petitioners filed as many as three or four
petitions before securing relief. The success rate for initial petitioners was thus much lower than
that for the sample as a whole.
193 Recall, for example, that Congress made direct payments both to Paolo Paoly and Jared
Shattuck for William Maley’s wrongdoing. By contrast, Congress paid the apparently solvent
naval officers (Alexander Murray and George Little) directly, compensating them for the amounts
of the judgments against them.
194 For example, the private bill on behalf of Samuel Ellis authorized the payment of up to
$1000 and directed the Secretary of the Treasury to determine the precise amount due. See Act for
the Relief of Samuel Ellis, ch. 40, §§ 1–2, 6 Stat. 132, 132 (1814).
195 We counted eighteen instances in which the House committee either issued an adverse
report or took no definite action on a petition. In no such case did the House adopt indemnifying
legislation. We excluded the Senate figures from this evaluation because all of the Senate
petitions were successful, an outcome that suggests some lack of representativeness in the
sample.
196 The Senate refrained from taking an active role in reviewing House bills that provided for
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the persistence of petitioning behavior in the face of congressional inaction
in cases like those of Jared Shattuck and George Little. Having secured a
favorable committee report, petitioners had reason to believe that a future
Congress would eventually provide the requested relief.
Apart from this pattern of deference, we found that Congress applied
established agency theory in determining whether to grant relief. In both
the successful Murray and Little petitions, Congress regarded the two naval
officers as having been held legally accountable for actions taken in
accordance with their instructions and as having acted in good faith and
without any malicious motive.197 In such cases, Congress concluded that
the government should bear responsibility for the loss; the men were acting
as honest agents of the government in taking the action that led to the
imposition of liability. When, by way of contrast, the government official
acted outside the scope of his agency or beyond the authority conferred by
law or his instructions, the officer was left to bear any resulting liability on
his own.
One sees the application of the agency principle reflected in
Congress’s handling of the unsuccessful petition of Joel Burt. Burt was the
collector for the Port of Oswego, New York, on the southeast coast of Lake
Ontario.198 In the spring of 1808, he refused to permit Charles Bristol to
ship ninety-five barrels of potash from Oswego to Sackets Harbor, New
York.199 Burt’s rationale was that he feared that the collector at Sackets
Harbor would allow the potash to enter a British (Canadian) port in
violation of the Embargo Act.200 Eventually, Bristol obtained a judgment of
some $1500 from a New York state court.201 Without having paid the
judgment, Burt petitioned the House for relief two years later.202 The House
referred this petition to the Committee on Commerce and Manufactures,
which took no action on the claim (effectively rejecting it).

relief. The Senate proposed amendments in only one case and adopted the House bill in all other
cases. Within the House, the Committee on Claims heard 45% of the petitions for officer
indemnification. The Committee had the duty to consider all claims and demands against the
United States. The remaining petitions were heard in the Commerce and Manufactures, Ways and
Means, Military Affairs, Naval Affairs, Judiciary, and Select Committees.
197 See H.R. REP. NO. 8-44 (2d Sess. 1805), reprinted in 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: NAVAL
AFFAIRS, supra note 18, at 129 (observing that Murray acted according to his perceived “duty”
and in compliance with his “public instructions”).
198 See H.R. REP. NO. 24-255, at 1 (1st Sess.1836) (identifying petitioner Burt as “collector of
the port of Oswego”).
199 See id.
200 See id.
201 See Bristol v. Burt, 7 Johns. 254 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1810) (denying motion to set aside verdict
for plaintiff in amount of $1472.20); H.R. REP. NO. 24-255, at 1 (noting that claim included
$1472.20 in damages and $90.83 in costs).
202 See H.R. JOURNAL, 12th Cong., 1st Sess. 196 (1812) (presenting Burt’s petition for relief
from payment of judgment).
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Nearly twenty-four years later, Burt and Bristol tried again. Burt
submitted a petition to the House, which referred it to the Committee on
Claims on January 5, 1836.203 Two weeks later, the Committee made a
negative report to the House.204 The Committee denied relief to Burt,
explaining that “[i]t should not be the policy of the United States to screen
their officers from making a just remuneration for losses sustained by her
citizens, when the acts of such officers are illegal, unjust, and without
palliating circumstances.”205 This report was ordered to “lie on the table,”
and no further action was taken.206 One month later, Charles Bristol
petitioned the House seeking payment of his judgment against Burt.207 The
House referred Bristol’s petition to the Committee on Claims on February
29, 1836.208 Citing Burt’s continued insolvency, Bristol sought relief under
the theory that Burt, being the collector of the port, was an agent of the
United States, and, as such, the liability he incurred in detaining Bristol’s
potash must be discharged by the United States.209 The Committee held the
matter under consideration for nearly a year before submitting an adverse
report to the House.210
The Committee report acknowledged that in answering the question of
government liability, it should give due regard to the nature of Burt’s action
as an employee and agent of the government.211 The Committee then turned
to general agency principles and conceded that a principal is liable for the
acts of his agent that are necessary “to carry [the intent of the agency] into
full and perfect execution.”212 However, “when an agent departs entirely
from the objects of his appointment and disregards the instructions of his
principal, the agent becomes personally liable” because “the power
delegated did not authorize the act.”213 Burt was not assigned to prevent
intercourse between two ports of the United States on the basis of his
suspicion of fellow collectors.214 Accordingly, when Burt took it upon

203 See H.R. JOURNAL, 24th Cong., 1st Sess. 140 (1836) (presenting Burt’s second petition for
relief from payment of judgment).
204 See id. at 249. The Committee admonished Burt’s actions, saying that if other collectors
acted as Burt had—refusing shipment without any proof that his fellow officer would violate the
law—they would “annihilate all intercourse by water between different points on the sea-board as
well as in the interior.” H.R. REP. NO. 24-255, at 1.
205 H.R. REP. NO. 24-255, at 1.
206 H.R. JOURNAL, 24th Cong., 1st Sess. 249 (1836).
207 See id. at 405.
208 Id.
209 See H.R. REP. NO. 24-233, at 2 (2d Sess. 1837).
210 See id. at 1.
211 Id. at 2.
212 Id.
213 Id.
214 Id. at 3.
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himself to exercise this power, he went beyond the scope of his agency.215
Bristol’s remedy “was properly sought, and, as far as the law could aid
him, was obtained against Burt,” and the United States was under no
further legal or moral obligation to provide relief.216 This negative report
was ordered to lie on the table, effectively killing the petition for relief.
Rules of agency also appeared to inform Congress’s eventual
resolution of Nathaniel Mitchell’s petition for relief. As the postmaster of
Portland, Maine, Mitchell was instructed to investigate the loss of letters
containing money.217 Pursuant to these orders, Mitchell placed test
packages in the mail and concluded, incorrectly as it turned out, that one
had failed to reach its destination. Mitchell initiated a criminal complaint
against an assistant postmaster, one William Merriam, but the criminal
process was abated when the missing package turned up.218 Merriam sued
Mitchell successfully for malicious prosecution. On review of the jury’s
verdict before entry of judgment by the Supreme Court of Maine, Mitchell
argued that he had probable cause and had acted without malice.219 The
court rejected this argument: The prosecution resulted from the defendant’s
carelessness in failing to track the missing package, not from any
suspicious conduct on the part of Merriam.220 As the court explained, it was
proper for the jury to hold Mitchell accountable on these facts for malicious
conduct. Otherwise Merriam would have no remedy “for losses and
expenses growing out of the charge, to say nothing of personal suffering
and lacerated feelings.”221
Although the Maine Supreme Court upheld the finding of malice and
entered a verdict in favor of Merriam, Congress did not view those
conclusions as a bar to eventual indemnity. After Mitchell filed his petition
for indemnity with the House, the Committee on Claims reported in favor
of granting relief to Mitchell, finding that he performed his duties with “a
strict adherence to the letter of his instructions, with a laudable zeal, and
with all good faith.”222 The favorable committee report appeared in 1838,
and Congress adopted indemnifying legislation in 1839.223 Apparently,
215

Id.
Id. In parting, the Committee noted that, had this property been sequestered and the
proceeds paid into the Treasury, an entirely different question would have been presented. See id.
For an example of the problems occasioned by payment to the Treasury in the context of the
successful petition of Richard and Benjamin Kidd, see infra note 233.
217 See Merriam v. Mitchell, 13 Me. 439, 444 (1836).
218 Id. at 444–46.
219 See id. at 456.
220 See id. at 457 (“We cannot but regard it as too much to hold this to have been probable
cause, to justify a prosecution against an innocent and unoffending man, who had given no color
for suspicion against him.”).
221 Id. at 458.
222 H.R. REP. NO. 25-780, at 3 (2d Sess. 1838).
223 See Act for the Relief of Nathaniel Mitchell, ch. 49, 6 Stat. 754 (1839) (appropriating sum
216
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Congress did not view the state court’s characterization of Mitchell as
having acted maliciously as a bar to recovery; rather, he was seen as a
public servant who had acted in good faith in carrying out his official
duties. Unlike Joel Burt, whom Congress regarded as having exceeded the
scope of his instructions and agency, Mitchell was seen as a loyal agent
acting within the scope of his instructions. With the grant of indemnity, the
government accepted the loss associated with the mistaken prosecution of
Merriam in much the same way it had accepted responsibility for the losses
occasioned by faulty instructions to naval officers during the Quasi-War
with France in 1800.
Yet, despite similarities between the handling of the Paoly and
Mitchell bills, congressional practice in handling petitions for indemnity
had grown a good deal more legalistic in the forty years that separated the
1802 Paoly indemnity bill from the Mitchell bill in 1842. As we have seen,
Congress established a practice of deference to the judgment of the House
Committee on Claims, and the Committee began to operate somewhat like
a court in its handling of indemnity (and other) matters. Thus, in handling
the Mitchell petition, the Committee required that the petitioner provide
affidavits, original receipts, and testimony to substantiate his claim.224
These statements set forth both the amount of the judgment, proof of its
payment, and proof of the costs and attorney’s fees Mitchell had incurred in
defending the litigation. In addition, the Committee on Claims explicitly
invoked both legal principles and precedents in supporting its
recommended disposition. Thus, the House took the position that the
obligation to indemnify its agent was grounded in contract and
encompassed both the liability imposed against the officer and the costs
and attorney’s fees “reasonabl[y]” incurred in defending the action.225 After
describing the controlling legal principles, the Committee noted that it had
“examined the precedents, and [found] that Congress has repeatedly
adopted the same rule in cases where agents of the Government have been
sued for acts done by them in the discharge of their official duties.”226
of $2392.21 for relief of Mitchell). The amount presumably covered the verdict of $1666 as well
as Merriam’s costs and fees. See Merriam, 13 Me. at 443. Three years later, Congress adopted
two bills appropriating some $1206 to cover the amount paid by Mitchell in defending the suit by
Merriam. See Act for the Relief of Nathaniel Mitchell, ch. 100, 6 Stat. 843 (1842) (appropriating
$931 to reimburse amount “paid by said Mitchell in defending a suit brought against him by
William Merriam”). Later legislation added $275 to this figure, bringing the total to $1206. See
Act for the Relief of Nathaniel Mitchell, ch. 197, 6 Stat. 863 (1842). That was the amount
recommended in the committee report. See H.R. REP. NO. 27-156, at 5 (2d Sess. 1842).
224 See H.R. REP. NO. 27-156, at 5.
225 H.R. REP. NO. 27-156, at 4 (“It is well-settled law, that where one individual is bound,
either by express or implied contract, to indemnify another, the reasonable costs incurred in the
suit, as well as the judgment recovered, must be paid.”).
226 Id.; see also H.R. REP. NO. 25-780, at 3 (2d Sess. 1838) (“The committee refer to the
subject of indemnity in Burch’s index to the Laws of the United States for a list of the cases
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The House had long relied on precedents in passing on private claims
for relief and indemnity. But a decisive step to formalize such reliance was
taken in May 1824, when the House directed its clerk, Samuel Burch, to
compile an index of the laws of the United States. One purpose of Burch’s
Index, according to the House resolution that led to its creation, was to
identify “the principles involved in acts for the relief of individuals, or of a
private or local nature.”227 By arranging these principles under “general
heads,” the index that Burch published in 1828 enabled House committees
quickly to identify precedents that dealt with the issues at hand.228 One of
the headings, “Indemnity,” collected the precedents related to the
indemnification of government officers through private bills.229 By the time
of Mitchell’s petition for relief in 1839, the House Committee on Claims
routinely referred to Burch’s Index in the course of deciding whether
precedents would support an application for relief. Thus, both the House
report on Mitchell’s petition for reimbursement of the judgment and the
House’s later report on his application for reimbursement of his costs and
attorney’s fees make reference to Burch’s Index.230
Burch’s Index operates, in essence, as something quite similar to an
abridgment or treatise of the law of private legislation and indemnity. In a
world where precedents provided guidance both to petitioners and to the
House committee that passed upon their claims, Burch’s Index performed
an important service in lending a degree of predictability to the
indemnification process. Government officers could rely, with some
confidence, on the availability of indemnity in accordance with the
principles identified in Burch’s Index. House committees could make use
of the index when passing on petitions for indemnifying legislation. Even
federal courts could begin to regard the process of indemnification as one
governed by legal principles. Perhaps, then, the appearance of Burch’s
Index, and the precedent-focused practice that it reflects, helps to explain
the otherwise surprising view of antebellum jurists that government officers
had a “right” to indemnity in a proper case.231 Today, we do not ordinarily
where relief has been granted in analogous cases to the one now under consideration.”).
227 BURCH’S INDEX, supra note 21, at i. On the increasing importance of expediting the
handling of petitions because Congress began to drown in petitions for public land by 1828, see
Mashaw, supra note 54, at 1736–37 & n.427.
228 BURCH’S INDEX, supra note 21, at i.
229 Id. at 152–53 (collecting two full pages of references to principles of indemnity reflected in
private legislation under heading of “Indemnity”).
230 See H.R. REP. NO. 25-780, at 3 (referring to precedents in “Burch’s index”); H.R. REP. NO.
27-156, at 4 (referring to check of “the precedents”).
231 The perception that one could enforce rights by way of legislative petition tends to confirm
that the practice of legislative adjudication persisted in Congress well into the nineteenth century.
See Shimomura, supra note 22, at 648–53 (detailing “flood of claims” filed with Congress).
Congress was expected to decide petitions on the basis of legal principles and applicable
precedents, rather than solely on the equities of the case. Such a conception of the early republic’s
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regard individual claims that depend on the passage of a private bill as
grounded in legal right; we understand individual petitioners to request
such an act as a matter of legislative grace.
One can see the antebellum understanding of indemnity as a legal
entitlement reflected in a variety of sources. Congress itself appears to have
taken this view of matters. Thus, the Senate granted relief to two
petitioners, Richard and Benjamin Kidd, whose claim for reimbursement of
wrongly collected duties foundered due to the insolvency of the official in
charge, the troubled Robert Swartwout. The Treasury Department refused
to provide the Kidds with their requested refund, apparently on the ground
that they could not have levied on the assets of the insolvent Swartwout
directly.232 The Senate refused to countenance this way of doing business;
the Kidds were entitled to a refund, and it was the government’s obligation
to make them whole.233 In providing relief to the victims, notwithstanding
the insolvency of the official, Congress was following the precedent set in
the handling of the petitions on behalf of Paoly and Shattuck.
Importantly, federal courts came to echo this conception of indemnity
as a legal entitlement. Thus, in Tracy v. Swartwout, another proceeding
against the unfortunate Mr. Swartwout, the Court was quite clear that
indemnity was available as of right.234 As it explained, “[s]ome personal
approach to indemnity as a right enforceable through petition seems broadly consistent with an
understanding that governments were thought to owe an affirmative obligation to provide a
system of redress for those who suffered legal injuries. See John C.P. Goldberg, The
Constitutional Status of Tort Law: Due Process and the Right to a Law for the Redress of
Wrongs, 115 YALE L.J. 524, 550 (2006) (discussing how early jurists were familiar with “the
principle that government owes its citizens laws and institutions for declaring and vindicating
basic rights, including the right to a law for the redress of wrongs”). This duty encompassed both
the victim’s right to pursue tort damages from the officer and the officer’s right to seek indemnity
from the government by petition to Congress.
232 S. REP. NO. 29-164, at 1 (1st Sess. 1846).
233 See Act for the Relief of Richard Kidd and Benjamin Kidd, ch. 185, 9 Stat. 677 (1846);
Kidd v. Swartwout, 14 F. Cas. 457 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1843) (No. 7756); S. REP. NO. 29-164. This
collection of materials tells the story of Robert Swartwout—the revenue collector for the Port of
New York—and his improper imposition of duties on the Kidds’ wheat and flour. Swartwout
would not release their goods without payment of duties, and the Kidds complied. The Kidds then
applied to the Treasury for duties wrongly exacted, but they were unsuccessful. The Kidds then
sued Swartwout in the Circuit Court for the Southern District of New York. They obtained a
judgment for duties, interest, and costs. The Kidds again applied to the Treasury, this time
seeking payment of this judgment. The Treasury declined to pay the full amount, instead offering
to repay the duties still held in exchange for a release from the judgment. Swartwout was
insolvent, so they could not seek payment from him directly. In considering their petition and
recommending relief, the Senate Finance Committee chided the Comptroller for attempting to
“extort” the Kidds and said that, even if Swartwout had been solvent, the payment of the
judgment would not have been his responsibility. S. REP. NO. 29-164, at 1–3.
234 See Tracy v. Swartwout, 35 U.S. 80, 98–99 (1836). Today, one finds it jarring to hear the
legislative process described as giving rise to an indemnification “right.” Congress acts as a
forum for political decisions, rather than as one for the vindication of rights. Ted Ruger and Jack
Goldsmith have suggested that we might test the politics of the antebellum era’s rights-based
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inconvenience may be experienced by an officer who shall be held
responsible in damages for illegal acts done under instructions of a
superior; but, as the government in such cases is bound to indemnify the
officer, there can be no eventual hardship.”235
The Court’s emphasis on the officer’s instructions highlights an
important feature of Congress’s evaluation of applications for
indemnification. At common law, of course, the doctrine of respondeat
superior resulted in the imposition of liability on the master for the torts of
the servant committed in the course and scope of the servant’s duties.236 In
the case of private wrongs, the master was theoretically entitled to
indemnity from the servant for any losses thereby sustained, although one
supposes that the servant rarely had pockets deep enough to warrant such
an action. In the context of public wrongs, the doctrine of respondeat
superior was administered not by the courts but by Congress; sovereign
immunity foreclosed suit against the government. It thus fell to Congress,
in passing on the indemnity petition, to evaluate the official’s actions and
determine if they had occurred in the course and scope of employment. If
so, then principles of agency law obliged the government to bear
responsibility for the loss. Although Congress might have, in theory,
insisted on indemnification from the officer for certain losses, the fact that
the officer acted under the government’s express or implied instructions
would negate the government’s claim. Instructions thus served not to free
the officer from liability in the first instance but to ensure that the
government would accept the full consequences of such liability through
the payment of indemnity.237
conception of indemnity by looking at the impact of the party affiliations of the petitioning
officers and members of Congress on the success rates for petitions. We share their view that such
analysis (in the hands of able empiricists) could produce interesting results. For now, we simply
note that the early years of Jefferson’s administration provide a useful historical (if not empirical)
window on the role of politics in the indemnification process. Even though the Jeffersonians had
steadfastly opposed the Quasi-War and taken steps in the early nineteenth century to roll back
Federalist war measures, James Madison worked to ensure that the government would assume
responsibility for losses caused by the Federalist officers who conducted that unpopular war.
Madison’s rather apolitical willingness to support claims for indemnity thus contrasts with his
refusal to dignify the contemporaneous Marbury litigation with a response.
235 Id.; see also Cary v. Curtis, 44 U.S. 236, 263 (1845) (finding that when official incurs
liability while acting under instructions, government is bound to indemnify official).
236 See 2 NATHAN DANE, A GENERAL ABRIDGMENT AND DIGEST OF AMERICAN LAW 315–16
(Boston, Cummings, Hilliard & Co. 1823) (“Here it may be observed, that all agree that the
master is liable in case for the negligent acts of his servant, done in the course of the master’s
business; and for any act of his servant so done by the master’s command, expressed or
implied.”). Dane also characterized the master as liable for the willful tort of the servant, done in
the master’s business, although some courts might treat the willful act as an abandonment of the
master’s service. Id. at 316.
237 Cf. id. at 316 (“The command of a superior to an inferior to commit a tort, excuses the
latter in no case but that of a wife. Such inferior, as servant, is bound to perform only the lawful
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In summarizing this institutional reality, the Taney Court described a
system of administrative law quite similar to that which Chief Justice
Marshall and Secretary of State James Madison had worked out at the
dawn of the nineteenth century.238 Madison, speaking on behalf of the
executive branch, was quite clear that claims against the government on
account of the actions taken by government officers should begin with a
judicial determination. He thus took extraordinary steps to secure a judicial
resolution of Jared Shattuck’s claim against William Maley. Madison
viewed Congress as responsible for any ultimate payment of government
funds on petition by the officer himself or by the injured claimant in cases
of official insolvency, although it was clear to Madison that Congress was
bound by legal principles to indemnify in proper cases. Marshall agreed
with Madison, ruling in Little v. Barreme and Murray v. Charming Betsy
that government officers were liable for the commission of torts, no matter
how clear their instructions and how evident their good faith in carrying
them out.239 The whole point of the enterprise was to ensure legal
accountability for the benefit of the victim of government wrongdoing and
to place Congress in charge of protecting officers from the consequences of
potentially ruinous personal liability. By the time of the Tracy decision in
1836, one year after Marshall’s death, the antebellum system was so well
established that the Court itself took for granted the availability of
indemnifying legislation and dismissed concerns with official liability as
involving no “eventual hardship” to the official defendants.240
D. Indemnity, Compensation, and Antebellum Administration
If the prospect of liability and indemnity had become an ingrained
feature of the antebellum system of administrative law, it was not alone in
shaping the incentives of the officers who administered the affairs of the
federal government. The early republic inherited a property-based
conception of government office that was in the process of evolving to our
more modern notion of government office as a contractual arrangement.241
In this property-based conception, government officers held title to their
office and to all of the privileges and perquisites associated with it. In some

commands of his superior; and the inferior person must know too when he does an injury . . . .”).
238 Tracy v. Swartwout, 35 U.S. 80, 98–99 (1836) (“Some personal inconvenience may be
experienced by an officer who shall be held responsible in damages for illegal acts done under
instructions of a superior; but, as the government in such cases is bound to indemnify the officer,
there can be no eventual hardship.”).
239 See supra notes 86–95 (discussing strict liability holdings in Little and Murray).
240 Tracy, 35 U.S. at 99.
241 For explorations of this evolution from office as property to office as public trust, see
generally Karen Orren, The Work of Government: Recovering the Discourse of Office in Marbury
v. Madison, 8 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 60 (1994), and Parrillo, supra note 30.
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cases, the office conveyed a right to fees payable by those who used
government services.242 Thus, justices of the peace, marshals, and other
ministerial officers in the judicial system were often paid through fees. In
other cases, the office entailed the payment of a salary. Early federal judges
were paid on this basis.243 Finally, some officers were put in a position in
which they could augment their income by initiating forfeiture proceedings
against offenders of the trade and revenue laws of the United States.244
Revenue collectors for the ports of the United States, charged with
enforcing complex trade and customs laws, as well as naval captains and
privateers during times of war, were entitled to a share of any property that
was forfeited for violations of these laws.245
In many cases, therefore, government officers acted for their own
account in enforcing the nation’s laws. Sometimes these inducements were
quite substantial. An estimated $700,000 in French shipping was captured
during the Quasi-War and subjected to forfeiture proceedings before
federal admiralty courts. Of this sum, one-half was to go to the United
States, and the other half to the officers and men of the American vessels
that perfected the capture. In addition to salary, therefore, naval captains
engaged in the Quasi-War would have expected to receive substantial
commissions in connection with their seizure of vessels. The prospect of
these commissions could certainly influence the judgment of the officers on
the high seas. George Little reportedly maneuvered to secure favorable
prize-taking assignments for his vessel,246 while another officer apparently
defied the instructions of his superior officer in leaving his assigned theater
of operations to accompany a captured prize into port.247
Consider the impact of this package of incentives on the behavior of
George Little. As a Captain in the U.S. Navy, Little was obliged to follow

242 For an overview of the fee-based payment system that Americans inherited from England,
see Pfander, supra note 29.
243 See id. at 19–29 (describing compensation system for federal judges).
244 On the origins and development of informer, or qui tam, litigation in the early republic, see
Richard A. Bales, A Constitutional Defense of Qui Tam, 2001 WIS. L. REV. 381, and Evan
Caminker, Comment, The Constitutionality of Qui Tam Actions, 99 YALE L.J. 341 (1989).
245 Courts understand these private motivations. See Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States ex
rel. Schumer, 520 U.S. 939, 949 (1997) (“[Q]ui tam relators are different in kind than the
Government. They are motivated primarily by prospects of monetary reward rather than the
public good.”).
246 See Frederick C. Leiner, Anatomy of a Prize Case: Dollars, Side-Deals, and Les Deux
Anges, 39 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 214, 217 (1995) (discussing Little’s arrangement with
Commodore Talbot and resulting dispute over shares of prize).
247 Captain Nicholson reportedly left his post in the Caribbean to accompany his prize, the
Niger, into port in Hampton Roads, Virginia. See STODDERT’S WAR, supra note 56, at 47. In
Nicholson’s case, the commission proved elusive; his claim was rejected and the vessel was
released to its British owners, who sued for damages and recovered relief in the form of a federal
appropriation. See Act of Mar. 2, 1799, ch. 28, 1 Stat. 723.
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the chain of command. He also enjoyed, especially on the high seas, a
measure of discretion in deciding how to deploy his vessel in pursuit of the
nation’s military objectives.248 His incentive package included his pay—
naval captains during his day were paid on the order of $1008 to $1830 per
year249—in addition to the fees to which he was entitled on any vessel that
he captured and condemned before a court of admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction. Under the rules of commission-based compensation in the
Navy during the period in question, naval captains were to receive up to
fifteen percent of the proceeds of any forfeiture.250 In a good year for
captains (but perhaps a bad year for a country at war), a captain’s
commission-based compensation might well exceed salary.251
The bounties available for the seizure of vessels were doubtless
designed to encourage government officers to enforce the law. For naval
captains, such incentives could exert a powerful influence in favor of the
taking of prizes; indeed, the financial rewards of prize taking were
eventually viewed as interfering with the prosecution of the war effort.252
For revenue collectors, forfeitures encouraged zealous enforcement and
performed another potentially important function: They created an
incentive for officials to reject the bribes of lawbreakers and to prefer the
more substantial rewards associated with a successful forfeiture
proceeding. An official on simple salary perhaps would be more likely to
accept bribes than one who stood to recover a substantial commission for
effective law enforcement. In this respect, Congress matched the structure
of official incentives with the nature of the office. Thus, Congress might
put judges on salary to avoid the jurisdictional expansion that might result
from a fee-based system. Where greater zeal was appropriate, as in the case
of marshals (and the members of Congress themselves),253 a fee-based
compensation system could make sense.
But zeal, unqualified by the prospect of liability in the event of
mistaken enforcement, might encourage irresponsible risk taking on the
part of government officers. Here, the threat of personal liability played a
248 As noted earlier, Little was described as having received gifts from foreign agents during
the course of his service in the Quasi-War. See supra note 56.
249 Nicholas Parrillo, The De-privatization of American Warfare: How the U.S. Government
Used, Regulated, and Ultimately Abandoned Privateering in the Nineteenth Century, 19 YALE
J.L. & HUMAN. 1, 26 (2007).
250 See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
251 See Parrillo, supra note 30, at 17–18 (describing opportunity to earn significant prizes
during wartime).
252 See id. at 32–33 (discussing move to salary-based compensation system in conjunction
with move to fleet-based naval strategy).
253 Congress chose to pay itself through fees calculated by reference to the days of attendance
and the mileage traveled to attend. Pfander, supra note 29, at 5 n.17. Assemblies invariably faced
attendance problems at the beginning and near the end of a session, and the fee system may have
been designed to counter this absentee problem to some extent.
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moderating role. Personal liability represented a particularly effective
counterweight to the incentives created by the prospect of commissions for
the seizure of vessels. Officers like Little, Murray, and Maley would
presumably think twice before seizing a vessel in a doubtful case for fear
that a court would award substantial damages in case of error. The promise
of indemnity, in turn, would temper the moderating influence of the risk of
personal liability. As long as the officer stuck to his instructions, seizures
would line his pockets. It should also be noted that the incentive system
might work better with officers who possessed some wealth and property,
and thus had something to lose if they irresponsibly seized neutral vessels.
Otherwise, as perhaps illustrated by William Maley, officers’ thirst for
commissions (and the rum they would purchase) and the absence of any
personal assets might encourage a reckless nothing-to-lose attitude.
IV
INDEMNITY IN THE ANTEBELLUM SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY

This study of the antebellum system of personal liability and
indemnity challenges many of the assumptions that have long underlaid
modern debates over sovereign immunity, government accountability, and
official liability and immunity. In this Part, we revisit these debates from
the vantage point of those who played key roles in creating and
administering the nineteenth century system of government accountability.
A.

Reflections on Sovereign Immunity

Today, we tend to regard the doctrine of sovereign immunity as a
barrier to the recovery of damages against the government. Where the
doctrine applies, it requires a court to dismiss the action for want of
jurisdiction.254 Although Congress has created a variety of exceptions to
sovereign immunity, the Supreme Court has been unwilling to put the
doctrine permanently to rest.255 As a consequence, sovereign immunity
remains a fact of life in the scheme of government accountability law. Both
in its constitutional form—as a bar to unconsented-to suits against state
governments—and in its conventional form—as a canon of interpretation
that requires a clear statement from Congress to authorize suits against the
254 For an early application of the doctrine of sovereign immunity, see United States v.
McLemore, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 286 (1846).
255 For example, the Court has insisted that any waiver of the government’s sovereign
immunity be expressed in legislative language that meets an exacting clear meaning standard.
See, e.g., Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187, 192 (1996) (“A waiver of the Federal Government’s
sovereign immunity must be unequivocally expressed in statutory text . . . .”); United States v.
Nordic Vill., Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 33 (1992) (“Waivers of the Government’s sovereign immunity, to
be effective, must be ‘unequivocally expressed.’” (quoting Irwin v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs,
498 U.S. 89, 95 (1990))).
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federal government—sovereign immunity can, in theory, require the
dismissal of otherwise meritorious claims.256 Based on their analysis of the
scope of these forms of sovereign immunity, Richard Fallon and Daniel
Meltzer question the accuracy of any descriptive account of government
accountability that is premised on the idea that there will be effective
remedies for all rights violations.257
Although scholars often depict sovereign immunity as the product of
an earlier day when rough justice prevailed, our survey of government
accountability law in the early nineteenth century suggests quite a different
view. During the period of our study, the role of sovereign immunity was
quite limited. To be sure, federal courts would dismiss actions that named
the federal government itself as a party.258 But the dismissal of a suit
against the government was not understood as depriving the individual of a
remedy, but as directing the individual’s application for redress into the
proper procedural channels. As we have seen, one who suffered a loss at
the hands of a government actor was entitled to sue the officer for damages
in state or federal court and recover an award.259 If the officer acted within
the scope of employment, Congress enacted indemnifying legislation to
make good the loss. Jurists’ belief that victims were entitled to
compensation and that officials were entitled to indemnity comes through
quite clearly. Thus, Congress frequently indemnified the victims of
government wrongdoing after the officer in question became judgment
proof.260 These victim-indemnity cases are striking; Congress could have
hidden behind the formal doctrine of sovereign immunity and taken the
position that its legal obligation was only to indemnify the officer, not to
compensate the victim.261 But Congress consistently refused to take this
legalistic view. In the cases of Paoly and Shattuck, Congress made good
their losses even though the insolvent defendant had disappeared. We
found similar solicitude for the rights of those injured by insolvent officials
in the successful petitions of the Kidds, Charles Hall, and Gould Hoyt.262
256 For well-known and much-remarked instances of the doctrine’s application to bar suit
against the states, see Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 712 (1999), and Seminole Tribe v. Florida,
517 U.S. 44, 47 (1996).
257 See Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 26, at 1779–86.
258 See United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 204 (1882) (“[T]he United States cannot be
lawfully sued without its consent . . . . [T]his proposition is conceded to be the established law of
this country . . . .”).
259 See supra notes 50–55 and accompanying text (describing history and process of habeas,
mandamus, trespass, and assumpsit claims in early republic).
260 See supra notes 101, 107–08, 233 and accompanying text (describing indemnifying
legislation that benefited Paoly, Shattuck, and Kidds).
261 A similar theory informed the position that Levi Lincoln put forward as Attorney General.
See supra text accompanying notes 144–48 (discussing Lincoln’s position as expressed in
correspondence regarding Maley’s case).
262 See infra Table 4 in the Appendix.
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If the treatment of victim-indemnity claims suggests that sovereign
immunity was simply a way to maintain the formal rule against
unconsented to suits against the government in its own name, the handling
of Maley v. Shattuck provides important confirmation. The government,
through James Madison, arranged an amicable proceeding in which Maley
appeared as a nominal defendant to facilitate a judicial test of Shattuck’s
legal claims. No one appears to have been offended by the thin formality of
this model: Madison issued the order that authorized the litigation, Dallas
dutifully entered an appearance on behalf of Maley without disguising the
fact that the proceeding was an amicable one, and the presiding courts
proceeded to enter judgment as if Maley were really before the court.
Reading the opinion of the Supreme Court with a full understanding of the
background of the case, one can see Marshall accepting the ruse and
winking at the formalistic quality of the proceeding.263 Thus, in reviewing
the claims for compensation, Marshall disallowed amounts Shattuck spent
in petitioning the federal government for compensation. No wonder, then,
that Marshall was later to treat sovereign immunity as a matter of mere
form that turned on the party named in the record of the case.264 All three
branches of the government were treating it that way. The formal quality of
government immunity also helps place in context Madison’s and
Marshall’s oft-quoted statements about state immunity from suit in federal
court made during the debates over the ratification of the Constitution.265
To the extent it fairly reflects founding era attitudes, moreover, Maley
v. Shattuck confirms that federal courts can hear claims against the United

263 See Maley v. Shattuck, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 458, 489–90 (1806) (describing evidence
presented by Maley as if he were present in lower court). In explaining that Maley need not pay
for such expenses, Marshall surely recognized that the ultimate payment would come from the
federal government itself. Id. at 491.
264 See Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 857 (1824) (“It may, we
think, be laid down as a rule which admits of no exception, that, in all cases where jurisdiction
depends on the party, it is the party named in the record. Consequently, the 11th amendment,
which restrains the jurisdiction granted by the constitution over suits against States, is, of
necessity, limited to those suits in which a State is a party on the record.”).
265 In comments to the Virginia ratifying convention, both Madison and Marshall denied that
Article III would authorize the assertion of jurisdiction over claims against the states on the
diversity side of the federal docket. See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 14 (1889) (“It is not in the
power of individuals to call any state into court.” (quoting THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE
CONVENTIONS, ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, AS RECOMMENDED BY THE
GENERAL CONVENTION AT PHILADELPHIA, IN 1787, at 533 (Jonathan Elliot ed., Philadelphia,
J.B. Lippincott Co. 2d ed. 1836) (statement of James Madison))); id. (“It is not rational to
suppose that the sovereign power should be dragged before a court.” (quoting THE DEBATES IN
THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS, ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, AS
RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL CONVENTION AT PHILADELPHIA, IN 1787, supra, at 555
(statement of John Marshall))). Viewed from the perspective of their role in Maley v. Shattuck,
the statements of Madison and Marshall suggest that they contemplated a fairly formal notion of
immunity that required suit against the officer in the first instance.
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States in appropriate cases, notwithstanding the doctrinal hurdles that have
arisen over time. In Hayburn’s Case, the Justices of the Supreme Court
refused to permit the federal circuit courts to hear pension benefit claims
where the judicial decision was subject to revision both by the executive
and by Congress; the resulting doctrine of judicial finality now bars federal
courts from hearing disputes unless their judgments are regarded as
decisive.266 Related doctrines define the judicial power to include the ability
to hear only disputes between adverse parties, which forecloses the courts
from hearing ex parte proceedings and from issuing advisory opinions.267
Finally, some have suggested that federal courts can hear cases only when
they have the power to issue process of execution to enforce their
decrees.268 An early twentieth-century decision, now discredited, thus took
the position that suits against the federal government simply lay beyond the
judicial power defined in Article III.269
Maley v. Shattuck offers an historical counterpoint to these supposed
limits on the scope of the judicial power. The case proceeded through the
judicial system without service of process on Maley, the nominal
defendant. The case was amicably arranged to allow a judicial test of
Shattuck’s claims, and Madison was careful to explain that the result would
not be understood as binding on the government or Congress.270 Thus, the
case presented the whole gamut of judicial power issues: It did not involve
proper parties but was brought to determine the interests of the United
States; it was subject to a measure of congressional revision (at least to the
extent that Congress chose not to pay Shattuck by private bill); and the
judgment, unenforceable either against Maley or the United States by writs
of execution, could have been regarded as an advisory opinion.271
Notwithstanding these difficulties, federal courts heard the case and
266 See Hayburn’s Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409 (1792) (stating that Court will not issue advisory
opinions). Hayburn’s Case has significantly influenced the development of the modern law of
judicial finality. See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 1, at 80–89; Pfander, supra note 37, at 700
(“Hayburn’s Case has come to stand for a principle of judicial finality that prohibits political
branch review of judicial decisions.”).
267 See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 1, at 80–89.
268 See Gordon v. United States, 117 U.S. 697, 702 (1885) (opinion of Taney, C.J.) (denying
that Congress can authorize or require Article III court to hear case “where its judgment would
not be final and conclusive upon the rights of the parties, and process of execution awarded to
carry it into effect”). For an assessment of the judicial role in the execution of judgments and
decrees, see Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., The Inherent Powers of Federal Courts and the Structural
Constitution, 86 IOWA L. REV. 735, 812–14, 857–64 (2001).
269 See Williams v. United States, 289 U.S. 553, 576–78 (1933) (denying that judicial power
extended to suits brought against United States). For the rejection of the Williams approach, see
supra note 46.
270 See supra text accompanying notes 149–51 (describing Madison’s view of proceedings).
271 The Court’s approval of declaratory judgment proceedings in Aetna Life Ins. Co. v.
Haworth, 300 U.S. 227 (1937), makes the prospect of immediate execution less essential to the
proper exercise of judicial power today than it was in the antebellum era.
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resolved it on the merits. They did so, moreover, without suggesting that
Article III posed a problem.272
Maley v. Shattuck thus anticipates many of the more flexible
expositions of the judicial power that have issued in the last seventy-five
years. One can see in Maley the suggestive outlines of a declaratory
judgment proceeding, in which a federal court resolves a genuine legal
dispute between adverse parties despite the federal judiciary’s ostensible
inability to enforce its judgment against the government. Maley also
anticipates the answer to the problem of finality that the Court announced
in Glidden Co. v. Zdanok.273 There, the Court found that the prospect of
payment through the congressional judgment fund was sufficient to
overcome any finality concerns with the adjudication of claims against the
federal government.274 Perhaps one can rationalize the Court’s willingness
to hear Maley as an early reflection of this more flexible attitude towards
finality. Just as in Glidden, where the judgment fund established a prospect
for eventual payment, the likelihood of a successful petition to Congress
may have been viewed as sufficient to justify judicial involvement in
Maley. One might harmonize that interpretation with Hayburn’s Case by
noting that the provision for judicial resolution of pension claims at issue in
Hayburn’s Case had provided for both executive revision and
congressional discretion over appropriations, making eventual satisfaction
of the judgment much less certain. Under Maley, by contrast, the executive
would play no formal role in evaluating the correctness of the judgment,
and legislative oversight would occur through the appropriations process.275
B.

Official Liability and Immunity

The early republic’s approach to liability and indemnity contrasts
dramatically with the current law of official immunity. Under the
prevailing standard today, federal officials sued by way of a Bivens action
enjoy immunity from suit unless their actions violated “clearly established”
rules of which a reasonable person would have known.276 Articulated in
272 For other examples of early feigned proceedings, see CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME
COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 392–99 (1926).
273 370 U.S. 530, 570 (1962).
274 Id.
275 See supra notes 102–08 and accompanying text (discussing Maley v. Shattuck). However,
the executive branch could play an informal role. In response to an inquiry from the House, both
Madison and the Attorney General expressed their view that the judgment was valid and should
be paid. See supra note 158 (noting Madison’s views).
276 On the liability of federal government officials for constitutional torts, see Bivens v. Six
Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). Today, federal
officers enjoy qualified immunity from tort-based liability under the Constitution. See Harlow v.
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (declaring judge-made rule of qualified immunity). In
addition, government officials today enjoy absolute immunity from tort-based liability under state
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Harlow v. Fitzgerald for the explicit purpose of facilitating summary
judgment, this objective standard of reasonableness seeks to avoid any
inquiry into the official’s subjective good faith.277 Such subjective inquiries
were thought to necessitate jury trials and thus impose both the risk of
liability and the burden of litigation on government officials whose actions
could be plausibly defended as lawful. The Court has justified its expansive
approach to official immunity as a way to calibrate official incentives
correctly. Thus, even as the Court has acknowledged the importance of
compensating victims and deterring governmental wrongdoing,278 it also
has sought to minimize what it has called the “social costs” associated with
official liability.279 These costs include “the expenses of litigation, the
diversion of official energy from pressing public issues, and the deterrence
of able citizens from acceptance of public office.”280 In addition, the Court
has expressed concern that the threat of liability “will ‘dampen the ardor of
all but the most resolute, or the most irresponsible [public officials], in the
unflinching discharge of their duties.’”281
The Court’s development of this judge-made body of immunity law
represents a remarkable feat of judicial creativity. In the space of only
fifteen years, the Court moved from a tailored immunity defense that the
Court implausibly attributed to the common law, to one that applied to all
federal officials without regard to the nature of their office or the nature of
the underlying claim. Thus, in Pierson v. Ray, the Court extended an
immunity defense to an officer sued for claims comparable to false arrest,
reasoning that liability should not attach where the police officer acted in
good faith and with probable cause.282 By the time of Procunier v.
Navarette, the Court had grown impatient with tailored immunity defenses

law for actions taken within the line of duty. For an account of Westfall Act immunity from statelaw tort claims, see James E. Pfander & David Baltmanis, Rethinking Bivens: Legitimacy and
Constitutional Adjudication, 98 GEO. L.J. 117, 132–39 (2009). For background on the Bivens
case, see generally James E. Pfander, The Story of Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, in
FEDERAL COURTS STORIES 275 (Judith Resnik & Vicki C. Jackson eds., 2009).
277 See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818.
278 See id. at 819.
279 Id. at 814.
280 Id.
281 Id. (quoting Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949)); see also Butz v.
Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 506 (1978) (noting importance of encouraging “the vigorous exercise
of official authority”).
282 See 386 U.S. 547, 556–57 (1967) (purporting to draw on common law defenses of good
faith and probable cause to define official’s immunity). For a critique of the Court’s attempt to
base qualified immunity on common law precepts, see Albert W. Alschuler, Herring v. United
States: A Minnow or a Shark, 7 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 463, 502–06 (2009) (describing invention of
immunity doctrine in Pierson and Court’s “feeble effort” to draw support from common law);
Woolhandler, supra note 1, at 465 (describing Pierson as having “eviscerated” common law
model of official accountability).
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and announced, over Justice Stevens’s dissent, a more uniform standard.283
The Court completed its transition in Harlow, defining immunity entirely
by reference to the existence of a clear constitutional right and abstracting
away from any inquiry into analogous common law claims or defenses.284
Recent years have witnessed ongoing judicial management of the qualified
immunity defense.285 This management role contrasts with the rhetoric of
deference to the legislative branch that the Court often deploys in its
discussions of official liability.286
Many have criticized the modern Court’s use of qualified immunity
doctrine to strike a balance between compensating the victims of official
wrongdoing and protecting officials from groundless suits.287 While these
criticisms often focus on the way in which the Court has struck the balance,
the antebellum system of government accountability suggests a more
fundamental critique. During the early republic, the courts—state and
federal—did not take responsibility for adjusting the incentives of officers
or for protecting them from the burdens of litigation and personal liability.
These were matters for Congress to adjust through indemnification and
other modes of calibrating official zeal. In the maritime tort cases that arose
during the Quasi-War, Chief Justice Marshall declined to treat the good
faith of the officer as a defense to liability in both the Little and Murray
cases. While the officer’s good faith was admitted in both instances, the
Court regarded good faith as relevant only to the award of vindictive
damages for tortious conduct.288 The obligation to pay compensatory
damages, however, did not turn on the officer’s good faith. This holding
would make little sense for a Court primarily concerned with tailoring the
incentives of a government official. But it made a good deal more sense for
a Court that viewed the suit against the officer as a mechanism for holding
the government ultimately accountable for the losses it had inflicted on
victims of government wrongdoing. Downplaying good faith also made
283 See 434 U.S. 555, 565 (1978) (defining official immunity as depending both on clarity of
law and any malicious intent on part of defendant); cf. id. at 568–69 (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(accusing majority of adopting single standard of immunity that applies without regard to
particular nature of claim and office).
284 See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818 (extending immunity to officials so long as they do not violate
clearly established federal law).
285 See, e.g., Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526–27 (1985) (allowing government officers
to seek interlocutory review of decisions that reject qualified immunity defense).
286 See, e.g., Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537, 562 (2007) (concluding that right of action in
question was matter for legislative, not judicial, creation); Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534
U.S. 61, 70 (2001) (questioning propriety of extending private rights of action to enforce
constitutional rights).
287 See supra notes 7–10 and accompanying text.
288 A similar distinction between compensatory and vindictive damages appears in the law that
developed around the jailer’s liability for the escapes of debtors during the colonial period. I am
indebted to Morton Horwitz for the reference to the jailer’s liability.
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sense for a Court that viewed the burden of official liability as a matter to
be managed by the political branches of government.289
As we have seen, the political branches had a variety of devices at
their disposal to calibrate the incentives of their officers and bureaucrats.
For one, Congress would occasionally confer a limited statutory immunity
on federal officers who acted in good faith.290 In addition, Congress could
choose some combination of salary- and fee-based compensation to
encourage the right degree of official activity.291 Forfeiture commissions, as
we have seen, would encourage official zeal and ward off any tendency
toward accepting bribes, but they might also come to occupy too central a
place in the officer’s conception of his job. Oversight and control through
the executive branch and the chain of command offered yet another tool by
which the political branches could control government officials. Students
of the period report that, although it was not especially common, the
Adams and Jefferson administrations occasionally disciplined officials for
misconduct or discharged them from service.292 The Department of the
Navy certainly cashiered William Maley for his seizure of neutral vessels.
Finally, the spurs of ambition and reputation would doubtless help to
ensure official compliance with law.
Legislative indemnity through private bills surely played an important
role in striking the right balance between the compensation of victims and
the protection of officers who acted in good faith. As we have seen, officers
could expect indemnification when they were subjected to liability for
actions taken in the line of duty and in compliance with their instructions.
289 Recall that in both Merriam v. Mitchell and Imlay v. Sands, the state courts emphasized the
importance of the judicial role in determining legality and viewed the issue of official hardship as
a matter for adjustment by the legislature through the private bill process. See Merriam v.
Mitchell, 13 Me. 439, 457–58 (1836) (highlighting need for remedy for victim’s “losses and
expenses”); Imlay v. Sands, 1 Cai. 566, 572–73 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1804) (“[W]e are bound to
pronounce the law as we find it, and leave cases of hardship, where any exist, to legislative
provision.”).
290 See Mashaw, supra note 11, at 1330 (providing examples of such early statutes); cf.
Mashaw, supra note 54, at 1683–85 (discussing reasons why Congress preserved access to state
jury trial against federal officials). These grants of immunity were in fact quite limited. Mashaw
reports that Congress gave Treasury Secretary Gallatin and his revenue officers less protection
from legal responsibility flowing from the enforcement of President Jefferson’s embargo than
they had sought. See id. at 1679–81. In England, Parliament adopted measures to protect justices
of the peace and constables from vexatious proceedings, but the protections were quite modest:
The statute required that defendants be given notice of the claims and afforded an opportunity to
pay damages and avoid litigation. See Act for the Rendering Justices of the Peace More Safe in
the Execution of Their Office, 1751, 24 Geo. 2, c. 44, §§ 1–2.
291 See Parrillo, supra note 30, at 15–19 (recounting range of salaries, fees, and commissions
paid to government employees in early republic).
292 We do not mean to suggest that the system worked seamlessly. As with any human
institution, the early republic’s system of government accountability was subject to the usual
human vices of coziness, corruption, laxity, and excessive zeal. See Mashaw, supra note 54, at
1680–85 (cataloging system’s vices).
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This indemnity extended not only to any damages awarded against them,
but also to the costs and expenses associated with defending the case. Thus,
the nineteenth-century solution to the problem that is now addressed
through qualified immunity was to hold the officer accountable in court for
violations of the victim’s legal rights but then to indemnify the officer for
any losses incurred in the line of duty through the legislative process.
Indemnity encouraged zealous conduct on the part of government officials,
but officers also understood that unwarranted action outside the scope of
their duties could produce liability that the government would not assume
through private legislation.
Given the primacy of political-branch actors in creating the
institutional framework of government accountability and indemnity, it is
unsurprising that the Marshall Court followed the lead of the political
branches in taking a strict approach to official liability. Up until now,
scholars have operated on the assumption that the relief bill for Alexander
Murray in 1805 represented the first instance in which Congress enacted
private legislation to indemnify a federal officer successfully sued for
conduct in the line of duty.293 Such legislation, coming one year after the
decisions in Little and Murray, could not have influenced the Court’s
understanding of the legislative response to the imposition of personal
liability. But the Paoly (and Niger) legislation demonstrates that indemnity
(or something quite similar) was paid in 1802 (and 1799)—two (and five)
years before the Court decided Little and Murray.294 To the extent that the
Court was aware of it, then, the Paoly legislation revealed the likely
response of the political branches to a judicial decision imposing personal
liability on naval officers for the wrongful seizure of neutral vessels.295
Such information about political branch attitudes would have been

293 See Act for the Relief of Alexander Murray, ch. 12, 6 Stat. 56 (1805). For scholarly
references to the primacy of this private bill, see, for example, Leiner, supra note 28, at 19, which
notes that the Murray legislation is “the first time that Congress ever indemnified a public officer
for a service-related judgment.” See also George A. Bermann, Integrating Governmental and
Officer Tort Liability, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 1175, 1190 n.94 (1977) (noting that indemnification
began “as early as 1805” with Murray). During the Civil War, a period outside the scope of our
study, Congress adopted legislation immunizing federal officers from liability for arrest. See
generally Tyler, supra note 37, at 639–51.
294 For an account of the Paoly affair, see supra notes 96–101. To be sure, the private bill ran
in favor of Paoly, not Maley, so it did not, strictly speaking, operate as indemnity to Maley for
amounts he had paid to satisfy a judgment. (As noted above, it seems likely that Maley’s
insolvency explains why Congress chose to pay Paoly directly.) For an account of the Niger
affair, see supra note 174.
295 The legislation indemnifying the owners of the Niger became law in 1799, while John
Marshall was serving as a member of the House of Representatives. Depending on the
circumstances surrounding the Niger indemnity bill, it may also help to explain Marshall’s
perception that the claims of neutral vessel owners were to be adjusted through the executive and
legislative branches.
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especially welcome at the time of the Little and Murray decisions in
February 1804, one year after the Court’s decision in Marbury v.
Madison.296 Although Marshall in Marbury ultimately steered clear of any
direct confrontation with the Jefferson administration by engineering a
jurisdictional dismissal,297 the Court was under tremendous pressure from
the political branches in 1803–1804. Congress had reinstated the Justices’
circuit-riding duties and suspended the Court’s sessions for a full year as
part of its “attack on the federal judiciary” in 1802.298 In the months
following Marbury, members of Congress had initiated proceedings aimed
at the eventual impeachment and removal of Federal District Judge John
Pickering from office.299 Justice Samuel Chase was next; the House
preferred articles of impeachment in late 1804, and the Senate conducted
its trial of Chase in January 1805.300 Although Chase’s narrow acquittal
ended the impeachment threat, other Justices, including Chief Justice
Marshall, might have faced impeachment had the Chase verdict gone the
other way.301
296

5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
See generally James E. Pfander, Marbury, Original Jurisdiction, and the Supreme Court’s
Supervisory Powers, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1515 (2001) (detailing Chief Justice Marshall’s
underlying rationale for Marbury decision).
298 Dean Alfange, Jr., Marbury v. Madison and Original Understandings of Judicial Review:
In Defense of Traditional Wisdom, 1993 SUP. CT. REV. 329, 385 (quoting ROBERT LOWRY
CLINTON, MARBURY V. MADISON AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 81 (1989)); see also RICHARD E. ELLIS,
THE JEFFERSONIAN CRISIS: COURTS AND POLITICS IN THE YOUNG REPUBLIC 59–60 (1971)
(discussing effective suspension of Supreme Court); Alfange, supra, at 359–60 (same).
299 For a detailed account of the impeachment affair and the politics that accompanied it, see
GEORGE L. HASKINS & HERBERT A. JOHNSON, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT:
FOUNDATIONS OF POWER, JOHN MARSHALL, 1801–1815, at 205–45 (1981). A brief summary of
the dates will highlight its potential relevance to the Court’s analysis of government liability
issues. The House impeached John Pickering, the aged and insane federal district judge for New
Hampshire, in 1803. Pickering was convicted and removed from office after a trial in March
1804. The impeachment of Justice Samuel Chase began in the wake of a widely circulated grand
jury charge in May 1803 in which Chase denounced Republican party judicial reforms. The
proceedings against Chase officially began in January 1804, with the appointment of a House
committee of inquiry. Formal impeachment articles were presented in March 1804 and amended
thereafter, but Chase’s trial and eventual acquittal in the Senate did not occur until 1805. Id. at
238–45.
300 For background on Justice Chase’s impeachment, see generally WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST,
GRAND INQUESTS: THE HISTORIC IMPEACHMENTS OF JUSTICE SAMUEL CHASE AND PRESIDENT
ANDREW JOHNSON (1992), and Terence J. Lau, Judicial Independence: A Call for Reform, 9
NEV. L.J. 79, 92–103 (2008).
301 For accounts of the friction between the Jefferson administration and the judiciary, see
generally ELLIS, supra note 298, at 19–68, which discusses the growing antipathy between the two
groups, and Alfange, supra note 298, at 349–72, which examines the political environment during
the Marbury era. Ellis shows that, as a practical matter, the Justices’ acceptance of their circuitriding responsibilities in the fall of 1802 represented a conclusive validation of the Jeffersonian
repeal of the Judiciary Act of 1801. ELLIS, supra note 298, at 53–68; see also Alfange, supra note
298, at 360–62 (exploring political environment compelling Justices to take up circuit riding). On
the threat of impeachment hanging over the judiciary, see ELLIS, supra note 298, at 69–82. On the
297
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In this period of judicial insecurity, Chief Justice Marshall’s initial
reluctance to uphold a substantial judgment against Captain Little may
have reflected a preference for shifting responsibility to the political
branches.302 Had the Court fashioned a qualified immunity defense for
Captain Little, Marshall explained that the process of compensating the
Danish victims would become a matter of “negotiation,” perhaps by way of
a treaty, an outcome Marshall may have viewed as less risky to the
judiciary’s already tenuous position.303 Along with the encouragement of
the unbowed Justice Chase, the Paoly legislation may have helped allay
Marshall’s concerns and blunted his instinct toward shifting responsibility
to the political branches. Private bills require bicameral adoption,
presentment, and presidential concurrence. The political branches, both in
the control of the Jeffersonians, had signed off on the payment of damages
in respect of William Maley’s capture of the Amphitheatre. Such an
acceptance of responsibility may have lent strength in turn to the view that
the Court’s role was simply to assess legality and award an appropriate
amount of compensatory damages. Thus, the willingness of Congress to
provide indemnity may have shaped judicial attitudes toward the
imposition of officer liability (as well as the other way around). In any
case, as we have seen, congressional indemnity contributed to a regime in
which the Court imposed relatively strict official liability and Congress
provided relatively routine indemnification for officers acting in good faith.
Apart from raising questions about the role of the federal courts in
fashioning immunity law, scholars (and the Court itself) have criticized the
jurisprudential stagnation that has followed from the Court’s modern
qualified immunity jurisprudence.304 The Court attempted to deal with the
problem of stagnation by requiring lower courts first to decide the
constitutional issue and only later to determine if the right at issue was
clearly enough established to trigger immunity from suit.305 Yet this twofailed impeachment of Justice Samuel Chase, see STEPHEN B. PRESSER, THE ORIGINAL
MISUNDERSTANDING: THE ENGLISH, THE AMERICANS, AND THE DIALECTIC OF FEDERALIST
JURISPRUDENCE 156–58 (1991), and Alfange, supra note 298, at 96–107. Given the threat to
Justice Chase, his firm refusal to view the instructions to Captain Murray as relevant to the
legality of his conduct seems all the more striking.
302 Marshall was elected to the Sixth Congress, where he represented Virginia from 1799–
1800, before serving as Secretary of State and then as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. He was
serving in Congress when the Niger indemnity bill became law in 1799. See supra note 295.
303 See Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170, 179 (1804).
304 See Alschuler, supra note 282, at 465 (arguing that qualified immunity and exclusionary
rule jurisprudence have led to stagnation in constitutional doctrine and left victims of government
misconduct without remedy); John C. Jeffries, Jr., Reversing the Order of Battle in Constitutional
Torts, 2009 SUP. CT. REV. 115, 117 (“Going directly to qualified immunity will not only inhibit
the development of constitutional doctrine, but will also degrade existing rights to a leastcommon-denominator understanding of their meaning.”).
305 See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001).

PFANDERHUNT-FIN2.DOC

164

11/8/2010 11:24:58 AM

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 85:nnn

step rule, or order of battle, drew criticisms of its own for producing
unnecessary constitutional decisions and complicating the process of
appellate review.306 Thus, the Court changed course, putting in place a
regime of discretion that allowed the lower courts to refrain from reaching
the constitutional issue if they determined that the right was not clearly
established.307 Whatever the wisdom of this switch and the risk that
problems of stagnation may recur, the Court’s current approach certainly
differs from that of the nineteenth century. Under the order of battle
established in Little v. Barreme and other early decisions, the judiciary
decided legal questions and left matters of indemnity to Congress. No one
had occasion to ask if the rights were clearly established, and no stagnation
could occur.
CONCLUSION

Viewed on its own terms, Marshall’s rejection of the good-faith
defense in the early cases of Little v. Barreme and Murray v. Charming
Betsy might appear quite adventuresome. The decisions placed liability on
officers of the government who could fairly claim to have been acting in
reliance on the instructions of their superiors. Viewed in the context of the
system of government accountability in place at the dawn of the nineteenth
century, however, the decisions appear unremarkable. Under the Federalists
and Jeffersonians, both the executive and legislative branches of
government had taken the position that federal courts were the proper
forum for the initial determination of issues of government liability.308 Both
agreed, moreover, that any court-imposed liability for actions taken in the
line of duty ultimately would call for the adoption of indemnifying private
legislation. Marshall’s decisions thus operated less to allocate the risk of
loss to the official than to provide a neutral evaluation of the legality of the
government’s conduct, which set the stage for the payment of
compensation that all three branches of government viewed as owing to the
owners of wrongly captured Danish vessels. Congress, then, was
responsible for adopting private bills of indemnity both to protect officers
who acted in good faith and to ensure that the government ultimately bore
liability for the actions of its agents acting within the scope of their
authority.
Our survey of legislative practice in the early republic largely bears
306 See Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808, 817–18 (2009) (cataloging these difficulties). But
see Sam Kamin, An Article III Defense of Merits-First Decisionmaking in Civil Rights Litigation:
The Continued Viability of Saucier v. Katz, 16 GEO. MASON L. REV. 53 (2008) (positing that
constitutional question should be reached only if colorable claim exists, such that litigants are
actually interested in matter).
307 See Pearson, 129 S. Ct. at 818.
308 For the view of Federalist Secretary of State Timothy Pickering, see supra note 85.
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out the confidence that Madison and Marshall placed in the proper
functioning of the private bill indemnification process. As we have seen,
Congress rather routinely adopted private indemnification bills when
officers were held liable for actions taken in the line of duty. Congress
placed much responsibility for determining issues of indemnification in the
hands of a special Committee on Claims, located within the House of
Representatives. The Committee conducted quasi-judicial investigations
into the background of the indemnity claims and recommended payment of
those it found to be deserving. Both the full House and the Senate
displayed remarkable deference to the decisions of the Committee. Indeed,
a negative report was invariably fatal to the petitioner’s application, and a
positive report almost invariably led to the adoption of some form of relief.
While advocacy, favoritism, and lobbying doubtless played a role in the
outcome of these petitions, the Committee’s decision to collect and rely on
the precedents embodied in Burch’s Index suggests a self-conscious
attempt to develop principles of indemnity on which the government’s
officers and the Committee’s own members could rely.
Sovereign immunity played only a modest role in the early republic’s
system of government accountability in tort. To be sure, it prevented
litigants from naming the United States as a party in federal court. But
cases such as Maley v. Shattuck demonstrate that the prohibition against
joining the government as a party was the barest of fictions. Lieutenant
Maley was nowhere to be seen; rather, the executive branch authorized the
litigation so that the judicial branch could evaluate the merits of the claim
as a prelude to the ultimate acceptance of responsibility by Congress,
which paid damages directly to the claimant by private bill. Sovereign
immunity did not block recovery; it ensured that each branch would
exercise the powers—legislative, executive, or judicial—that the
Constitution had assigned. Nor did official immunity play a role in the
determination of these claims—at least not in the form of a judge-made
doctrine that barred the courts from evaluating the conduct at issue. Courts
evaluated legality; Congress decided questions of agency and scope of
employment and adjusted official incentives accordingly.
No one would argue for a return to the world of the early republic and
its reliance on an indemnity practice managed through petitions to
Congress. However, something may be learned from the way the founding
generation allocated responsibility for the evaluation of the legality of
government conduct and the ultimate payment of compensation. All agreed
that the government should pay when it was determined that its officers
acting within the scope of their duties had violated the law, strictly
construed. All agreed that the courts were to make this evaluation in the
first instance. The rule of strict official liability that Chief Justice Marshall
applied in Little v. Barreme was less an act of judicial hubris than one of
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judicial deference to the institutional arrangements that Madison and the
Republicans in Congress had helped to put in place. One finds similar
deference in Maley v. Shattuck, where the Marshall Court agreed to hear an
amicably arranged dispute that effectively ran against the federal
government. While these conclusions do not necessarily undermine the
Court’s modern management of the doctrines of sovereign and official
immunity, they certainly invite further study. One can fairly ask whether
victims of positive government wrongdoing would fare better in 1810 or
2010.
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APPENDIX
TABLE 1
TABLE ABBREVIATIONS
Definition

C

Claims

CM

Commerce and
Manufactures

Category
Relief
Sought

Code

Code

Definition

D

Defense

DJ

Defense of Judgment

Judiciary

J

Judgment

Naval Affairs

A

Adverse Report

S

Select

MA

Military Affairs

WH

Whole House

WM

Ways and Means

Committee Action

J
NA

ASB

Agreed to Senate Bill

F

Reported Favorable Bill

I

Indefinite

NA

No Action

EM

Enlistment of a Minor

DLT

Discharged and Laid on
Table

F

Fraud

DWLTW

Discharged with Leave
To Withdraw

MP

Malicious Prosecution

LT

Laid on Table

LTW

Leave To Withdraw

NCA

No Congressional Action

P

Passed

PWA

Passed with Amendment

Refused Entry
Seizure of Person

SPO

Seizure of Property

TPO

Trespass on Property

C

Citizen

RCC

Referred to Court of
Claims

MO

Military Officer

RCW

Referred to Committee of
the Whole

MS

Marshal

X

Postponed

PO

Postal Officer

P

Paid Amount Owed by
Officer

RC

Revenue Collector

R

Reimbursed Officer

GO

General Orders

SA

Vested Superior Officer
with Settlement Authority

SO

Specific Orders

U

Unknown

Last Action

RE
SPE

Relief Granted

Authority

Agent Type

Claim Type

Committee

Category
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TABLE 2

Party

Committee

Claim Type

Agent Type

Authority

Relief Sought

Comm. Action

Last Action

Cong. Session

Amount
Requested

No. of
Attempts

Relief
Granted

Date of Last
Cong. Action

OFFICERS PETITIONING THE HOUSE

Beesley,
Maurice309

C

SPO

MO

SO

J

I

X

5

N/A

2

None

Mar. 2,
1799

Hastings,
Jonathan310

C

F

PO

GO

D

A

LTW

7

N/A

1

None

Feb. 12,
1803

Stille,
James311

C

TPO

MO

GO

DJ

A

DWLTW

8

N/A

2

None

Dec. 28,
1803

Murray,
Alexander312

C

SPO

MO

GO

DJ

F

P

8

$14,930.30
+ costs

1

R

Jan. 31,
1805

Adams,
Francis313

C

SPO

RC

GO

J

A

NCA

9

$56.86

2

None

Jan. 7,
1806

Little,
George314

C

SPO

MO

GO

DJ

F

P

9

$10,245.96
+ costs

3

R

Jan. 17,
1807

Gelston,
David315

CM

MP

RC

SO

DJ

F

P

9

N/A

1

R

Feb. 5,
1807

Randall,
John316

CM

SPO

RC

GO

J

NA

NCA

11

N/A

1

None

June 15,
1809

Brent,
John317

CM

SPO

RC

GO

J

NA

NCA

11

N/A

2

None

Mar. 9,
1810

309 H.R. JOURNAL, 5th Cong., 1st Sess. 274 (1798); 1 DIGESTED SUMMARY AND
ALPHABETICAL LIST OF PRIVATE CLAIMS WHICH HAVE BEEN PRESENTED TO THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES FROM THE FIRST THROUGH THE THIRTY-FIRST CONGRESS 117 (Washington,
Wm. M. Belt 1853) [hereinafter 1 DIGESTED SUMMARY OF PRIVATE CLAIMS].
310 H.R. JOURNAL, 7th Cong., 2d Sess. 316 (1803); 2 DIGESTED SUMMARY AND
ALPHABETICAL LIST OF PRIVATE CLAIMS WHICH HAVE BEEN PRESENTED TO THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES FROM THE FIRST THROUGH THE THIRTY-FIRST CONGRESS 50 (Washington,
Wm. M. Belt 1853) [hereinafter 2 DIGESTED SUMMARY OF PRIVATE CLAIMS].
311 H.R. JOURNAL, 8th Cong., 1st Sess. 468 (1803); 3 DIGESTED SUMMARY AND
ALPHABETICAL LIST OF PRIVATE CLAIMS WHICH HAVE BEEN PRESENTED TO THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES FROM THE FIRST THROUGH THE THIRTY-FIRST CONGRESS 410 (Washington,
Wm. M. Belt 1853) [hereinafter 3 DIGESTED SUMMARY OF PRIVATE CLAIMS].
312 Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64 (1804); H.R. REP. NO. 8-44 (2d
Sess. 1805), reprinted in 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: NAVAL AFFAIRS, supra note 18, at 128; 2
DIGESTED SUMMARY OF PRIVATE CLAIMS, supra note 310, at 546.
313 H.R. JOURNAL, 8th Cong., 2d Sess. 49–50 (1804); H.R. JOURNAL, 9th Cong., 1st Sess. 228
(1806); 1 DIGESTED SUMMARY OF PRIVATE CLAIMS, supra note 309, at 5.
314 Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170 (1804); H.R. REP. NO. 8-46 (2d Sess. 1805),
reprinted in 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: NAVAL AFFAIRS, supra note 18, at 138; 2 DIGESTED
SUMMARY OF PRIVATE CLAIMS, supra note 310, at 327.
315 H.R. JOURNAL, 9th Cong., 2d Sess. 506 (1807); 1 DIGESTED SUMMARY OF PRIVATE
CLAIMS, supra note 309, at 704.
316 3 DIGESTED SUMMARY OF PRIVATE CLAIMS, supra note 311, at 142.
317 H.R. JOURNAL, 11th Cong., 1st Sess. 59 (1809); H.R. JOURNAL, 11th Cong., 2d Sess. 274
(1810); 1 DIGESTED SUMMARY OF PRIVATE CLAIMS, supra note 309, at 187.
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Beale,
William318

WM

SPE

C

SO

DJ

NA

NCA

20

N/A

1

None

Feb. 16,
1829

Ellis,
Samuel319

CM

SPO

MS

SO

DJ

F

P

13

N/A

3

SA

Mar. 13,
1814

Sands,
Joshua320

WM

SPO

RC

GO

J

F

P

13

N/A

3

R

Feb. 27,
1815

Rodgers,
John321

S

SPO

MO

GO

J

F

P

14

N/A

1

R

Feb. 15,
1816

Hampton,
Wade322

C

SPE

MO

GO

J

NA

DLT

14

$6000
+ costs

1

None

Feb. 14,
1817

Berry,
Joseph323

C

SPE

MO

SO

DJ

NA

NCA

15

N/A

1

None

Mar. 16,
1818

Gelston,
David II324

WM

SPO

RC

SO

J

F

P

15

$107,369.43
+ costs

3

R

Mar. 21,
1818

Rodgers,
John II325

S

SPO

MO

GO

D

F

P

15

$43,250
+ costs

1

R

Apr. 11,
1818

Brown,
Jacob326

C

SPE

MO

GO

J

F

P

15

$669.81

1

R

Apr. 18,
1818

Austin,
Loring327

C

SPE

MO

GO

J

F

P

15

$6673.90

1

SA

Apr. 20,
1818

Wells,
George328

C

SPE

MO

SO

J

F

P

15

N/A

1

None

Apr. 20,
1818

Pool(e),
Benjamin329

WM

SPO

RC

GO

D

F

P

15

N/A

1

R

Feb. 20,
1819

Worsham,
Alexander330

C

EM

MO

GO

J

A

LT

16

N/A

1

None

Mar. 23,
1820

318 H.R. JOURNAL, 20th Cong., 2d Sess. 289 (1829); 1 DIGESTED SUMMARY OF PRIVATE
CLAIMS, supra note 309, at 106.
319 H.R. REP. NO. 13-35 (1st Sess. 1814); H.R. JOURNAL, 12th Cong., 1st Sess. 264 (1812); 1
DIGESTED SUMMARY OF PRIVATE CLAIMS, supra note 309, at 586–87.
320 Sands v. Knox, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 499 (1806); H.R. REP. NO. 13-71 (2d Sess. 1815); 3
DIGESTED SUMMARY OF PRIVATE CLAIMS, supra note 311, at 263.
321 H.R. REP. NO. 14-138 (1st Sess. 1816), reprinted in 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: NAVAL
AFFAIRS, supra note 18, at 408; 3 DIGESTED SUMMARY OF PRIVATE CLAIMS, supra note 311, at
220.
322 H.R. JOURNAL, 14th Cong., 2d Sess. 389–91 (1817); S. JOURNAL, 14th Cong., 2d Sess.
237–38 (1817); 2 DIGESTED SUMMARY OF PRIVATE CLAIMS, supra note 310, at 23.
323 H.R. JOURNAL, 15th Cong., 1st Sess. 344 (1818); 1 DIGESTED SUMMARY OF PRIVATE
CLAIMS, supra note 309, at 131.
324 Gelston v. Hoyt, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 246 (1818); H.R. JOURNAL, 15th Cong., 1st Sess. 331
(1818); 1 DIGESTED SUMMARY OF PRIVATE CLAIMS, supra note 309, at 704.
325 3 DIGESTED SUMMARY OF PRIVATE CLAIMS, supra note 311, at 220.
326 H.R. REP. NO. 15-387, at 551 (1st Sess. 1818); 1 DIGESTED SUMMARY OF PRIVATE
CLAIMS, supra note 309, at 207.
327 H.R. REP. NO. 15-379, at 545 (1st Sess. 1818); 1 DIGESTED SUMMARY OF PRIVATE
CLAIMS, supra note 309, at 57.
328 H.R. JOURNAL, 15th Cong., 1st Sess. 417–18 (1818); 3 DIGESTED SUMMARY OF PRIVATE
CLAIMS, supra note 311, at 608.
329 3 DIGESTED SUMMARY OF PRIVATE CLAIMS, supra note 311, at 99.
330 H.R. JOURNAL, 15th Cong., 1st Sess. (1817); 3 DIGESTED SUMMARY OF PRIVATE CLAIMS,
supra note 311, at 702.
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Steele,
John331

WH

RE

RC

SO

J

F

PWA

16

N/A

1

R

May 1,
1820

Wilkinson,
James332

S

SPE

MO

GO

J

F

P

16

$2500
+ costs

2

P

May 11,
1820

Bates,
Alexander333

C

SPO

MO

SO

DJ

NA

NCA

18

N/A

1

None

Jan. 12,
1824

Dixon,
Luther334

MA

SPE

MO

GO

DJ

NA

DLT

18

$300
+ costs

4

None

Feb. 10,
1824

Clark(e),
Archibald335

WH

SPO

RC

GO

J

F

P

18

N/A

1

R

May 19,
1824

Johnston,
George336

C

SPO

RC

SO

J

F

P

19

$1241.81

1

R

Feb. 5,
1827

Wilkinson,
Jesse337

NA

SPO

MO

GO

J

F

P

20

N/A

2

U

May 24,
1828

Flournoy,
Thomas338

J

SPE

MO

GO

J

F

P

20

$2500
+ costs

1

P

Feb. 12,
1829

Conard,
John339

J

SPO

MS

SO

J

F

P

21

$240,000

1

P

May 29,
1830

Cutler,
Enos340

MA

SPO

MO

GO

DJ

F

P

21

N/A

1

P

May 29,
1830

Payne,
M.M.341

MA

SPO

MO

GO

D

F

P

21

N/A

1

R

May 29,
1830

Dibble,
Solomon342

C

N/A

MO

SO

DJ

A

LT

22

N/A

1

None

Dec. 31,
1831

Brown,
Harvey343

J

SPO

MO

GO

DJ

F

P

22

$1041

1

R

July 14,
1832

331

3 DIGESTED SUMMARY OF PRIVATE CLAIMS, supra note 311, at 396.
H.R. JOURNAL, 16th Cong., 1st Sess. 216 (1820); 3 DIGESTED SUMMARY OF PRIVATE
CLAIMS, supra note 311, at 649.
333 H.R. JOURNAL, 18th Cong., 1st Sess. 130 (1824); 1 DIGESTED SUMMARY OF PRIVATE
CLAIMS, supra note 309, at 98.
334 H.R. JOURNAL, 16th Cong., 2d Sess. 265 (1821); 1 DIGESTED SUMMARY OF PRIVATE
CLAIMS, supra note 309, at 519–20.
335 1 DIGESTED SUMMARY OF PRIVATE CLAIMS, supra note 309, at 329.
336 H.R. REP. NO. 19-159, at 1–4 (1st Sess. 1826); 2 DIGESTED SUMMARY OF PRIVATE
CLAIMS, supra note 310, at 207.
337 H.R. REP. NO. 20-192 (1st Sess. 1828); 3 DIGESTED SUMMARY OF PRIVATE CLAIMS, supra
note 311, at 649.
338 H.R. REP. NO. 19-62, at 1–2 (2d Sess. 1827); 1 DIGESTED SUMMARY OF PRIVATE CLAIMS,
supra note 309, at 646.
339 H.R. REP. NO. 21-323 (1st Sess. 1830); 1 DIGESTED SUMMARY OF PRIVATE CLAIMS, supra
note 309, at 377.
340 H.R. JOURNAL, 21st Cong., 1st Sess. 144 (1829); 1 DIGESTED SUMMARY OF PRIVATE
CLAIMS, supra note 309, at 444.
341 H.R. REP. NO. 21-193, at 1–2 (1st Sess. 1830); 3 DIGESTED SUMMARY OF PRIVATE
CLAIMS, supra note 311, at 34.
342 H.R. JOURNAL, 22d Cong., 1st Sess. 26 (1831); 1 DIGESTED SUMMARY OF PRIVATE
CLAIMS, supra note 309, at 510.
343 H.R. REP. NO. 22-74, at 1 (1st Sess. 1831); 1 DIGESTED SUMMARY OF PRIVATE CLAIMS,
supra note 309, at 206.
332
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Massias,
Abraham344

MA

SPE

MO

GO

J

F

P

22

$1000

1

P

Mar. 2,
1833

Renshaw,
James345

NA

N/A

MO

N/A

D

NA

DLT

23

N/A

1

None

Apr. 22,
1834

Jouet,
William346

WH

N/A

MO

N/A

N/A

ASB

P

23

N/A

1

U

Nov. 3,
1835

Scott,
Samuel347

C

SPE

MO

GO

J

A

LT

24

$530.31

1

None

Jan. 13,
1836

Burt, Joel348

C

SPO

RC

GO

J

A

LT

24

$1573.03

2

None

Jan. 29,
1836

Adams,
James349

C

SPO

MO

SO

J

A

LT

24

$605.57

3

None

Mar. 3,
1836

Lewis,
Andrew350

C

SPO

MO

SO

D

A

LT

27

N/A

1

None

Mar. 17,
1842

Delany,
John351

C

SPE

MO

GO

DJ

F

PWA

27

$839.81

1

R

May 25,
1842

Cline,
John352

C

SPO

MO

SO

DJ

F

P

27

$573.27

3

R

July 9,
1842

Mitchell,
Nathaniel353

C

MP

PO

GO

J

F

P

27

N/A

4

R

July 27,
1842

Morrow,
James354

J

SPE

MO

GO

DJ

F

P

27

$1114.57

2

R

July 27,
1842

Clay,
Cassius355

C

TPO

MO

SO

J

F

RCW

30

N/A

1

None

Feb. 28,
1849

344 H.R. REP. NO. 22-176, at 1–18 (1st Sess. 1832); 2 DIGESTED SUMMARY OF PRIVATE
CLAIMS, supra note 310, at 397.
345 H.R. JOURNAL, 23d Cong., 1st Sess. 190 (1834); 3 DIGESTED SUMMARY OF PRIVATE
CLAIMS, supra note 311, at 167.
346 2 DIGESTED SUMMARY OF PRIVATE CLAIMS, supra note 310, at 222.
347 H.R. REP. NO. 24-128, at 1–2 (1st Sess. 1836); 3 DIGESTED SUMMARY OF PRIVATE
CLAIMS, supra note 311, at 282.
348 H.R. REP. NO. 24-255, at 1–2 (1st Sess. 1836); H.R. REP. NO. 24-233, at 1–2 (2d Sess.
1837).
349 H.R. JOURNAL, 15th Cong., 1st Sess. 433 (1818); H.R. JOURNAL, 24th Cong., 1st Sess. 457
(1836); 1 DIGESTED SUMMARY OF PRIVATE CLAIMS, supra note 309, at 6.
350 S. REP. NO. 27-191, at 1–2 (2d Sess. 1842); 2 DIGESTED SUMMARY AND ALPHABETICAL
LIST OF PRIVATE CLAIMS WHICH HAVE BEEN PRESENTED TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
FROM THE THIRTY-SECOND THROUGH THE FORTY-FIRST CONGRESS, INCLUSIVE 424
(Washington, Gov’t Printing Office 1873) [hereinafter DIGESTED SUMMARY FROM THE THIRTYSECOND THROUGH THE FORTY-FIRST CONGRESS].
351 H.R. REP. NO. 27-752, at 1–8 (2d Sess. 1842); 1 DIGESTED SUMMARY OF PRIVATE
CLAIMS, supra note 309, at 479.
352 H.R. REP. NO. 27-1, at 1–2 (2d Sess. 1841); 1 DIGESTED SUMMARY OF PRIVATE CLAIMS,
supra note 309, at 347.
353 H.R. REP. NO. 25-780, at 1–3 (2d Sess. 1838); 2 DIGESTED SUMMARY OF PRIVATE
CLAIMS, supra note 310, at 503.
354 H.R. REP. NO. 27-272, at 1 (2d Sess. 1842); 2 DIGESTED SUMMARY OF PRIVATE CLAIMS,
supra note 310, at 531.
355 H.R. REP. NO. 30-131, at 1–4 (2d Sess. 1849); 1 DIGESTED SUMMARY OF PRIVATE
CLAIMS, supra note 309, at 341.
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Simonds,
Lewis356

NA

SPO

MO

GO

D

F

P

33

N/A

3

R

July 31,
1854

Mott,
Danford357

C

SPO

RC

GO

D

F

RCC

38

$2829.92

3

None

Jan. 27,
1865

356 H.R. REP. NO. 33-228, at 1–2 (1st Sess. 1854); DIGESTED SUMMARY FROM THE THIRTYSECOND THROUGH THE FORTY-FIRST CONGRESS, supra note 350, at 424.
357 DIGESTED SUMMARY FROM THE THIRTY-SECOND THROUGH THE FORTY-FIRST
CONGRESS, supra note 350, at 327.
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TABLE 3

Party

Committee

Claim Type

Agent Type

Authority

Relief Sought

Comm. Action

Last Action

Cong. Session

Amount
Requested

No. of
Attempts

Relief
Granted

Date of Last
Cong. Action

OFFICERS PETITIONING THE SENATE

Clark,
Ashael358

C

N/A

N/A

N/A

DJ

F

P

15

N/A

1

R

Apr. 11,
1818

Barrow,
Matthew359

MA

SPO

MO

SO

D

ASB

P

16

$20.37

1

R

Jan. 28,
1820

Swartwout,
Robert360

MA

SPO

RC

GO

J

F

P

16

$2500

1

P

Mar. 3,
1821

Purdy, Lt.
Cl.
Robert361

MA

SPE

MO

GO

J

F

P

17

$816.70

4

R

Mar. 3,
1823

Stockton,
Robert362

NA

SPO

MO

N/A

N/A

ASB

P

17

N/A

1

R

Mar. 3,
1823

Hook,
Josiah363

J

SPO

RC

GO

DJ

F

P

18

$6.46

3

R

May 18,
1824

Paschal,
George364

C

SPO

MO

SO

D

F

P

27

$291.62

3

R

Aug. 12,
1842

Mitchell,
D.D.365

MA

SPO

MO

SO

DJ

F

P

32

Approx.
$102,000

2

P

Feb. 10,
1863

358

1 DIGESTED SUMMARY OF PRIVATE CLAIMS, supra note 309, at 329.
Barrow v. Page, 6 Tenn. (5 Hayw.) 97 (1818); S. JOURNAL, 15th Cong., 2d Sess. 40
(1818); 1 DIGESTED SUMMARY OF PRIVATE CLAIMS, supra note 309, at 90.
360 H.R. REP. NO. 16-526, at 731–32 (1st Sess. 1820); 3 DIGESTED SUMMARY OF PRIVATE
CLAIMS, supra note 311, at 435.
361 Luty v. Purdy, 2 Tenn. (2 Overt.) 163 (1811); S. REP. NO. 17-610, at 874–75 (2d Sess.
1822).
362 S. JOURNAL, 17th Cong., 2d Sess. 176 (1823); 3 DIGESTED SUMMARY OF PRIVATE
CLAIMS, supra note 311, at 413.
363 S. REP. NO. 17-566, at 802 (1st Sess. 1822), reprinted in 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS:
CLAIMS, supra note 103, at 802; 2 DIGESTED SUMMARY OF PRIVATE CLAIMS, supra note 310, at
121.
364 H.R. REP. NO. 26-448, at 1–2 (1st Sess. 1840); 3 DIGESTED SUMMARY OF PRIVATE
CLAIMS, supra note 311, at 23.
365 S. REP. NO. 32-53, at 1–2 (1st Sess. 1852); DIGESTED SUMMARY FROM THE THIRTYSECOND THROUGH THE FORTY-FIRST CONGRESS, supra note 350, at 317.
359
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TABLE 4

Party

Committee

Claim Type

Agent Type

Authority

Relief Sought

Comm. Action

Last Action

Cong. Session

Amount
Requested

No. of
Attempts

Relief
Granted

Date of Last
Cong. Action

CLAIMANTS PETITIONING THE HOUSE

Paoly,
Paolo366

S

SPO

RC

GO

D

F

P

7

N/A

1

P

Apr. 14,
1802

Shattuck,
Jared367

C

SPO/
SPE

MO

GO

J

F

P

12

$33,244.67

1

P

Feb. 2,
1813

Hoyt,
Gould368

None

SPO

RC

GO

J

None

None

15

$200,000

1

P

Apr. 9,
1818

Shattuck,
Jared II369

C

SPO/
SPE

MO

GO

J

A

LT

18

Unpaid
interest

1

None

Jan. 2,
1824

N.Y. Ins.
Cos.370

WM

SPO

MS

SO

J

F

P

22

N/A

1

P

July 14,
1832

Bristol,
Charles371

C

SPO

RC

GO

J

A

LT

24

$1472.20

2

None

Feb. 16,
1837

Adams,
George372

WM

SPO

RC

GO

D

A

LT

27

$1585.65

2

None

Mar. 8,
1842

Diedrick,
Robert373

C

SPO

RC

GO

J

None

LT

26

$1505.31

1

None

Mar. 8,
1842

Hall,
Charles374

CM/
WH

SPO

RC

GO

J

F

RCW/P

27

$1705.28

3

P

Mar. 3,
1843

Kidd,
R. & B.375

WM

SPO

RC

GO

J

F

P

29

$2436.29

1

N/A

Aug. 10,
1846

Lee,
Oliver376

C

SPO

RC

GO

J

F

P

31

N/A

1

P

May 17,
1850

366 PAOLY REPORT, supra note 98; 3 DIGESTED SUMMARY OF PRIVATE CLAIMS, supra note
311, at 8.
367 Maley v. Shattuck, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 458 (1806); 3 DIGESTED SUMMARY OF PRIVATE
CLAIMS, supra note 311, at 309.
368 Gelston v. Hoyt, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 246 (1818); 2 DIGESTED SUMMARY OF PRIVATE
CLAIMS, supra note 310, at 140.
369 H.R. JOURNAL, 18th Cong., 2d Sess. 42 (1824); 3 DIGESTED SUMMARY OF PRIVATE
CLAIMS, supra note 311, at 301.
370 2 DIGESTED SUMMARY OF PRIVATE CLAIMS, supra note 310, at 570.
371 Bristol v. Burt, 7 Johns. 254 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1810); H.R. REP. NO. 24-255 (1st Sess. 1836);
H.R. REP. NO. 24-233, at 1–3 (2d Sess. 1837); 1 DIGESTED SUMMARY OF PRIVATE CLAIMS,
supra note 309, at 194.
372 H.R. REP. NO. 27-329, at 1–2 (2d Sess. 1842); 1 DIGESTED SUMMARY OF PRIVATE
CLAIMS, supra note 309, at 6.
373 H.R. REP. NO. 27-345, at 1 (2d Sess. 1842); 1 DIGESTED SUMMARY OF PRIVATE CLAIMS,
supra note 309, at 478.
374 2 DIGESTED SUMMARY OF PRIVATE CLAIMS, supra note 310, at 9.
375 Kidd v. Swartwout, 14 F. Cas. 457 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1843) (No. 7756); S. REP. NO. 29-164
(1st Sess. 1846); 2 DIGESTED SUMMARY OF PRIVATE CLAIMS, supra note 310, at 246.
376 2 DIGESTED SUMMARY OF PRIVATE CLAIMS, supra note 310, at 302.

